This book is a compilation of the best papers presented by participants of the first “Euro-Mediterranean Forum for Young Researchers” in the following two categories: “Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue” and “Euro-Mediterranean Relations”. The event, which took place in Istanbul between April 13-15, 2011 was jointly organized by Global Political Trends Center (GPoT Center) of Istanbul Kültür University, Chios Institute for Mediterranean Affairs (CIMA), Center for International and European Studies (CIES) of the Kadir Has University and the Euro-Mediterranean Observatory of the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM).

Authors: Nihan Akınçılır, Anna Alexieva, Jennifer Brindisi, Evinç Doğan, Amanda E. Rogers, Beatrice Schimmang
Edited By: Mensur Akgün, Lenka Petková

YOUNG MINDS RETHINKING THE MEDITERRANEAN
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INCLUDES CONTRIBUTIONS BY
Nihan Akıncılar
Anna Alexieva
Jennifer Brindisi
Evinç Doğan
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EDITED BY
Mensur Akgün
Lenka Peťková
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Global Political Trends Center of Istanbul Kültür University  
Chios Institute for Mediterranean Affairs  
Euro-Mediterranean Observatory of the Hellenic Centre for European Studies  
Center for International and European Studies of Kadir Has University

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## ABOUT THE AUTHORS

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Throughout history, much has been written on why wars and crises occur and why human beings kill each other or are often so ready to do so. While some blame human nature, state structures or the anarchic order within the international system, others hold prejudices and the “othering” or dehumanizing of those different from us as being responsible.

The region in which we live has particularly suffered a great deal from these violent processes. Nationalist ideologies, most of which were defined in opposition to one another, alienated “others,” abstracted them from their humanity, and made them subject to various kinds of tyranny. Turks, Bulgarians, Greeks and many others had their share in this process of mutual alienation. Across the Euro-Mediterranean region throughout history immigrations have been imposed, publics extorted, crises fomented, and interventions and wars suffered through.

The study in your hands sheds light on the processes of “othering” and alienation in large part responsible for this troubled history. It serves as a tool through which the past and the future can be understood. And it examines prejudice, the largest obstacle facing Turkey on its path to EU membership, while touching on various issues such as minority rights, the notion of culture, the role of symbols and other visual images in politics, the narration of culture within the capitalist order and its political outcomes, and finally the EU’s Mediterranean politics.

As mentioned in our partners’ prefaces, this book comprises six articles written by young researchers who shared their unique visions of the Mediterranean region during the first Euro-Mediterranean Forum for Young Researchers in Istanbul organized by Global Political Trends Center (GPoT Center) of Istanbul Kültür University, Chios Institute for Mediterranean Affairs (CIMA), the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM), and the Center for International and European Studies (CIES) of the Kadir Has University in April 2011. The authors of this publication interpret and analyze issues relevant to two particular Forum categories, i.e. “Intercultural and Interreligious Dialogue” and “Euro-Mediterranean Relations”. While the book has considerable academic value, it more importantly unveils these researchers’ “anti-othering” approaches to
Euro-Mediterranean affairs, their perception and understanding of the world they live in, and their willingness to change it.

On behalf of GPoT Center of Istanbul Kültür University, we are most delighted to publish this book and share the ideas and viewpoints of these young minds from various countries. We believe this publication will serve to help spread the writers’ visions of reconciliation and peace to societies in the region. We hope that you will also think likewise while reading it.

Mensur Akgün, Director & Lenka Petková, Project Assistant
Global Political Trends Center of Istanbul Kültür University
The Euro-Mediterranean Forum for Young Researchers could not possibly have been a more timely initiative.

Launched in May 2010 by the Chios Institute for Mediterranean Affairs (CIMA), a non-governmental, non-profit association of Greek law with headquarters on Chios island, a few miles off the Turkish city of Izmir, the Forum was, since its origins a truly joint undertaking between leading Greek and Turkish universities and research centers: CIMA and the Hellenic Centre for European Studies on the Greek side; and Centre for International and European Studies of the Kadir Has University as well as the Global Political Trends Center of the Istanbul Kültür University on the Turkish side. The close cooperation between Greek and Turkish academic institutions on this occasion sets an example to be followed by the whole Mediterranean region.

Yet, the Arab revolutions were to give a new meaning and dimension to this event. Indeed, the momentous events in Tunisia, Egypt and elsewhere brought a series of interrogations: what are the deep causes and likely consequences of these social movements? Should a certain “Turkish model” of cooperation between the religious and public spheres be emulated in the rest of the Arab world? Is a domino effect on the rest of the region a possible scenario? How should the international community react when authoritarian regimes oppress and kill civilians? What are the implications for the European Union and the Union for the Mediterranean?

A mere three months after President Ben Ali fled the country, the Istanbul Forum provided a platform for 120 doctoral students and researchers from 40 countries to debate these issues, discuss and get feedback on their ongoing research, find new partners for research projects and learn about publication opportunities in the Mediterranean, thanks to the kind cooperation of two influential scientific reviews: Mediterranean Politics and the International Journal of Euro-Mediterranean Studies.

I am delighted to present to you the best six articles on Euro-Mediterranean relations as well as on intercultural and inter-faith dialogue discussed during the Forum. These articles were selected by a jury of five members composed of Dr. Maria Gianniou (Greece), researcher at the Hellenic Centre for European Studies; Dr. Dimitrios Triantaphyllou (Greece), Assistant Professor at Kadir Has University and Director of the Centre for International and European Studies; Dr. Mensur Akgün (Turkey), Director of the Global Political Trends Center of Istanbul Kültür University; Dr. Münevver Cebeci (Turkey), Assistant
Professor at the European Union Center of the Marmara University; and Dr. Andreas von Staden (Germany), Assistant Professor at the University of St. Gallen and Member of the Scientific Board of the Chios Institute for Mediterranean Affairs.

I also hope the next issue of the Istanbul Forum will continue to increase our understanding of Euro-Mediterranean dynamics, thereby providing decision-makers with accurate analyses, without which there can be no genuine political change.

**Mathieu Rousselin, Forum Coordinator**
Former Scientific Director of the Chios Institute for Mediterranean Affairs
Researcher at the Centre for Governance and Culture in Europe,
University of St. Gallen
The Romans could not better describe the importance of the Mediterranean for the life of the people surrounding it: *Mare Nostrum*, our sea. A sea, a vital region, uniting the littoral civilizations commercially, socially, economically and politically. A region of prosperity, but also an area of instability and often great turmoil.

Like in the past, the two shores are still struggling to establish a balanced relationship based on genuine cooperation, equal burden sharing and commensurate benefits. The European Union currently approaches its southern partners through bilateral and inter-regional cooperation schemes and value exportation. This beneficial overture might present, at times, uncertain results. Nevertheless, it contributes to the establishment of a regional cooperation environment aiming at enhancing synergy between the Mediterranean states.

The Euro-Mediterranean Forum for Young Researchers aspires to become the leading paradigm for cooperation between young scholars of the Mediterranean region. The first meeting, which took place in Istanbul, in April 2011, highlighted not only the pertinence of the exchange of information and know-how, but brought also attention to the will of young researchers to understand and to communicate with “the other”.

The Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM), through its Euro-Mediterranean Observatory (EuroMedO), places great importance on the promotion of research and youth interaction. Based in Athens, at the heart of the Mediterranean Sea and at the meeting point between Europe and its neighbourhood, EKEM’s mission is to promote the analysis and understanding of the EU’s relations with the region. EKEM fosters cooperation with relevant regional research centres and has become a pole of attraction for young scholars around the Mediterranean region.

The event in Istanbul, organised by the Chios Institute for Mediterranean Affairs (CIMA), in cooperation with the Hellenic Centre for European Studies (EKEM), the Centre for International and European Studies (CIES) of the Kadir Has University, and the Global Political Trends Center (GPoT Center) of Istanbul Kültür University, paved the way for the establishment of a Mediterranean research milieu where cooperation and interaction will be able to flourish. It is our hope that this publication will enhance access regionally and globally to the thought-provoking work of the new generation of scholars of the Mediterranean.

Elena Lazarou, Head & Maria Gianniou, Senior Researcher
Euro-Mediterranean Observatory of the Hellenic Centre for European Studies
This joint publication is an example of synergies at various levels. First of all, it represents recognition for the work of those who conceived the Euro-Mediterranean Forum for Young Researchers. I would particularly like to single out Mathieu Rousselin of CIMA and the University of St. Gallen for his inspiration and diligence in keeping this project alive and making it a reality.

Secondly, the Euro-Mediterranean Forum for Young Researchers was a joint endeavor of institutions across borders whereby two Greek-based institutes, CIMA and EKEM, joined forces with two Istanbul-based counterparts, CIES and GPoT Center, whose human resources account for many nationalities for the Forum to take place.

Thirdly, all partner institutions played simultaneously a complementary yet fundamental role – CIMA by conceiving the Forum and doing a lot of the groundwork in ensuring that over 120 young researchers from over 35 countries gathered in Istanbul; CIES for hosting it by offering the Kadir Has campus, taking care of logistics during its three day duration, and contributing to the intellectual content of the program; EKEM for being actively involved during the duration of the Forum; and GPoT Center for taking the lead in publishing the six best papers written by promising young scholars.

For all the aforementioned reasons, the Center for International and European Studies (CIES) at Kadir Has University is proud to be associated with the Forum and this publication. The focus on the Euro-Mediterranean space is also one of the priority areas of the CIES as is the emphasis on empowering younger generations of scholars by providing them with appropriate forum to present their research results.

The Euro-Mediterranean area, apart from its long-standing relevance as a recognized region in terms of research and policy-making, is also at the center of the systemic changes brought about by the ongoing Arab “springs”. This makes this book project all the more timely, exciting, and relevant. In this regard, CIES is particularly honored to be a part of it.

Dimitrios Triantaphyllou, Director
Center for International and European Studies of Kadir Has University
ESSAYS BY PARTICIPANTS OF
THE EURO-MEDITERRANEAN FORUM FOR
YOUNG RESEARCHERS
THE EUROPEANIZATION OF MINORITY RIGHTS IN TURKEY: A COMPARISON WITH THE GREEK CASE

By Nihan Akıncılar

Abstract

In this paper, Europeanization of minority rights in Turkey will be explained in detail and in the conclusion part, it will be compared and contrasted with the Europeanization of minority rights in Greece. In this comparison, it is difficult to compare and contrast the mechanisms of Europeanization in Turkey and Greece because these mechanisms are suitable for the member states of the European Union (EU). For the candidate countries, the question of “how it is Europeanized” can be only answered with conditionality. Therefore, instead of trying to adapt Turkey in the case of minority rights to the mechanisms of Europeanization for the member states, in this study, it will be dealt with how the EU matters in affecting the minority rights protection in candidate and member states. Therefore, what this study implies when it is expected to explain Europeanization of minority rights in Turkey is not to handle this case through the Europeanization theories, but how the EU affects the candidate countries through conditionality.

I argue that while the EU has too much affected Turkey in the case of minority rights protection through political conditionality for its membership since the Helsinki European Council of 1999, Greece as a member state of the EU since 1981 has not paid much more attention than Turkey in regards to its minority rights problems. In order to explain this argument, firstly, minority rights in the EU context will be given. Then, the Greek case in terms of the minority rights protection will be shortly mentioned. Lastly, the developments in the minority rights in Turkey will be explained through the conditionality mechanism of Europeanization. At the end of this paper, the two countries will be compared and contrasted in terms of to what extent the EU has affected them in the improvement of minority rights protection.

Keywords: Europeanization, Turkey, Greece, minority rights
Introduction

After the end of the Second World War, the first wave of European studies analyzed the integration theories, especially after the establishment of the European Economic Community (EEC). These studies possessed a post-ontological view, which means that they accepted European integration as a given so they did not research the process of integration but after it. Then, the second wave of European studies dealt with the top-down interaction between the European Union (EU) and the member states, which can be summarized as the impact of the EU on member states’ domestic policies. Since the end of the Cold War, Europeanization theories have gained impetus with the third wave of European studies, which have claimed that Europeanization is not European integration but much related to it. Initially, Claudio M. Radaelli (2003), Tanja A. Börzel and Thomas Risse (2003), Frank Schimmelfennig and Ulrich Sedelmeier (2006) and Simon Bulmer (2006) dealt with the Europeanization theory which created a new set of research agendas. In theorizing Europeanization, these theorists have asked three main questions. Firstly, they have asked what is Europeanized, which is answered with the domains of Europeanization. Secondly, they have asked how it is Europeanized, answered through the mechanisms of Europeanization. And thirdly, they have asked to what extent it is Europeanized, answered with the directions of Europeanization. These above mentioned theorists have asked the same questions but the answers to them may differ from each other. That is, they have added different answers to these questions while trying to explain both bottom-up and top-down interaction between the EU and its member states.

In this paper, Europeanization of minority rights in Turkey will be explained in detail and in the conclusion part; it will be compared and contrasted with the Europeanization of minority rights in Greece. In this comparison, it is difficult to compare and contrast the mechanisms of Europeanization in Turkey and in Greece because these mechanisms are suitable for the member states of the EU, which is especially the case for Radaelli’s (2003) classification of mechanisms. For the candidate countries, according to the studies of Börzel (2003), the question of “how it is Europeanized” can be only answered with conditionality. Therefore, instead of trying to adapt Turkey in the case of minority rights to the mechanisms of Europeanization for the member states, in this study, it will be dealt with how the European Union matters in affecting the minority rights protection in candidate and member states. Therefore, what this study implies
when it is expected to explain the Europeanization of minority rights in Turkey is not to handle this case through the Europeanization theories, but how the EU affects the candidate countries through the conditionality.

In the literature, there are several studies in the area of the Europeanization of minority rights in Turkey and Greece. In his article, Ioannis N. Grigoriadis (2008) understands Europeanization as “the emergence and development at the European level of distinct structures of governance” (Risse, Green Cowles, & Caporaso, 2001, p. 3), so in this way he explores the Europeanization of minority rights protection in Turkey and Greece as “how Greece and Turkey responded to European pressures to reform their illiberal minority policies” (Grigoriadis, 2008, p. 23). On the other hand, Dia Anagnostou (2005), in her article, understands Europeanization as “the emergence of European norms and institutions and their impact on domestic policies and practices” (p. 335). Hence, just like Grigoriadis, she emphasizes on the degree of ‘fit’ between national and European norms and institutions in terms of the minority rights protection. Because there has been ‘misfit’ (Börzel & Risse, 2003) between both Turkey and Greece and the EU in the case of minority rights protection, the EU has been exerting adaptational pressures on these countries in order to transfer its norms and policies, even though it does not have a standard minority rights policy, to them. Like these above mentioned studies, the author of this paper also agrees with Grigoriadis and Anagnostou that in the case of Europeanization of the minority rights protection in Turkey and Greece, the term ‘Europeanization’ should be used as the European Union’s impact on the two countries through transposing its norms and policies.

In this paper, it is argued that while the European Union has too much affected Turkey in the case of minority rights protection through political conditionality for its membership since the Helsinki European Council of 1999, Greece as a member state of the EU since 1981 has not paid much more attention to its minority rights problems than Turkey. In order to explain this argument, firstly, minority rights in the EU context will be given. Then, the Greek case in terms of the minority rights protection will be shortly mentioned. Lastly, the developments in the minority rights in Turkey will be explained through the conditionality mechanism of the Europeanization. At the end of this paper, the two countries will be compared and contrasted in terms of to what extent the EU has affected them in the improvement of minority rights protection.
Minority Rights in Europe

Until the end of the Cold War, the European Union ignored the minority problem in Europe. This stems from the general understanding of the European countries after the end of the Second World War, which on the one hand, relied on the fear of the countries from the probable separatist movements of the minorities, and on the other hand, the European countries’ prediction of the ipso facto solution for the minority problems in the era of European integration (Saraçlı, 2007, p. 48). This realist understanding of the European countries led to the disregard of the protection of national minorities during the Cold War era. Nevertheless, after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia, 28 new states emerged with their new minorities. “The rights and obligations of minorities have become an acute question for minority peoples, for the states in which they dwell and for the European order generally” (Miall, 1994, p. 1). Therefore,

establishing minority rights – that is, the rights of minorities to receive equal treatment, to practise their culture, religion and language, and to participate fully in the political and economic life of the state – appears to be one of the more promising approaches to this problem. (Miall, 1994, p. 2)

In order to establish minority rights in European countries and to create a standard minority rights policy, the Council of Europe (CoE) and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE since 1995 / Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe 1975-95) took the lead.

In fact, Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (1953) and Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966), which is still problematic due to its limitations (see Thornberry, 1994, p. 15), are the first measures to the protection of minority rights in which for the first time until that time the term ‘minority’ is used.

Starting from its establishment until the end of the Cold War, the European Union had paid secondary importance to minority rights issues. However, since the early 1990s, the Union has utterly relied on the mechanisms created by the CoE and the OSCE in order to deal with minority problems. First, the EU has accepted the European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages (1992) as its legal basis for the protection of minority rights. Then, it adopted the CoE Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) in 1995. On the other hand, in December 1992, a resolution was adopted by the
United Nations (UN), which includes the Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities. These three documents can be regarded as a “new international minimum standard for minority rights” in the early 1990s (Thornberry, 1994, p. 16).

Although these main documents of minority rights have been accepted in the early 1990s, there has still been no one agreed definition of the term ‘minority’. The European Union has not worked to overcome this problem because the minority rights issue has not been given priority by the EU. That is, the stability of institutions providing democracy, the rule of law and the existence of a functioning market economy have always had precedence over the protection of minority rights, which can be seen in the Copenhagen criteria.

Greek Case: Turkish/Muslim Minority in Western Thrace

After the homogenization and Hellenization attempts of Greece during the early 20th century, the country has only accepted Muslims as its officially

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1 The rise of nationalism in the Balkan Peninsula led to the Balkan wars between 1912 and 1914 and then, to the First World War between 1914 and 1918. Now, these warring countries tried to establish their own nation-states and in order to purify it, especially Turkey, Greece and Bulgaria, wanted to get rid off their minorities and/or those who did not have minority status but had other nationality origin. First, in 1919 after the end of the First World War, Greece and Bulgaria signed the Treaty of Neuilly, which decided to a Voluntarily Population Exchange between the two countries (Pentzopoulos, 2002). Within a short period of time, approximately 30,000 Greeks left Bulgaria while about 53,000 Bulgarians left Greek Thrace. Just after this exchange, the Turkish War of Independence started in 1919 and continued up until 1923. At the end of the war between Turkey and Greece, the Treaty of Lausanne was signed in July 1923, in which the independence of the Turkish Republic was officially recognized. During the negotiations of Lausanne Conference, an important issue was decided by Turkey and Greece concerning the Turkish residents in Greece and Greek residents in Turkey. An obligatory Population Exchange seemed a good solution for the homogenization of both countries (Özkirimli & Sofos, 2008, pp. 145-178), for a Muslim Turkey and an Orthodox Christian Greece (Clark, 2008, p. 15), as newly established nation-states. Thus, almost 1.2 million Greeks left Turkey, with the exception of Greeks in Istanbul, Bozcaada/Tenedos, and Gökçeada/Imbros while around 355,000 Muslim Turks left Greece, with the exception of Turks living in Western Thrace (Hirschon, 2004, pp.14-15). This Population Exchange created a lot of difficulties for both Turkish and Greek migrants. For example, they had to reluctantly leave their immovables, jobs, friends and money where they had lived for centuries. More importantly, the migrants could not easily adapt to their new lives because Turkish people did not accept the newcomers as real Turks, likewise, Greek public saw the newcomers as the Turkified Greeks.

In order to solve this problem, Turkey and Greece had formed a Joint Commission and signed Athens Agreement in 1923, and Ankara Agreements in 1930, under which “Turkey and Greece officially recognized the existing territorial boundaries and accepted naval parity in the eastern Mediterranean” (Gallant, 2001, p. 153), and in 1933. These agreements aimed at securing the rights and properties of Muslim Turks in Western Thrace.

Moreover, Jews of Salonika became a target of Greek officials so they tried to expel those Jews with a huge pressure and violence in the summer of 1931.
recognized minority group and tried to assimilate Slovac-speaking Bulgarians, Pomaks, Roma in Western Thrace and Jews in Salonika. It is obvious that the country has not accepted the national diversities. In fact, Greece adopted it as a state policy in order to balance Turkey, which has maintained its Ottoman tradition of the acknowledgement of only non-Muslims as the official minorities. This reciprocal relationship has remained up until now.

Greece severed the legal and social conditions for minorities especially with the beginning of the Second World War. Because just after the Second World War, civil war started throughout the country in 1946, and the discrimination towards the minorities reached to its peak. This attempt was legitimized with the acceptance of Greek Citizenship Code in 1955, especially with the discriminatory Article 19 for minorities.

Having its origins at a Presidential Decree of 1927, Article 19 of the National Code, which was established by Legislative Decree 3370 in 1955, stated that, 'A Greek citizen of non-Greek descent (allogenis) who left the Greek territory with no intent of return may be declared as having lost his Greek citizenship.' (Grigoriadis, 2008, p. 25)

Greek governments had implemented this legislative act in order to deport Muslim Turks from Western Thrace starting from 1955 until 1998 when it was abolished. As a response to September 6-7, 1955 events which organized in Istanbul by hyper-nationalists against Rum citizens with the usage of Cyprus issue, and to the deportation of Rum citizens again with the same excuse in 1964, Greek officials deported approximately 60,000 Thracians, the majority (50,000) of which were Muslim Turks, and annihilated their Greek citizenship until 1998. That is to say,

. . . the deprivation of citizenship on the basis of Article 19 was part and parcel of a broader set of informal but widespread restrictive measures instituted by Greek governments appealing to the need to balance out the demographic decline of the Greek population in Istanbul. (Anagnostou, 2005, p. 338)

Afterwards, Colonel Georgios Papadopoulos made a coup d’etat on April 21, 1967 and established a seven-year long dictatorship which ended up in July 1974 with the Cyprus catastrophe. During this dictatorship era, discrimination against minority rights became the most prevalent issue throughout the Greek history. Soon after the foundation of the junta, the relations between Greece and
the CoE and the EEC became frozen in 1969 due to the violations of the human and minority rights. Furthermore, after the Turkish intervention to Cyprus, Greek dictatorship was abolished in June 1974. Then, democracy was started to consolidate and democratization process has been started in every realm of the state. In 1975, Greece approved a new and more democratic Constitution in terms of human rights protection. This attempt of Greece was rewarded by the re-admission to the CoE and six years later by the EC membership in 1981.

However, this new Constitution did not abolish the Article 19. On the contrary, Article 4 was put to the constitution which stated that (para. 3) “a Greek citizen may be deprived of his/her nationality only if s/he voluntarily acquires a new nationality or if s/he undertakes services abroad contrary to national interest” (Anagnostou, 2005, p. 339). This contradicts Article 19 whereas Article 111 (para. 6) was kept in force “until its repeal by law” (Anagnostou, 2005, p. 339). In addition to this, Greek government gave back about 1,000 citizenships to those deprived in the first years of the newly established democracy.

In 1981, Greece was accepted to the EEC as a full member relatively easier than post-1993 period. Afterwards, European pressure for the improvement of human and minority rights in Greece has risen because the impact of the EC has been added to the binding power of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) to which Greece became a party.

The sharp Europeanization and democratization attempts started in 1990 with the election of Konstantinos Mitsotakis as the leader of New Democracy. He tried to restore relations with the EC which was not so good during the previous PASOK government.

In June 1989, two Turkish Thracians were elected as independent MPs to the Parliament. Mitsotakis supported them a lot because he believed in equality of all Greek citizens and according to him, minority status had to be given in terms of national diversities, that is, Turks, Pomaks and Roma should have been granted minority status. In this way, he possessed the slogan ‘legal equality – equal citizenship’. Nevertheless, because these two Turkish MPs insisted on their Turkishness with the government support, big riots among Greeks living in Western Thrace were held in Komotini (Gümülçine) in January 1990. The pressure of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was added to these events, hence, the Greek government felt itself incumbent to improve conditions for the Turkish minority in terms of minority rights protection. Mitsotakis’ visit to Western Thrace in May 1991, therefore, had a big meaning. He arrived at a decision that due to the underdevelopment of Western Thrace,
this minority problem occurred. Consequently, he suggested political and economic liberalization of the country, especially of this region. Besides, the Mitsotakis government had ratified the European Charter of Regional and Minority Languages (ECRML) in 1992. However, he did not still abolish Article 19 and continued to accept only Muslims as a religious minority group.

Besides, a new era had started in the EU history with the acceptance of Copenhagen criteria in 1993. From then on, states fulfill these requirements in order to become a member of the EU. Despite the fact that Andreas Papandreuou’s nationalistic government did not care this improvement between 1993 and 1996, the new leader of PASOK and the successor Prime Minister of the country, Konstantinos Simitis, aimed at full integration into the EU. In order to improve minority rights protection, Greece ratified UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (1966) in 1996 with the reservation of Article 27 but this was dropped in 1997. Moreover, Greek government also signed CoE Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (FCNM) in 1995 but has not ratified yet. The country also signed European Convention on Nationality in 1997. Nevertheless, Greece has still not signed the CoE European Charter for Regional or Minority Languages since 1992. Hence, these international conventions and the ECtHR together forced the country in order to develop the legal conditions of minorities and wanted Greece to abolish Article 19. After the Monitoring Committee of the CoE decided in November 1997 to hold a meeting in early 1998 to discuss Article 19 of the Greek Citizenship Code, Simitis’ government unanimously decided to abolish this article in January 1998.

Since the early 2000s, the Greek governments have dealt with the minority rights problems of Muslim Turks in Greece as a reciprocal problem with Turkey. Thus, the country still has problems in implementation of the newly accepted laws. Apart from the full integration of Greece into the EU in terms of Europeanization of its policies, laws, politics and economics, the signature of several international agreements on minority rights, and the abolition of Article 19 of Greek Citizenship Code as a big improvement for minority rights, there is no real direct impact of the EU policies on Greece.

**Turkish Case: Greek/Rum Minority in Turkey**

After the end of the First World War and the Turkish War of Independence, the Turkish Republic was established with the signature of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923. During the negotiations of this treaty, Turkey and Greece mutually
decided to grant minority status only in terms of religious diversity in their own countries. That is, only Greeks, Armenians and Jews were officially granted a minority status in Turkey.

Starting from the establishment of Turkey up until the mid-1970s, the rise of nationalism throughout Turkey led in times to create hyper-nationalist attempts against non-Muslim minorities.\(^2\) Besides these attacks, the three official

\(^2\) In 1928, ‘Citizen, Speak Turkish!’ Campaign was announced by the Republican People’s Party (RPP). This campaign was accepted in the National Assembly in order to assimilate non-Muslims who did not speak Turkish among each other. Actually, Jews did not even know Turkish at all. Thus, this campaign was used towards those Jews living in Thrace by hyper-nationalist residents and anti-Semitic publications. This pressure with the government support reached to its peak in 1934 and Thracian Jewry had to leave either the country or only the Thrace and resettled in Istanbul. Likewise, Armenian minority who were left over after the 1915 Armenian forced migration and survived in interior and eastern parts of Anatolia, were forced to leave their habitations and to resettle in Istanbul between 1929 and 1934. At the end of 1930s, Kemalist elite’s goal had been finished by gathering almost all Jews, Armenians and Rums in Istanbul. From then on, they had been trying to force them to leave the country, that is, to deport them from Istanbul with the state deterrence policies but this should have seemed like a voluntary migration to the international arena. Since the early 1910s, Turkish ruling elites were aware that monopoly of bourgeoisie had been in the hands of the non-Muslim minorities. This bothered them a lot so they tried to create a ‘national bourgeoisie’ in order to Turkify the economy. The first visible attempt in order to remove minorities from economic life was the implementation of ‘Wealth Tax’ in 1942 which was accepted in the National Assembly with the claim of balancing and distributing properties of minorities. The actual aim behind the scenes was to impoverish the non-Muslim minorities and eliminate them from the competition in the national economy. Instead, the RPP government tried to create a new wealthy Turkish Muslim bourgeoisie. If some minority citizens could not afford the tax, they were sent either to Sirkeci or to Aşkale camps in order to work there until they could pay the tax to the Turkish state. This heavy burden was suddenly abolished in September 1943 due to the critical publications of the producer of New York Times about the Wealth Tax. For the first time, detailed news about the Wealth Tax took place in the Allied Powers’ press (Aktar, 2000, p. 151), so this led to the removal of the tax enforcement. Although the RPP government promised to give back the paid taxes to non-Muslims, it did not happen. Therefore, Turkish minority citizens lost their reliance to the state and a number of them emigrated from Turkey, which was shown to the international actors as a voluntary migration. Afterwards, Democrat Party (DP) was established in 1946 as the opposition party which introduced the multiparty system to Turkey. In fact, Turkey followed the international trends, that is, until the end of the Second World War one-party governments were common among the European countries, but after the Second World War, a democratization wave spread thoroughly starting from the Yalta Conference. Because the DP used a pro-minority speech in order to get their votes, which was a big deal to exceed RPP’s votes, almost all non-Muslim minorities gave their votes to the DP and it came to the power in 1950. It’s very ironic that minorities expected positive improvements about minority rights protection from the DP although they knew very well that they were the same people who approved the Wealth Tax in the National Assembly within the RPP several years ago. After the DP won the elections in 1950, minorities expected from government to increase minority rights’ protection, but the party maintained the tendency of discrimination against non-Muslims. Because the DP aimed at creating a conservative-religious-traditional society, it offered to respect father’s authority, love younger people, obey the societal rules, be patient, be aware of the illicit and the permissible, keep away from alcohol, gamble, dissipated and deluxe life, hide the woman sexuality and obey the rules of the women and men wearing apparel (Demirel, 2005, pp. 522-523). In this way, the DP tried to make the members of the society similar to each other, so the society
minority groups of Turkey have been deprived from some legal rights and freedoms. That is, legal restrictions and discriminations towards non-Muslim minorities had been getting worsened and stricter in the 1962 Constitution, 1972-73 amendments and the 1982 Constitution. For example, non-Muslims could not name their associations or foundations in their own language. Likewise, the Ecumenical Patriarchate of Orthodox Rum citizens suffered from legal rights. That is, the Patriarch should be a Turkish citizen whose election should be approved by the Turkish governors. In addition, “the Ecumenical Patriarch was not recognized as the spiritual leader of the Orthodox Christians but only as the religious leader of Turkey’s Greek minority” (Grigoriadis, 2008, p. 33). Likely, in order to prevent religious education of Orthodox Christians, of Rum citizens, the government shut down the Orthodox Religious Seminary of Heybeliada (Halki) in 1971, which was training since 1844. Nowadays, opening up the Halki is still a touchy issue between Turkey and Greece.

Furthermore, in 1936, the Law on Foundations was accepted in the National Assembly, which did not allow the minorities to possess properties of their “vakıfs / foundations”. This situation became stricter in 1974, when the Turkish Court of Cassation decided to equate Turkey’s minority vakıfs to the ordinary foreign foundations. Thus, they could not own anything, and in times, all of vakıf properties were expropriated by the Turkish state. Recently, in February 1964, once again Turkey used the Cyprus issue as an excuse and annihilated unilaterally a Turkish-Greek agreement about the location of minorities. Then, the government forced Rum minorities who did not have Turkish identity card to leave the country as soon as possible. Within a short period of time, thousands of Rum minority members immigrated to Greece. Once again, the number of Rum minorities decreased in Istanbul and the government came near to achieve its ongoing purpose.
The Europeanization of Minority Rights in Turkey: A Comparison with the Greek Case

2008, Turkish government has amended the Law on Foundations reciprocally. That is, if the Greek government’s implementation for the Turkish minority vakıfs became the same, Turkish government would accept Rum vakıfs to own their properties and also would modify the status of the Patriarch. In spite of the fact that the ‘reciprocity’ condition has created discontent, the EU effect on Turkey in minority rights protection can be said noticeable.

In June 1993, criteria for EU membership were determined at several meetings of the European Commission in Copenhagen, known as the “Copenhagen Criteria”. It was stated that applicant countries “could join the European Union if they wish to, provided they meet the economic and political conditions set forward by the European Union” (Berument, Malatyalı, & Neyaptı, 2001, p. 53). In terms of political conditions, applicant countries should have achieved democracy with full respect for the rule of law, human rights, and minority rights. In addition, the applicant country has to align its law and administrative bodies with the European Community legislation, the acquis communautaire. From then on, Turkey has tried to fulfill these political and economic conditions and to initiate democratization attempts in order to become a full member of the EU.

At the end of the 1990s, via the friendship of Cem and Papandreou and the “earthquake diplomacy” between Greece and Turkey, relations between the two countries were recovered in 1999. Therefore, in the Helsinki European Council, Greece did not veto Turkish application and Turkey gained the candidate status. Then, in order to perform Copenhagen criteria and to gain the membership as soon as possible, Turkey sped up its reform process. Especially, several amendments were held about human rights and minority rights protection. In a short period of time, seven reform packages were accepted. While Articles 26 and 28 of the Turkish Constitution concerning the ban on speaking, training and broadcasting in languages other than Turkish were abolished in 2001, the right to possess the properties of vakıfs and the right to establish religious places were granted to the non-Muslim minorities in 2002 and 2003. In addition to them, some major international agreements about human and minority rights protection were signed and ratified by the government. That is, in 2002, the UN International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1966) and in the following year, the UN International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights with the reservation on Article 27 were signed. Nonetheless, Turkey has been criticized by the EU through the Commission’s Regular Progress Reports prepared since 1998 that the country

Finally, Turkey should abolish polemical Article 301 of the Turkish Penal Code, which forbids insulting Turkey and Turkishness. This article was abused by the Turkish governors, which led to provoke some hyper-nationalists to murder an Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in January 2007. Although Turkish government amended the article in April 2008, it is not enough according to the European standards. Furthermore, a big improvement deserves to be mentioned. Before 2004, when international convention contradicts the domestic law, domestic law used to head. However, in 2004 the government decided that international convention has to have precedence over the domestic law when they clash. This created a meaning to sign an international agreement since then.

Conclusion

To sum it up, when we examine Turkish and Greek cases in terms of their minority rights protection, we can compare and contrast their tendencies in accordance with their historical backgrounds and recent improvements.

From the formation of the two countries until the early 1980s, both of them preferred to behave their religious minorities with discriminatory implementations. Even though Turkey and Greece became members of the CoE in 1949 and soon after that signed the ECHR, these developments did not constitute a pressure for them to protect the fundamental rights of their minorities. In fact, due to the regular army interventions to the politics, democracy in both countries was cut off for several periods of time and these countries had faced whether relatively short-lived military regimes or long-lasting dictatorships. During those regimes, both countries did not care the pressure of the international institutions to which they affiliated even though they occasionally faced with suspension of relations. Nevertheless, negative reciprocity between these countries had maintained until the end of the 20th century.

On the other hand, in 1981 Greece became a full member of the EEC while not having any requirements to fulfill. From then on, Turkey made efforts to get the membership. However, after the declaration of the Copenhagen criteria in 1993, Turkey has decided to overcome every criterion and started to sign some major international agreements for the development of minority rights protection.
In the mid-1990s, when the EU decided to enlarge through Balkan countries, Greece desired to play the leading role in the area for its neighboring countries. Therefore, despite the fact that there was no major EU expectation from Greece to improve its human and minority rights protection, the country signed several important international agreements some of which have not still been approved by Turkey, and more importantly, abolished the Article 19 of the GCC.

When earthquakes occurred both in Turkey and Greece in the summer of 1999, relations have been ameliorated thanks to the good dialogue of Cem and Papandreou. Yet, former negative reciprocity has been replaced by positive reciprocity. As a result, in the Helsinki European Council, Turkey was accepted as a candidate state in 1999. Suddenly, Turkey started to accept radical reform packages in the Assembly but still some changes are needed.

In my opinion, when we compare the impact of the EU on Turkey and Greece for the increase in minority rights protection, Turkey seems to be more affected by this pressure than Greece. That is, because admission criteria were not determined when Greece became the 10th member, the EU had not been a forcing power for the country. Instead, the increase in the number of cases held in the ECtHR has urged Greece for further improvement of human rights and minority rights protection. Nevertheless, due to the fact that Turkey has to fulfill the EU requirements, the Union has utterly influenced the decisions of the country for further amendments and improvements. Unfortunately, still in both sides, some fundamental rights and implementations are lacking. According to me, if the EU increases its ‘carrots’ for both countries, Turkish minority in Greece and Rum minority in Turkey will leave their second-class citizen position and gain more legal rights, equal to ordinary Turkish and Greek citizens.

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**Periodicals**


THE TRAUMATIC HERITAGE:
IMAGES OF THE ORIENTAL WITHIN
BULGARIAN CULTURE

By Anna Alexieva

Abstract

The article intends to trace the process of the Eurocentric identity construction of the Bulgarians, which was built by the negation of the Oriental and mixed with the notions “Ottoman” and “Turkish” in the popular consciousness. The construction of the image of the Orient in a negative way is fulfilled by the ideologists of the nationalism during the period of the Bulgarian National Revival (XIX c.), when the Oriental (viewed mainly as the “Turkish”) had close relations with a certain set of signs, which designates menacing aggression and bellicose primitivism. In many sources, the Turk is incarnated in negative representations – voluptuous dissolution and immorality; barbarity, shown in its sadistic aptitude; disgusting lack of culture and impossible to be civilized. In the discourse of the ideologists for the cause of acquiring the political independence, the Ottoman Empire is labeled as “sick man”, i.e. it is anachronistic reality, exhausted in the political and spiritual aspect, which makes the cultural evolution of the Slavic people lagging. Yet, the negative sphere of the Orient was not only represented by the Turkish essentiality.

This field is also effortlessly registered the surreptitious and mercenary Greeks, which attempts to manipulate and thus offers outdated, “Byzantine” cultural values, concealing the transparency of the assimilative energies and threatening the identity of the homeland. Despite its European appearance, the Greek has masked face and it is just the other version of the Oriental, viewed in the plane of the radical conservativeness and exhaustion.

Additionally, the third image of the Orient can be isolated from the representations of the Far East, apprehended always as a symbolical place of exotic primitiveness. That's why it is very useful not to mix up this type of image with the former two. There are sources, dating from the National Revival epoch, in which Turkey is described as “European China” with a certain intention to its European identity renounced, and put emphasis on its
Europeanness as a super-value: Europe is the symbol of Modernity, progress and enlightenment.

This convention, viewed as correct ideologically, is sanctioned in numerous canonized literature texts. But, it fails in the sphere of the real, everyday life, in the margins of the mass culture, which willingly incorporates resources of the Oriental. In the Bulgarian National Revival frame, together with the revolutionary poems and verses, the Greek and Turkish love songs gain vast popularity. They are performed in the language that they are written and they bring exotics of the Orient, singing for the oriental beauties. The following decades are also marked by the popularity of the oriental representations, despite the efforts of officious discourses to unnerve it. According to their ideological code, Oriental heritage is either replaced, camouflaged as something original, native, characteristic to the Balkans (yet not Ottoman), or it is absolutely unrepresented, not available, drastically annihilated (for example – the destruction of the mosques, the massacre of Muslims during the so called “Revival process”, unavailability of the authors with Turkish background in Bulgarian literature canon etc.). Despite the purposive efforts to turn the Oriental heritage into a negative one (until 1989 it is political mainstream, though it has reflections in the present as well), it is significantly present in the popular culture of Bulgaria. It defines a certain segment of musical preferences (for example, widespread new urban folk music, popularly called “chalga”, a type of music with the Ottoman background). It is present also in the everyday language, in the notions of the so-called “national kitchen”, in the taste of the auditory to the Turkish serials, so popular nowadays, etc.

It is truism that all these uses of the Oriental rather belong to the sphere of the cultural intimacy – the notion, invented by Michael Herzfeld – a set of specific aspects of the identity, inspiring with confidence and feeling for community. At the same time, the cultural intimacy means disregarding the official norms and standards, accompanied with the feeling of discomfort, caused by this disregard. Traumatic and shameful, unwillingly recognized by the official discourses, the Oriental cultural heritage inevitably marks the pattern of Bulgarian national identity.

Keywords: oriental heritage, identity, nationalism, traumatic heritage, images of the culture, elements of Bulgarian culture with oriental background, cultural intimacy, everyday-life culture, cultural canon, official discourse and unofficial cultural taste
The Traumatic Heritage: Images of the Oriental in Bulgarian Culture

The process of constructing the Eurocentric identity of Bulgarians and the pursuing the ambitions for modernization goes together with the process of distancing from the oriental heritage and marginalizing it in the cultural periphery. Unwillingly recognized, this heritage raises a set of complexes and traumas, together with undesired and shameful emotions. The activation of these emotions took place in the XIX c. and coincides with the period of Bulgarian National Revival, when the ideologists of the nationalism drew strategies for the political liberation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman dominion.

Amongst all the motives that led to the negatively constructed image of the Oriental essentiality, the aspects of religious difference are distinctive, which was later added to “the mythology and the propaganda of nationalisms, emphasizing on the outer and oppressive political character of the Empire, which was possible to emancipate of only by arms in the hands” (Aretov, 2008, p. 60). This representation is not single and is probably the result of long-lasting process of laying multiple layers of Western points of view towards the Orient, constructing it in negative way or dispose it in the field of the exotic-blurred; consider it as thing, proper “to be studied in Academia and to be exhibited in museums” (Said, 1999, p. 14), for anthropological theories and analyses in romantic pieces of art. However, this image is interlaced with those of the Eastern Europe; being more as “Eastern” than “Europe”, i.e. inscribed unproblematically in the frame of the Oriental world (Wolff, 2004). This frame traumatizes the Bulgarians, making them feel inadequate to the civilization, and underdeveloped in comparison to the European models. In its turn, in a variety of sources, the European topos is moulded as utopian space of perfectness and longing, as a new Paradise-like place, substituting the former holy spaces. The image of the Ottoman essentiality, viewed to be as its close concrete, and permanently present and thus unbearable, appears in the antithesis of the model ideality of the image of European space (viewed to be ideal as it is impossible to achieve).

1 The text is created in the frame of interdisciplinary project: “Emotional content of Bulgarian national identity: historical origins and contemporary dimensions”. For further information about the project, see: http://balkansbg.eu/en.html

2 This notion, although outdated, is widely accepted by Bulgarian researchers, and that’s the reason to be used in this text. It is canonically correct and one of the purposes of its usage here is to revise its meanings and relevance to the contemporary situation in the humanities.
In the Bulgarian representations, “the Ottoman essentiality” is mostly considered to be identical with “the Turkish one”. It is remarkable that, in the mass consciousness, the words “Ottoman”, “Muslim”, “Mohammedan” work in one the same synonym order, and focus on the character of the Turkish people without any regard whether they are Turkish in the ethnical sense of the notion. The process of constructing the negative image of the Turk, outlined in the fiction, memoires and political texts, dating from the period of national movement, could be traced in several directions.

Before all, as a ruler, the Turk is immediately accepted as “criminal by status” (Foucault, 2000, p. 112), as a despot, who uses the mechanisms of power for satisfying his sadistic whims. In the demonization of his image, a considerable contribution is made through relating it with the signs of inhumanity, the savagery and the disaster. Its merging with the images of the political monster and the Other, which is the remarkable doubling of the unacceptability, is not quite a Bulgarian invention. The same interpretation can also be registered in a series of pamphlets, dedicated to Marie-Antoinette, in which she is considered, as Faucault says, as man-eater, thirsty for the blood of French peoples. This is very similar to the consideration model of the Turk as being featured with menacing aggression and bellicose primitivism. A good example for this relation is the following quote, taken from a poem, written by Hristo Botev, probably the most canonical author of the Bulgarian literature:

. . . However, the tyrant is raging / and dishonours our land of birth / slaughters, hangs, beats, curses / and mulcts the people enslaved. (Botev, 1978, p. 48)

Not only the sadistic inclinations of him cause embarrassment and shock, but also his everyday convictions, his dissipated rituality, dissolving in the timelessness of the harem and his smoking narghileh (hookah). Since the space of the harem is hermetically closed and inaccessible for outsiders’ sight, it provokes impulses for imagination in stylistics, hyperbolizing his negative characteristics. The harem is a topos of sexual pan-permission, analogue to certain extent to the castles of iniquity of the texts of Marquis de Sade. In the harem the woman is deduced to the meanings of the object of voluptuousness and submission, she it thought as fleshliness only, deprived from social and psychological depth. The time in the harem is considered as a repetition of one-and-the-same, as freezing in the abyss of orgiastic endless time circle. This state, lacking of motion, is reflected in the smoking narghileh, recognized as a harmful habit, because it causes the
condition, marked by intoxication and mindset to static and pointless staying, viewed as extremely unacceptable for European rationalistic mental perspective. In a text of Lyuben Karavelov, one of the significant Bulgarian authors of the XIX c., we can find a definition of the Turkish everyday life, implied with prejudice against the Eastern contemplative trance:

To be seated all day long in the harem or in the café, to smoke narghileh, to stare at the smoke, going through the water of the narghileh, to stare at the burning fire in the hearth – these are the major Turkish activities. (Karavelov, 1967, p. 432)

Not only literature has particular focus on the intolerable figure of the Enemy-Ruler, yet visual arts also take part in this discrediting ideological matrix. It represents the Turk in two different angles: the first is formulated in the already known categories of bloodthirstiness and bestiality (for example, in the lithographic works “The second battle of Hadji Dimitar and Stefan Karadja” and “The suicide of Angel Kanchev”); the second is defined by the aspect of his impassable heartlessness (for instance, in the picture of “The Batak massacre” of Anton Piotrovsky, depicting the bashibazouks with faces, expressing coolness and unconcern in complete contrast to the horror, demonstrated by the death corpses of the innocent victims). The two aspects of the image – the aspect of fierceness and the impassibility, are present in the fresco of Anton Mirchev “The slaying of Patriarch Eutimius”, painted in the cathedral church “St. Alexander Nevsky”. They are represented by the characters of the headsman, preparing with theatre gesture to behead to the last Bulgarian Medieval patriarch, and by this of the Sultan-conqueror, portrayed on the background, watching the cruel scene of violation against the sacred man without any concern. However, this fresco activates a representative nationalistic myth, narrating that the Bulgarian patriarch was killed by the sword of the enslaver; which denies the fact that he was in exile, which is the reality.

Turkish violence against religious symbols and cultural values is “common place” in the Bulgarian nationalistic discourse. The imagination, marking out the aspect of physical pain suffered, is focused with an equal extreme on the civilization damages, caused by the enemy. It turned the ancient capitals in ruins; remarkable medieval buildings are ashes; it erased all the records of the

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Bulgarian past glory; destroyed the monuments of the past greatness. In other words, as it is suggested by a poem written by the ideologist of the nationalism Georgy Rakovsky:

*Cities and flourishing towns and villages / Turkish from Asian deserts / in black graveyards turned / obscenely [. . .] upturned the relics. (Rakovsky, 1983a, p. 265)*

The cultural underdevelopment of Bulgarians, claimed by the texts of the National Revival period, is caused by the Empire’s power of primitivism. Any reforms or strategies for the education and enlightenment would not be able to cultivate the Orient, which was considered as inflexible and insusceptible to the civilization processes. The languages of the National essentiality put together all the “Hatt-i Humayuns, Hatt-i Sharifs and Gülhanes [. . .] all these Turkish laws and rights” (Karalelov, 1954, p. 97) in the synonym order of the nonsense. The Empire itself is thought in the metaphors of illness, anilities and the terminating end; it is nominated as the “last-breathing old woman”, “the sick man of Europe”; it is considered as anachronistic, politically and spiritually exhausted reality who keeps the South Slavs in cultural retardation.

The animosity plots curious images, combining the exotic and the primitive: Turkey, besides being “corpse on the death bed”, is “European China” as well (Botev, 1978, pp. 147-148). The combination is viewed as particularly comic in its barbarism, as fully able to provoke “(the) mockery of the humanity”, “(the) reproach of the contemporary Europe” (Botev, 1978, p. 147). The East is nothing, but “symbolical topos of primitivism, stagnancy, extreme conservativeness and underdevelopment” (Peleva, 1998, p. 101). In its taxonomy, the barbarity is firmly framed with denominations such as “Chinese”, “Japanese”, “Indian”, “Persian” and “Asian”.

Unlike the Turkish essentiality, these are not thought in the categories of menace, but rather in the humoristic paradigm of the strange and outlandish. The extreme difference is presumed to be undervalued and funny. However, it is completely clear that this is the grotesque antipode of the progressive Europe. That’s why the raising of the question: “What could Newton or Voltaire do, if they were born in Persia?” (Karavelov, 1966, p. 69) sounds reasonable.

The territory of the value and progress is named as “Europe”. It is idealized not only due to its enlightenment potentials, not only because of its Christian virtues, yet due to its role of being symbolical counterpoint of the Orient. However, a
single layer of meanings does not shape the geography of the European space. For instance, because of its Slavic background, Russia is associated with this space unproblematically. Sometimes the West falls off from this space in the same unproblematic way, particularly when it looks indifferently at the Asian “atrocities” in the Balkans or shows colonial ambitions. The fact that sometimes Europe behaves not as “Europe”, and that it commits a treachery against the Enlightenment values, which it proclaimed, is explained to be a result of the lack of knowledge due to the information darkness, although the belief that there is no exculpation for the absence of empathy to the “Bulgarian case” is still actual:

*Does Europe know how much innocent blood pours today in Bulgaria by Turkish bloodsuckers…? As though we are inferior kind than black people, for whom long ago particular diligence were made and efforts to stop the enslavement they caused were made? As if we are not worthy for their mercy and morality?! We, the inhabitants of Europe and more than 7 million people, having Christian faith . . . (Rakovsky, 1983b, p. 18)*

In the geography of this uninterested Europe, the place of Greece is specifically problematic. There is a systematic denial to frame them under the enlightened European peoples. Because of the subordination of the Bulgarian Church to the Patriarchate of Constantinople since the fear caused by the assimilatory pretentions and nationalistic projects of the Greeks; and last, but not the least – because of including the Greeks into the number of stereotypical images of the neighbour-enemy, the Greeks are viewed as the factor of the falseness and Jesuitism of the imitative civilization. They are considered as the anti-presentation of the European essentiality, as one other face of the Orient, being even more perfidious. The combination of the order of the Asiatic-Turkish-Greek also runs in the direction of the idea for unity between discredited nations – Turkish conquered Bulgaria, because Greeks invoke them (*the Greek king Manuel summoned firstly the Turks and let them overseas in the Bulgarian territory. Thus the war against Bulgaria and king Shishman started – Paisiy Hilendarski, 1972, p. 241*); Turks destroy Bulgarian cultural heritage, because they were prompted by Greeks (*fire devoured our letters, / scholars were all killed / the Turk gave it to oblivion / they learned this from guileful Greeks! – Rakovsky, 1983a, p. 241*).

The equalization of the Greek and the Turkish essentialities is also regarded in the aspect of the anachronistic; In the nationalistic dictionary, Turkey is referred as “illness” and “decline”; while Greece symbolizes “archivists’ madness
towards the past, antiquity, (its) obsolete history” (Dakova, 2007, p. 56), absurd with its outdated Byzantine pretention. The images of the Turkish, the Far-Eastern and the Greek, when thought as essentialities, are considered as the unpleasant faces of the Orient, from which the Bulgarian differs itself in an intensive manner. Nevertheless, the image of Europe, in relief, is shaped by two main meanings: between its model and not so ideal aspects, and yet Orient is available in the nationalistic discourse plainly. This oversimplification can hardly be considered to be indifferent, as Edward Said says, it is loaded with storming energies of negation.

These energies are particularly active, when the problem of ineradicable oriental habits in its own space is the focus, when they are caught in oriental breaks of the Bulgarian culture as well as the popular customs in spite of the ideological stigmatizations. Recognition of the-Other-in-me bears shaming reflections not only during the period of the national movement for independence, but in the epoch after the Liberation (3. 03. 1978), when the Eurocentric model is imposed even more intensively. This model in constructed on the understanding on the civilization inferiority. Product of this understanding is the book “Bay Ganyo” by Aleko Konstantinov, one of the canonical pieces of Bulgarian literature, narrating about the uncultured Bulgarian man, got into the model European surrounding. The behaviour of Bay Ganyo is not any match to the European culture code; it is clearly not liable to the European civilization process, and raises a feeling of complexes amongst the other characters – compatriots of him, bearing the emotions of national shame. Shameful are exactly the Oriental habits of the character: its familiarity, loud physiological reactions, somatic domination, strange clothing, his taste preferences, sticking out Oriental elements, coalesced with the Bulgarian essentiality, which are all recognized as negative national features. The book “Bay Ganyo” is an indicator for something significant – it represents the cultural situation after the Liberation of the Ottoman rule as dramatically bisected between the Eurocentric officious discourses and the everyday life, which was already formatted under Ottoman way of living. It registers elements of the Ottoman origin in the Bulgarian popular customs, manners, tastes and habits, which were all infiltrated in the traditional culture despite all the ideological prohibitions.

The process is visible in the National Revival epoch itself: Although the ideologists of the nationalism had ambitions to forge a literary language, based mostly on native elements that were taken from the folklore or from the rusty medieval Bulgarian tradition, the daily speech of the ordinary Bulgarian people
is full of words of Turkish origin, while in series of instances the spoken language is completely Turkish. Yuriy Venelin, a researcher, who travelled around the Northern Bulgarian territories, notices, with sadness, that Bulgarians ignore their mother tongue even in the everyday life:

*I was able to hammer in their head, that for Bulgarians is wrong to talk among themselves in Turkish.* (as cited in Detchev, 2010, p. 55)

Relatively more educated Bulgarians, whom he met, talk and write in Greek language and study in Greek schools since this is regarded as weightier and more prestigious. The observations of Venelin, in fact, repeat the decades-old pathetic reproach of imitating the foreign models, which is expressed by Paisiy Hilendarski:

*But, some people don’t like to know about the nation they belong to, they turn to the foreign culture and foreign language, and do not care about their own Bulgarian language; but they study to read and to talk in Greek, and shame on naming themselves Bulgarians. O, unwise and mooncalf! Cause what you are shamed to name yourself Bulgarian and you don’t read and talk in your mother tongue?* (1972, p. 42).

The usage of the foreign language in more drastic practices that concerns the sphere of the sexuality can be outlined within the songs of erotic contents, which is the widespread habit of the period. They extol a voluptuous line of behaviour, and reflect somatic desires and weaknesses through a hedonistic approach. It is remarkable to see how the erotic songs are performed in the foreign (Turkish, Greek) languages coupled with the non-native (oriental) melodies. They express a more relaxed attitude shaped in the urban environment, and differ in comparison to the patriarchal Bulgarian reticence that coexists with the revolutionary songs and proclaim aggressive resistance against the foreigner-enemy.

Erotic songs in foreign languages (mostly in Turkish), which were printed in the Slavic alphabet, were the constant part of the literature production during the period of the National Revival. Sometimes there is a bilingual combination, in which the two languages – Bulgarian and Turkish – are combined in one song. This phenomenon can also be used to correct the conventional understandings for the challenging identities. In a number of cases, the songs are performed completely in Bulgarian, though you might hear oriental figures in the text, borrowings from outside as supplementing the Ottoman/Turkish accompany.
It is interesting to see how these songs could coexist with the rebellion songs in the works of one and the same author; how in the poetry of Petko Rachov Slaveykov, for example, can be found texts summoning the drastic measures against the enslaver (come on, children, / as it accrues in the name of the freedom / beat on the tyrants / on godless sons of Agar . . . – Slaveykov, 1978, p. 32), but also songs, dedicated to oriental beauties (Enchitsa white married Turkish woman / waving her white boobs / in my poor heart wound me . . . – Slaveykov, 1852). Under the pressure of the nationalistic discourse that was particularly activated just before and after the liberation, Petko Slaveykov attempts to excuse his erotic poetry with patriotic reasons, saying that he wrote these songs in order to save “the youth from Turkish songs”, which were fashionable at the time. Yet the author’s erotic songs distance the “youth” from the well-known oriental imagery nowise. These songs keep on coexisting with the “Bulgarized” or translated foreign love texts that begin (in very contrast to the nationalistic requirements) with the following instruction: “it is sang in the melody of so and so Turkish or Greek song”.

If “songs for the soul” (Aretov, 2010) – though unable to make the feeling of deviation to patriotism – are still not contradictory to the process of Bulgarian identity building, it is because they function in the sphere of the unserious; as they are songs, dedicated to the Sultan and bear a grave discomfort and stress in the literary canon that is constructed after the Liberation. Invoked by the ambition to put the cultural values in hierarchy, to separate “the correct” from the discreditable, this canon privileges the texts with revolutionary inclination it shapes anti-Ottoman national narrative; and according to the logic, attempts to devaluate a creative line that was widespread during the National Revival period, which declares loyalty to the Tanzimât and admires the rule of the Sultan. These texts, popular in the technical notion of the “teachers’ poetry” as they are mainly written by teachers, have considerable place in the press of the National Revival, i.e. they are part of the official publicity; and they are enjoying public visibility even more than the rebellion songs that were published in the emigrants’ press and remained in manuscript spread orally. Teachers’ poetry,

For more detailed analysis of the erotic songs, written by Petko Slaveykov, and for further data about the process of marginalization of this poetic genre, see: http://liternet.bg/publish14/a_aleksieva/erotichnata.htm

or more precisely as the civilian poetry, maintains the ideological postulates of the Enlightenment and praises the social activity of the person. Itformulates the necessity of secular education and the victory of the intelligence over the instinct. At the same time, it expresses the delight of being Sultan's subject. There are numerous texts, for example, explaining the “obligations” to the subjects of the Sultan in details:

Who loves the sultan, / he runs towards him, / loves him from his heart, / works in his favor [...], / To least need / he makes maximal effort, / serves to him with fidelity / and blesses him. (Izvorsky, 1851)

The disobedience is not only unacceptable; it is even morally stigmatized and discredited:

But, who hates the sultan, / he commits sin, / and who means mischief to him, / let the God kill him. (Izvorsky, 1851)

The respect to the social hierarchies, loyal service, and hence the Sultan and his self-assurance, is the initiator of the progressive transition to better life, which are portrayed as concomitant kernels within the plots of such poems. In these poems, the praise to the Enlightenment and civil activity is constantly turned in apology to the ruler. The texts mostly admire the Ottoman Sultan, Abd-ul-Mejid I who is recognized as a praiseworthy heir of his famous father, Mahmud II, due to his attempts to modernize the Empire. In the poems, it is obvious to see that the launch of the ideas of the Enlightenment is associated with the effects of Hatt-i Sharif together with the entire transformation movement of the Tanzimât, which decrees equal rights, obeys the common laws, respects a wise government and guarantees the peace of the subjects.5

Thus the types of attitude shaped the oriental images of the social-cultural circumstances during the National Revival period: the Ottoman rule and the Ottoman heritage. The first is the attitude of the ideologists of the nationalism (e.g. Rakovsky, Karavelov, Botev etc.), analogous to the attitude of this group of intellectuals, worked mainly in emigration and claimed for fundamental changes of the political status quo, demanding the emancipation of Bulgaria from the Ottoman dominion. This elite discredits the Ottoman heritage; they are intolerant to the religious diversity and are oriented to forging national

5 For more about so-called “teachers’ poetry” see also Alexieva, 2004, pp. 16–22.
cultural paradigms, in which European and Russian elements, with folklore matrixes (though excluding the oriental cultural codes) incorporated, can clearly be seen. The second type of attitude could be found in the mass culture, voluntarily using the resources of the Oriental. It includes songs with the Ottoman background, which bears the exotics of the Orient and praises the oriental beauties without any worry. This friendly attitude to the Ottoman heritage is clearly visible within the approach of the Bulgarian press, which was published inside the borders of the Empire, and popularizes texts that demonstrate an endless love to the Sultan and loyalty to his government.

In other words, previously there was an unproblematic arrangement and a tense co-existence between the Bulgarian and the Ottoman elements, which started erode during the decades of the Revolution, or more precisely in the 1860’s and the 1870’s, and becoming further outdated after the Liberation, when the popular culture turned into a national culture, as the newly founded state institutions, shaped the Bulgarian cultural canon. The new cultural canon reorders the cultural layers and orders them within a hierarchical subordination. As suggested, the winners are the nationalistic discourses that shape the sphere of the official national “higher” culture along with a special emphasis on anti-Ottoman narrative.

The anti-Ottoman ideology, which set its roots as a state policy after the Liberation and further intensified during the Socialist regime, is promoted by two aspects: at the level of drastic measures, it aimed to destroy and erase the Ottoman, oriental and Greek elements; and, on the plane of the substitution, it absorbs and depersonalizes these element into the Bulgarian ones, and transforms them into the national tradition, aiming to originate local models.

The drastic erase of the Ottoman heritage during the liberation movement, which included Ottoman architectural monuments and mosques, could be identified within this regard. It is outlined within the National Revival Period Project of establishing the literary language that aimed at purifying the language from all the words of Turkish origin. The Project turned into a series of state-regulated set of requirements, which intended to remove the Turkish-originated lexica not only from the official texts, but also from people's everyday speeches⁶. The main aim was to re-shape the everyday culture while liberating it from the suspicious elements of the Ottomans. One

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of the results of this ambitious Project was the construction of the “correct” musical taste (which was particularly the case during the Socialism period) together with the “correct” folklore (processed according to the norms of European choir singing, which upgrades the folklore canvas) and “correct” popular music (so-called “estrada” – a musical type of Soviets, containing some Western shades as well). The “correct” canonical literature, in its turn, prefers narratives with remarkable contribution to the process of construction of the national identity. It favours texts dedicated to defending the national cause. The heroes of the National Revival are mythologized and placed within the pantheon of the unforgettable individuals, sharing a rank with today’s glorified Communist authors. Additionally, canonical literature and academic discourse of historiography relates the line of myth making to the narratives focused on “Turkish yoke,” which refers to the five-century long massacres of Bulgarians by the Turks.

Anton Donchev’s book, “Time of Parting” (1964) probably represents the culmination of the anti-Ottoman narrative in the sphere of arts. It recounts the forcible Islamization of the Rhode Mountains’ Bulgarians during the Ottoman rule. The novel puts emphasis on the well-known stereotypes for monstrous Turk and suffering Bulgarian. It makes extreme accent on the pain suffered and hyperbolizes the state of the Ottoman cruelty. In spite of its extremity, the text enjoys wide popularity as it was filmed and translated into more than 30 languages. There are a number of literary critics who suspect that the translations were in fact “financed by The Ministry of Culture as the novel itself was written after a State command, in the hopes of supporting the serial wave of repressions to pomaks and the Bulgarian Turks” (Vrinat-Nikolov, 2002). The top of this repressive line, without any doubt, is the Renaissance Process (Reborn Process, Revival Process, Bulgarization etc.) – the popular name of the State policy during the 1970’s and 1980’s that aimed at the assimilation of the Bulgarian Muslims. It includes the forcible change of the Turkish names with the Bulgarian ones, limitation in regard to the usage of their mother tongue and the prohibition of the traditional rituals. This process, at times, also included physical extermination.

The anti-Ottoman line is not uniformly drastic and destructive. In a series of cases, it works surreptitiously as it transforms the Ottoman symbols into a native tradition through substitution and metamorphosis. In fact, the situation is very similar to that defined by Eric Hobsbawn in his “invention of tradition” (Hobsbawm & Ranger (Eds.), 1983) – which argues that symbols that are
introduced as ancient and native are actually neo-national (Ottoman, in this case) models, though effectively masked as traditionally Bulgarian within the near past.

Some of the such “invented” symbols are, for instance, the National Revival Period’s Bulgarian traditional house, (though considered as the emblem of the Bulgarian building, it has distinctive birth-marks belonging to the Ottoman architectural style⁷), the Bulgarian national cuisine (plentiful of Ottoman culinary notions, recognized as typically Bulgarian meals⁸), the Bulgarian folklore costume (whose Bulgarian elements are under doubt due to the inclusion of visible Greek and Turkish elements⁹), some “traditional” Bulgarian rituals (the “kurban”, for instance: a Muslim feast, related to the custom of sacrifice, but confirmed as “Bulgarian custom” in Bulgaria), and etc.

Therefore, the anti-Ottoman attitude marks the sphere of the everyday life under the sign of the substitution or in the plane of deliberate destruction that was initially formulated by the official academic discourses as it is included in the aspect of the so called “banal nationalism”. The creation of the national state led to such kind of a nationalism, as Michael Billig marks (Billig, 1995), later, becoming the parts of the everyday life, the routine activities and the banality of the daily living. I can add that this type of nationalism is significantly more durable than the nationalism registered within the aspects of the academic speeches. For example, after 1989, the anti-Ottoman narrative in the history textbooks is oriented into a more neutral perspective: as the “Turks” are renamed as the “Ottomans,” and “the slavery” as the “dominion”, or the “rule.” The narrative “shrugs off its extreme tones, the facts are explained in a more prosaic way and there is a new tendency to avoid the lexica and narrative techniques, characteristic of hero-making” (Atanassov, 2010).

The changes in the academic narrative have meagre results in the everyday languages of the nationalism, which, by definition, annihilate the Ottoman

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⁷ For more detailed analysis on the problem of Bulgarization of the Ottoman architecture see Marinov, 2010, pp. 325–404.

⁸ Alexander Vezenkov in his article “The Paradoxical use of Turkish loanwords in the Bulgarian national discourse” focuses on the meals, regarded as parts of Bulgarian national cuisine: “kyufte”, “kebapče”, “kachamak”, “boza” etc. – the notions with definite Ottoman background. In the Bulgarian cultural narrative this meals are attributed by “cooked according to old Bulgarian recipe/technology”. See Vezenkov, 2010, pp. 490–519.

⁹ For further information about the creation of the Bulgarian national costume see Detchev & Voukov, 2010, p. 159–254.
heritage. Popular TV shows as “All the Bulgarians together”10, “Memory Bulgarian”11, “An hour about Bulgaria”12 harden the myth of the extremely highly esteemed antiquity of the Bulgarian. Humorous narratives, which belong to the genre system of the popular jokes, keep on maintaining the image of the neighbour-enemy13. Additionally, many academic projects are challenged by the popular discourses. Herein, a good example would be the research project called “Batak as a place of memory” of Martina Baleva and Ulf Brunbauer, which provoked wide media reaction in 200714. The findings, which suggests the mythologization of the Batak town as the symbol of the Bulgarians’ sufferings caused by the “Turks” during the April Uprising (April 1876), is accepted as offensive by the locals. It also provoked acute reaction from the academic field, which divided the scholars while raising political reactions from the highest level.

No matter how inflexible the popular culture stands against the Ottoman representations, or no matter how easy it is to accept the nationalistic messages; the culture of the masses shows extreme flexibility and susceptibility for set of things, which can be defined as the components of the Ottoman heritage. The

10 The name of the show is written in inverted word order, imitating the formulaic language of the folklore songs, and uses a dialect form of the word “all” in order to make an allusion with the non-literal tradition of the folklore.

11 The screen face of this TV show is the director of the National Museum of History in Sofia and ex-minister of Bulgarians abroad Bojidar Dimitrov. The name of the show is made also in inverted word order, but imitating here the language of poetry.

12 The author and screen face of this show is a prominent Bulgarian professor-nationalist named Plamen Pavlov. The name of the show in more creative translation should be “A lesson about Bulgaria”, because in Bulgarian school slang “hour” means “school hour”, i.e. “lesson”.

13 An example I came across while I was writing this text, this time without any relation to the image of the Turk, but even though discredit of the neighbours, is the following joke story, which I saw in the Internet:

“A Greek, a Serb and a Romanian caught the Golden fish ready to materialize their wishes.
- I want to see the volcano erupting in Bulgaria! – said the Greek.
- I wish a flood in Bulgaria! – screamed happily the Serb.
- My wish is Bulgaria to be destroyed by earthquake! – added finally the Romanian.
- Done! – said the Golden fish.
All they watch disbelieving their own eyes: volcano erupted in the very centre of the Thessaloniki, Belgrade under water and Bucurest all destroyed by earthquake.
- O, Golden fish, what have you done? – shouted the three persons in the same time.
- Oh! – became confused the fish . . . I beg your pardon, but I’ve used the outdated map – added it.”

14 See the collected works, accomplished in the research project of Martina Baleva, Ulf Brunbauer et al. – see Baleva, M., Brunbauer, U. (Eds.). (2007). Batak as a Place of Memory. Sofia.
widespread popularity of the Oriental background pop-folk music\textsuperscript{15} “Chalga” and the recently launched Turkish TV series prove that no matter how many and how significant and controversial the discourse conflicts are, the Ottoman heritage is still featured with a noteworthy endurance and permanence.

As an inheritor of the “songs for the soul” from the National Revival period, the nowadays phenomenon, “chalga” shapes the space of joy and forgetfulness, of love dreaminess, or, in contrary – of the social actualities. In both cases, it is able to “talk” and deliver an already factual message to the Bulgarian people. It brings a feeling of intimacy, warmness and comfort that could not be delivered by the coldness of the elite music, which is considered as unclear, misty and the other.

As it is referred by Dimitar Atanassov, the striking widespread popularity of the Turkish TV series, “marks undoubtedly the beginning of a new change that is related to the transformation of the verbal aggression towards the Ottoman heritage, coupled with a mistrust towards today’s Turkey and everything that symbolically or geographically belongs to Turkey, as it refers a consciousness for togetherness, culminating the shared historical faith of the last seven centuries” (Atanassov, 2010). If expressed, the receptive attitudes of the audience would sound as follows: the Turk, viewed on the screen, is very similar to the Bulgarian; the words of the Turk are so memorable as if they were said by the Bulgarian people during the National Revival period; the everyday life, represented by the Turkish TV series, is the same as the Bulgarian lifestyle; the daily conflicts and worries of the Turkish people are absolutely the same as those experienced by the Bulgarians.

The ongoing interest to “chalga” and to the Turkish TV series touches upon the shameful recognition of the Oriental essentiality, which is even sometimes concealed by the fans of the musical genre and the TV products, but sometimes manifested intrusively. Herein, we, once again, point out to the distinguishable effects of the trauma, as well as its complexes. As suggested by Micheal Herzfeld, the Oriental cultural code gives the feeling of a “cultural intimacy” – or “the recognition of those aspects of the cultural identity, which are not easily shared with the people that are outside the community, yet, in spite of

\textsuperscript{15} Called sometimes “new urban folk”, it is named “chalga” in Bulgarian slang. A considerable part of academic anthropologists in Bulgaria prefer to use this notion as more authentic and specific.
its discomfort, they provide the people with some kind of an inside confidence due representing the actuality of their own community” (Herzfeld, 2007, p. 17).

Though rejected and discredited in many circumstances, the Ottoman elements are part of the constant constructive kernel of the Bulgarian national identity and they are perceived to be the “self” and the native as well.

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EUROPEAN CULTURAL IDENTITY AND ITS IMPACT ON TURKEY’S BID FOR EU MEMBERSHIP

By Jennifer Brindisi

Abstract

The construction of Europe’s cultural identity is of fundamental significance in understanding Turkey’s bid to become a full member state of the European Union (EU). This paper seeks to deconstruct key elements of the European cultural identity to understand why Turkey’s EU aspirations have not yet been realised. It analyses the European Orientalist discourse on Turkey to highlight the current misgivings about Turkey across the EU. It also discusses the role of Christianity in Europe, including the proposed mention of Christianity in the preamble to the EU Constitution, and how this has hindered Turkey’s EU prospects as a predominately Muslim nation. It concludes by drawing upon Joseph Nye’s research into soft power to illustrate how the Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture programme persuasively presents Turkey as an enduring influence on the European cultural identity and a cultural asset to the EU, thereby deserving full EU membership.

Keywords: Turkey, European Union, Orientalism, soft power, cultural identity

Introduction

Turkey’s bid to attain full membership of the European Union (EU) has spawned countless analyses in journals, books, and newspapers around the globe. Yet despite the variety of sources available, most address a routine set of questions: Is Turkey’s economy strong enough to positively contribute to the EU? Has it shown that it can respect human rights with the same vigour as the EU? What kinds of security challenges does its inclusion represent, including the threat of increased illegal immigration from the Middle East into Europe? However, rarely in these discussions is the role of culture ever considered. Therefore, this paper seeks to contribute a fresh perspective to the debate by questioning how Europe’s cultural identity has impacted Turkey’s bid for EU membership. Furthermore, it assesses the potential of the Istanbul 2010 European Capital of Culture (ECoC) programme to improve diplomatic relations between Turkey and Europe.
In order to address these questions, this paper begins by deconstructing the European cultural identity: Which events and traditions have shaped it and how can it be defined? It then examines the role of Christianity in the formation of the European cultural identity, and how it provides a significant challenge to Turkey's EU aspirations as a predominately Muslim country. Finally, it will analyse whether the influence of the Istanbul 2010 ECoC programme promises to transcend the fine arts to impact diplomatic relations between Turkey and Europe. It concludes that while Europe's cultural identity does indeed pose significant hurdles for Turkey on its path to becoming an EU member state, the Istanbul 2010 ECoC programme suggests a new chapter in EU-Turkey relations that could bolster Turkey's bid for full EU membership.

Turkey’s Road to EU Membership

If for no other reason, Turkey’s bid for accession to the EU is significant in that no other country has worked so hard to accede and yet made such little progress. Despite standing as a member of the Council of Europe since 1949, and signing a Customs Union agreement with the EU in 1995 (pursuant to a much older promise, dating back to 1963), full EU membership has thus far eluded Turkey. Even after playing a ‘part of the EU’s crisis management operations in the Balkans’ and asserting itself as a leader in the Mediterranean, Turkey remains on the outskirts of Europe (Kösebalaban, 2007, p. 107). Its path to becoming an EU member state began in 1987, when Turkey first lodged its application for membership, but it ‘was not until 1999 that the Union recognised it as a candidate, and negotiations began only in 2005, with ascension not expected before 2015’ (Pinder & Usherwood, 2008, p. 138).

The start of negotiations was perhaps the most significant development in Turkey’s relationship with Europe as it signaled that Turkey sufficiently fulfilled the Copenhagen criteria—the three pillars of values that underwrite the EU. While the EU determined that Turkey demonstrated sufficient political freedom and economic stability to uphold the first and second pillars, it found Turkey’s ‘acceptance of the Community acquis’, the criteria of the third pillar, to be lacking (European Commission, 2007b). Thus, the EU called for “enhanced political and cultural dialogue between the people of the EU Member States and Turkey. This includes a dialogue on cultural differences, religion [. . . ] which the EU will facilitate” (European Commission, 2007a). However, as will be illustrated in the
following pages, improving the cultural dialogue between Turkey and the EU is a complex project and one that will take many years to complete.

After determining that Turkey satisfied the Copenhagen Criteria, the EU then laid out thirty-five negotiating chapters requiring resolution before Turkey could be accepted as a member state. While only one of thirty-five negotiating chapters has been resolved, thirteen remain open to discussion and eight “have been frozen since late 2006 over Turkey’s failure to normalise trade ties with Cyprus” (South Eastern Times, 2010). Though Štefan Füle, EU Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy, publicly reiterated support for Turkey’s accessions as recently as 12 July 2010, it was with the caveat: “if Turkey meets the necessary conditions” (European Commission, 2010b). Considering the amount of work that remains to be done to secure Turkey’s membership, it seems unlikely that talks will finish by 2014 as was once predicted (Dismorr, 2008, p. 17).

Public Opinion on the Accession

Within the EU, public support for Turkey’s accession has varied considerably since it first became an official candidate. In the November 2008 Eurobarometer survey, 55 per cent of Europeans responded that they ‘are against [Turkey] becoming a part of the European Union in the future’ (European Commission 2008, p. 28). However, 45 per cent indicated that they would be ‘fairly in favour’ or ‘strongly in favour’ of Turkey’s integration ‘once it complies with all the conditions set by the European Union’ (European Commission, 2008, p. 29). While support for Turkey’s accession is highest in Sweden (71 per cent), the Netherlands (67 per cent) and Romania (64 per cent), it is lowest in Austria (16 per cent), Luxembourg (32 per cent) and France and Germany (35 per cent) (European Commission, 2008). French President Sarkozy and German Chancellor Merkel, in particular, have voiced concerns that Turkey does not belong in the EU and should instead be offered the chance of a ‘privileged partnership’ (Kardas, 2009).

As a consequence of harsh criticisms from Europe and the slow pace of negotiations, support for the accession has plummeted within Turkey. According to Marc Pierini, the EU’s ambassador to Ankara, Turkish President Recip Tayyip Erdoğan feels increasingly discouraged by remarks made by President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel (Gardner, 2010). Publically, support has decreased considerably since 1999 when it ‘was remarkably strong [. . . ], lingering at around 75 per cent for a long time. Meanwhile, it was even stronger in the
Kurdish area, reaching 90 per cent, reflecting expectations of further cultural rights and freedoms granted’ (Dismorr, 2008, p. 124). However, results from the November 2009 Eurobarometer survey show that Turkish public support for the accession has fallen to 45 per cent (Gültaşlı, 2009). Despite the EU’s official words of reassurance, it appears many Turks are questioning whether the EU will honour the ‘principal of pacta sunt servanda (agreements are to be kept)’ and keep its promise to make Turkey a full member (Dismorr, 2008, p. 210).

**Europe’s ‘Other’ Legacies of the Ottoman Empire**

Understanding why there are such strong reservations about Turkey’s accession in countries like Austria, France and Germany requires looking back to the first European constructions of Turkish identity. However, it is important to recognise that many contemporary European misgivings about Turks stem from prejudices formed when Turkey lay at the heart of the Ottoman Empire. This confusion is ‘often responsible for the unjust anachronistic treatment by European states of the issues concerning modern Turkey’ (İnalcık, 2006, p. 113). Until the formation of the Turkish Republic in 1923, Turkey was but a small portion of the expansive Ottoman Empire. At its zenith from 1520-1566, under the rule of Suleiman the Magnificent, the Ottoman Empire’s northern borders expanded into the Balkans and Hungary and in 1529 the Ottomans even tried to capture Vienna. It also spread across the north coast of Africa over to Egypt, up into Palestine, Lebanon, Syria and Jordan, and into parts of Arabia. However, its powerful reign could not be successfully sustained, and by 1920 its borders had shrunk to those of modern day Turkey. Thus, while The Ottoman Empire consolidated its power within Turkey, its borders extended far beyond Anatolia into north Africa and the Middle East.

Because Turkey once functioned as the seat of the vast Ottoman Empire, today it is perceived ‘as mysteriously oriental and distinctly different from the rest of Europe [. . .] despite being a part of European history for centuries’ (Dismorr, 2008, p. 9). As the Ottoman Empire’s borders once extended to the Middle East, in some ways it can be understood as a metonym for ‘the Arabs and Islam, which for almost a thousand years together stood for the Orient’ (Said, 1978, p. 17). The Orient, which was largely comprised of the Ottoman Empire at its height, served Europe as a ‘cultural contestant, and [provided] one of its deepest and most recurring images of the Other’ (Said, 1978, p. 1). Having once identified Turkey as part of the alien Other, it is now difficult for some Europeans to assimilate it into the European institutional self, the EU.
Europe United Against the Turkish Threat

One of the reasons Europe classified the Ottoman Turks as the Other was because of the threat they posed to Europe at the height of their power. With the rise of the Ottoman Empire in the seventeenth century, ‘the “Ottoman peril” lurked alongside Europe to represent for the whole of Christian civilisation a constant danger’ (Said, 1978, p. 59). It was this fear of the Ottomans that helped Europe form a provisional collective identity – while they may have spoken different languages and lived in different European empires, none of them were Ottoman Turks. Thus:

> The scattered and dispersed European powers developed the practice of coming together and consulting on how to best deal with the threat of Islam. Napoleon once stated that the nature of this unity was that, “for a few shadings, France, Spain, England, Italy and Germany have the same traditions, the same religion, the same costume . . . Except for Turkey, Europe is but one province of the world”. (Aktay, 2008, p. 100)

The strength of this binary – Europeans/Turks – was such that is still endures today, as evidenced by resistance to Turkey’s EU accession bid. There continues to exist within Europe a feeling that Turks cannot be integrated into the ‘Western family, some of whose members spent centuries trying to drive the Turks out of a Europe they threatened to overwhelm’ (TIME, 1992, p. 31). Thus, it seems that ‘for Europe, [the Ottoman Empire] was a lasting trauma’ which cannot be overlooked when considering Turkey’s bid for EU membership (Said, 1978, p. 59).

Europe as Superior to the ‘Other’

Europe’s fear of the Ottoman Turks was tempered by a strong sense of intellectual and cultural superiority over them. Beginning in ‘the sixteenth century, when successive Christian intellectuals called upon their rulers to bury their differences and mount a crusade against the Turks, the claim was always that European, Christian, science could never fail against Asian ignorance’ (Pagden, 2002, p. 50). This attitude endured well into the eighteenth century when European visitors to the Ottoman Empire described Turks as appearing ‘as a strikingly exotic sort of people with both awkward and detestable features’ (Çırakman, 2002, p. 4). Consequently, this ‘informed the European self-image as superior and advanced’ (Çırakman, 2002, p. 4). Thus, by solidifying itself against the perceived inferiority of the Ottoman Other, Europe established a culture of superiority over the Turks.
Europe’s scorn of the Ottoman Turks was never more explicitly expressed than with the 1920 Sèvres Treaty, which sought ‘to split Anatolia between British, French, Greek and Italian regions’ (Dismorr, 2008, p. 26). However, the treaty was never ratified due to the Turkish independence movement, which resulted in the formation of the Republic in 1923. The Allies sought to carve up the Ottoman Empire as they believed it was suitably weakened to merit the moniker, the Sick Man of Europe. In her book, from the “Terror of the World” to the “Sick Man of Europe”, Aslı Çirakman (2002) cites a 1769 letter from the Earl of Crawford as perhaps the first instance in which the Empire was described as such. The Earl likened the Empire’s declining state to “an overgrown body, full of distempers, enfeebled with its own bulk, and sick at heart” (p. 164). Even Edward Said (1978) ironically compared the Empire to a diseased body in his book Orientalism: ‘As a result of World War I, Asiatic Turkey was being surveyed by Britain and France for its dismemberment. There, laid out on an operating table for surgery, was the Sick Man of Europe, revealed in all his weaknesses’ (p. 223). This powerful metaphor and the Sèvres Treaty still haunt Turkish national pride. In questioning why their accession has taken a longer and harder road than any other, many Turks speak of ‘Sèvres syndrome’, whereby it is felt that the EU states have yet to rightfully recognise Turkey as an equal (Dismorr, 2008, p. 26).

The Role of the Oriental ’Other’ in Defining Europe’s ‘Self’

The creation of an Orientalist discourse on the Ottoman Empire can be understood as Europe asserting its cultural identity through negative identification. As Hasan Kösebalan (2007) observes: ‘identities are defined through relationships with others, which are constructed through historical experience’ (p. 97). In a ‘nationalist approach to European culture there is a need to designate the radical other’ so as to better define the nebulous European Self (Ifversen, 2002, p. 10). According to Bo Stråth (2004), ‘the image of a European identity necessarily contains a demarcation of the non-European. This is the Janus head of every distinction, which necessarily is both exclusive and inclusive. Europe is seen in the mirror of the Other’ (p. 15). In many ways, this approach to creating a European identity reflects the work of semiologist Roland Barthes who ‘insisted that, in the assignment of an identity to anything whatsoever, we must not only assign it a name, we must also assert the absence or presence of some feature of it’ (White, 2004, p. 72). Thus, Europe’s Orientalist discourse on the Turks can be seen as a means of creating a European identity by first identifying what it is not.
While it would be remiss to suggest that Europe's identity was constructed entirely in response to the Turks, uniting itself against them helped Europe to coalesce its otherwise disparate Self. In this way, the European identity 'enacts a double "composition"; that of the relations between the peoples and nations that compose Europe and that of the relations that those peoples and nations and the totalities that they constitute have with the rest of the world' (Robson, 2008, p. 380). Only in the presence of the Other can Europe '[bring] to the fore the so-called distinctive European characteristics and thereby [distinguish] the Europeaness of Europe' (Yeğenoğlu, 2006, p. 247). The need for a 'clear boundar[y] between “We Europeans” and the Others, the Turks, the Muslims, and so on' (Stråth, 2004, p. 23), is symptomatic of Europe's inability to define its identity from within its own borders. Since the 'identity of Europe is contested, and its culture, although occasionally and partially shared, can never be defined into a single coherent dominant; its only cohesive and consistent bond is its opposition to its Other (Shahin & Wintle, 2000, p. 5). Thus, by defining itself in contrast to an Other, Europe creates a provisional identity for its Self that satiates its 'longings for cohesion and holism' (Stråth, 2004, p. 26).

In this light, it is not surprising that Turkey's EU accession bid has faced bitter resistance from certain EU leaders like President Sarkozy and Chancellor Merkel. If Turkey successfully integrates into the EU, it will 'challenge many conceptions of what the EU is and should be' (Pinder & Usherwood, 2007, p. 139). Considering that 'the discourse of European identity is a symptom of anxieties about non- Europeans', Turkey's accession can be seen as rattling Europe's nerves by dismantling the Self/Other binary that has defined it for centuries (Asad, 2002, p. 211). Though Turkey's bid has required considerably more time and effort than any other candidate country's, in the context of Europe's discourse of the Ottoman Empire, it is easier to understand why it has not progressed more quickly or smoothly.

**Breaking with Past Traditions**

While formulating a European identity created solely in opposition to Turkey is fatal for its accession prospects, creating a European identity based exclusively on past traditions is equally exclusionary. As Hayden White (2004) notes, 'Europe is routinely considered to be characterizable by the multiplicity of the cultural traditions (Classical, [ . . . ] humanistic, Enlightenment, Romantic, Realistic); and yet none of those include or even acknowledge Turkey's past (p. 82). If 'the idea of a common European identity can be presented as [ . . . ]
a historical uncovering of a common past,’ then it can also be understood that Turkey will never overcome oppositions to its accession bid (Castiglione, 2009, p. 35). This opinion is exemplified by Valery Giscard d’Estaing (2004), who led the drafting of the EU constitution and tried to define the foundations of Europe as ‘the cultural contributions of ancient Greece and Rome, [. . .] the creative enthusiasm of the Renaissance, the philosophy of the Age of Enlightenment, and the contributions of rational and scientific thought’. By using only these traditions to assess Turkey’s cultural compatibility with Europe, he concluded that ‘Turkey has developed its own history and its own culture, which deserves respect. However, the foundations of Europe’s identity, so vital to the cohesion of the EU today, are different’ (2004). His words illustrate that if Turkey is to ever become a part of the EU and share a cultural identity with Europe, then past traditions can no longer be considered the only avenue to formulating a European identity.

If one accepts that the past cannot provide an adequate cultural identity for contemporary Europe and Turkey, one must then look to the present and the future. By locating ‘European roots in a narrative whose starting point is Europe's present,’ Turkey will not only be liberated from the Orientalist discourse that continues to haunt its relationship with Europe, but also from past traditions in which it did not participate (Castiglione, 2009, p. 35). Allowing Europe's cultural identity to extend beyond a static past also lives up to Robert Schuman’s declaration that, ‘Europe will not be made all at once, or according to a single plan. It will be built through concrete achievements which first create a de facto solidarity.’ While ‘the dialectics of European diversity and unity are certainly not a topic that will soon be settled “once and for all”’, taking the present as a starting point and recognising that a European identity will continue to evolve over time is crucial for Turkey’s accession (Schäffner, Musolff & Townson, 1996, p. 12). Thus, if Turkey is to ‘no longer be ignored or dismissed as a somewhat odd and persistent EU candidate country, which will remain on the fringes of Europe,’ it must also be included in a contemporary discourse of European identity, rather than one that is located squarely in the past (Dismorr, 2008, p. 10).

Finally, it is worth noting that the EU cannot modify its geographical borders while maintaining its old cultural identity without creating second-class citizens of the new member states. As the EU’s borders have already undergone significant transformations, most notably in 2004, it has shown that ‘it has no fixed external frontiers’ (Modood, Triandafyllidou & Zapata-Barrero, 2006, p. 10). This assertion is verified by Title VIII, Article 49 of the Treaty on European Union: ‘Any European State which respects the values [of the Union] may apply
to become a member of the Union’ (EU Treaty C 321 E/10). Therefore, if the EU is willing to consider expanding its borders to include Turkey, it follows that it must also include it in a contemporary discourse of European identity. Otherwise, the EU will violate its own Charter of Fundamental Rights, which promises to ‘respect cultural, religious, and linguistic diversity’ (EU Charter 2010/C 83/02). Thus, if the EU seriously values Turkey’s bid for accession, it will demonstrate a willingness to expand and update its cultural identity as well as its borders.

**Europe’s Exclusionary Christian Past**

While grounding Europe’s cultural identity in past traditions is damaging for Turkey’s EU prospects, it is still not as exclusionary as constructing a discourse of identity based on Christianity. With 99.9 per cent of Turkish citizens identifying themselves as Muslim, the prospect of Turkey’s accession represents a significant rupture in the EU ‘Christian Club’ (World Values Survey, 2009). Christianity ‘has been the majority religion of the continent for nearly two millennia, and at times the geographical extent of Roman Christianity has closely approximated the boundaries of what was called “Europe” ’ (Wintle, 2000, p. 13). Consequently, the idea that Christianity is synonymous with Europe ‘is found in so many books and articles on the subject of Europe [ . . . ] that the sense of being European was at one time virtually identical with that of being Christian’ (Gossman, 2010, p. 204). Thus, in considering Turkey’s bid for membership, the EU must strongly reflect on whether or not it is prepared to reconsider the ‘standard narrative of the European past [which] has been built around the coordinates of Greece, Rome and Christianity’ (Ifversen, 2002, p. 8).

Though European Christians have traditionally separated into two groups, ‘Catholics in the north and Protestants in the south,’ they have always found common ground in defending Europe against the Muslim Turks (Klausen, 2005, p. 142). Despite their denominational differences, the Christians’ fear of Muslims was such that ‘for centuries, the only all-European enterprises were joint actions against Muslims from the Crusades of the Middle Ages to the defence of the Habsburg Empire against the Turks in the late seventeenth century’ (Kumar, 2002, p. 55). This solidarity allowed Europe to ‘[define] itself as a community, from the Middle Ages to the seventeenth century, largely in relation to expansionist Islamic pressures’ (Gossman, 2010, p. 204). Thus, much like the Ottoman ‘threat’ provided Europe with a cohesive cultural identity that it would have otherwise lacked, the Ottomans also provided Europe with an impetus to coalesce its disparate Christian denominations.
The extent of the historical animosity between European Christians and Muslim Turks was such that it is frequently cited as an insurmountable obstacle for Turkey on its path to EU membership. Contemporary ‘Euro-federalists, who [consider] Europe’s Greco-Roman and Judeo-Christian heritage to be the foundations of European identity, vehemently [oppose] the prospect of Turkey’s membership’ (Grigoriadis, 2006, p. 149). For them, it is impossible to re-evaluate ‘the narration of European history as a long, violent struggle between Christianity and the Muslim world’ (Kuzmanovic, 2008, p. 54). While ‘there have been Muslims in Europe since the Middle Ages, and there are now a very great number, […] the long history of Islam providing the external other for Europe’s identity’ has proven to be a significant obstacle in gathering European support for Turkey’s EU bid (Wintle, 2000, p. 25). Throughout ‘countries such as Austria, Denmark, Holland, France, and Germany, the opposition to Turkish membership is pronounced, and in these countries Turks are often framed as the “other” purely based on religion’ (Kirişci, 2008, p. 31). Therefore, if relations between Turkey and the EU are ever going to move beyond merely a “coexistence” [that] can be envisaged between “us” and “them”, Europe will have to look past its Christian heritage when considering Turkey’s EU prospects (Asad, 2002, p. 213). Otherwise, it will never assuage Turkish suspicions that ‘as a predominately Muslim nation, it is not really wanted in the EU “Christian Club”’ (Murray, 2009, p. 196).

**The Changing Role of Christianity in Contemporary Europe**

Despite having defined and defended themselves as Christians for centuries, recent studies suggest that Europeans decreasingly identify themselves as Christian. If this is true, it would significantly undermine the argument made by critics of Turkey’s EU bid that Turkey does not belong in the EU because it is not a Christian country. After all, how can Turks be denied access to the EU for not being Christian if Europeans no longer think of themselves as Christian? Though ‘Christianity remains Europe's main religion, with about 550 million adherents[,] the number of Europeans who identify as Catholic – by far the biggest denomination on the Continent – has fallen by more than a third since 1978’ (Chu, 2003). This ‘decline of Christian belief and practice in most European countries has made it more difficult to claim that Christianity is still essential to the definition of Europe in any but the vaguest sense’ (Gossman, 2010, p. 204). Instead, ‘western European societies [are now considered] deeply secular societies, shaped by the hegemonic knowledge regime of secularism. The progressive, though highly uneven, secularisation of Europe is an undeniable social fact’ (Casanova, 2009, p. 143).
Christianity and the EU Constitution

While Christianity’s popularity may be on the decline in Europe, it still holds powerful sway in cultural relations between the EU and Turkey. As the May 2004 controversy over the EU Constitutional Treatise shows, Christianity still presents a significant hurdle for Turkey in its quest for EU membership. Journalist Ian Black (2004) summarised the situation as such: ‘seven states, led by Italy, urged the union to recognize a “historical truth” and refer explicitly to the “Christian roots of Europe”’. Though the proposal was unsuccessful, German Chancellor Angela Merkel championed it again in 2006: “I believe this treaty should be linked to Christianity and God because Christianity was decisive in the formation of Europe” (Murray, 2009, p. 195). Though her support may have been largely motivated by a desire to curry favour with the Germany right-wing party, the CSU, she cemented her position by meeting with Pope Benedict XVI at his summer residence in Rome. Merkel later recounted: “we spoke about the role of Europe and I emphasized the need for a constitution and that it should refer to our Christian values” (Watt, 2006). Despite the weight of Chancellor Merkel’s support, the proposal, like the constitution itself, failed to gain majority support. However, the fact that it attracted such attention indicates that Christianity is still a defining characteristic of Europe for many Europeans.

While the proposal was never forthrightly discussed as a measure to deter Turkey from EU membership, the strong support it received indicates that Europe is not yet ready to see a predominately Muslim country as a culturally integrated member state of the EU. Had it passed, it would have signaled to many Turks that they are not wanted in the EU ‘Christian Club’. For José Casanova (2009), the debate over the preamble shows that:

> Europe, rather than Turkey, is actually the ‘torn country’, deeply divided over its cultural identity, unable to answer the question whether European unity, and therefore its external and internal boundaries, should be defined by the common heritage of Christianity and western civilisation or by its modern, secular values. Publicly, of course, European liberal, secular elites could not share the Pope’s definition of European civilisation as essentially Christian. But they also could not verbalise the unspoken cultural requirements that make the integration of Turkey into Europe such a difficult issue. (p. 144)

Thus, despite indications that Christianity is slipping away from the European cultural identity, it is evident that ‘the image of Christian Europe is still
influential and very useful in the political struggle over the future face of the EU’ (Jung & Raudvere, 2008, p. 7). And, as the efforts of Chancellor Merkel prove, ‘religion as a cultural value [does] mobilise people politically far outside the cultural sector’ with great passion (Vestheim, 2007, p. 219). Though the decision to not include Christianity in the constitution is a positive step towards integrating Turkey, it is clear that ‘a European identity cannot be separated from the historical legacy of Christian thought for some politicians and debators’ (Jung & Raudvere, 2008, p. 6).

More significantly, the constitution debate illustrates that Europeans are more tightly bound to their Christian heritage than their present actions would indicate. Jytte Klausen (2005) observes that ‘empty pews in churches suggest that Europeans care less and less about religion. But if Europeans are not in general actively Christians, they are, by their own assessment, passively Christian in large numbers’ (p. 138). Despite the conclusions drawn from the European Values Survey, ‘large numbers of Europeans, even in the most secular countries, still identify themselves as Christian, pointing to an implicit, diffused and submerged Christian cultural identity’ (Casanova, 2009, p. 143).

Therefore, as both Turks and Europeans contemplate a shared future, it is clear that there will need to be many more talks about how to make room for almost seventy-four million Turkish Muslims in the residually Christian European cultural landscape.

**Istanbul as a Cultural Bridge**

If the proposed Constitution proves anything, it is that the cultural differences between Turks and Europeans are strongly defended by both sides and hold significant repercussions for Turkey’s EU membership bid. As a result, Turkish and EU leaders have come to understand the need for both groups to share a cultural experience if Turkey’s relationship with Europe is to be strengthened. Thus, it is no coincidence that Istanbul was selected as one of three European cities to carry the title of ‘2010 European Capital of Culture.’ Though the programme was started in 1985 and more than forty cities have since boasted the title of ECoC, Turkey is only the second non-EU country to participate, after Norway (European Commission, 2010a). While Istanbul’s inclusion in the ECoC programme may seem unexpected, the role it aspires to play in the larger context of Turkey’s relationship with Europe makes it clear that its selection was extremely well planned.
From EU documents, it is evident that by including Istanbul in the ECoC programme, the organisers hoped to create a cultural bridge between Turks and Europeans, reflecting the geographical position of the city and its status as the gateway between East and West. In 2007, the European Parliament wrote that it ‘welcomes the nomination of Istanbul as a European Capital of Culture in 2010 as an opportunity to strengthen intercultural dialogue and cooperation between the EU and Turkey’ (Parliament Report A6-0168/2008). Furthermore, the choice of Istanbul embodies the ECoC programme’s goal of ‘[highlighting] the richness and diversity of European cultures and the features they share, as well as [promoting] greater mutual understanding between European citizens’ (Parliament and Council Decision No 1622/2006). Thus, the choice of Istanbul as a ECoC can be understood as a calculated effort to try and bridge the cultural differences dividing Turks and Europeans by highlighting the European qualities of Turkey’s greatest city.

Istanbul ECoC as an Opportunity for ‘Soft Power’

As the Istanbul 2010 ECoC programme offers the possibility to strengthen the dialogue between Turks and Europeans, it holds significant power. For political scientist Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004), power is ‘the ability to influence the behaviour of others to get the outcome one wants’ (p. 2). More specifically, the ECoC programme in Istanbul holds great ‘soft power’, which ‘rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others’ (Nye, 2004, p. 5). Joost Lagendijk (2010), a former member of the European Parliament observed: ‘even Turkey’s opponents in the EU would admit that Istanbul offers the best way to convince indecisive and uninformed EU citizens about the European past, present and future of the country’. While other political scientists might dismiss the role of the Istanbul ECoC programme in Turkey’s relationship with Europe, Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004) cautions: ‘it is not smart to discount soft power as just a question of image, public relations, and ephemeral popularity. It is a form of power – a means of obtaining desired outcomes’ (p. 129). Therefore, it follows that if Turkey exploits the ‘soft power’ potential of the ECoC programme, it can persuade European visitors to re-consider their cultural identity and its exclusion of Turkey.

How the ECoC Programme Absorbs the ‘Other’ into the European Self

One way in which the ECoC promises to maximise its soft power potential is by presenting an alternative narrative to the Self/Other binary that has for so long hindered relations between Europe and Turkey. Positing Istanbul firmly in Europe alongside Pécs and Ruhr as ECoC cities demonstrates that:
There is no doubt as to Istanbul's Europeanness . . . Even at the worst times of the Ottoman Empire it was called the “sick man of Europe” not the sick man of Asia or something else. Many roots of European culture still lie in Istanbul. (EurActiv, 2006)

This opinion is clearly shared by President Erdoğan who proclaimed that, ‘Istanbul with its history, culture, civilisation and people is a city that has its face turned toward Europe. As much as this city has internalised European culture, European culture has been shaped by Istanbul’ (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010d, p. 28). By collapsing the Self/Other binary, Istanbul as the 2010 ECoC illustrates how ‘“Europe” is a signifier with a host of different and often contradictory signifieds attached to it, and that “Europe” is less a concept than a figure [of] fiction’ (White, 2004, p. 72). The ECoC title challenges the historical hegemony of the Self/Other relationship by showing that ‘in terms of culture and civilisation, Istanbul is one of the richest cities in Europe [. . . ]. [The ECoC project] aims to take this important chance to remind everyone that the roots of European culture lie in [Istanbul], and that [Turks] are a part of that culture’ (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010a, p. 20). By giving both Turks and Europeans the opportunity to see their histories from a fresh perspective as historically intertwined, the ECoC programme melds the Turkish Other into the European Self with soft power.

Istanbul as a Template for Religious Diversity in Europe

Lavishing attention upon Istanbul not only presents an alternative to the Self/Other binary, but also to the Christian/Muslim differentiation between Europe and Turkey. In this case, the ECoC holds great power to assuage European fears about Turkish Muslims by showcasing a European city where Christians and Muslims have co-existed in relative peace for thousands of years. Nuri Çolakoğlu, chairman of the Executive Committee of the ECoC, boasts how ‘Istanbul is one of those rare places where you can find a synagogue, a church and a mosque next to each other on the same street’ (Euractiv, 2006). President Erdoğan has also expressed pride in the city for a similar reason: “The sound of prayers rising from those minarets never suppresses the sound of church bells. Istanbul is a capital of tolerance as much as it is of culture” (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010d, p. 28). For them and many other Turks, bestowing the 2010 ECoC title upon Istanbul is a means of indicating to both European Christians and Turkish Muslims that coexistence is possible and that religion should not segregate Turkey from the EU.
The rhetoric of religious diversity is underscored by two events prominently featured in the ECoC programme. The first is the exhibition “Legendary Istanbul: 8,000 Years of a Capital”, held at the Sakıp Sabancı Museum. In recounting the history of the city, the exhibition employs many valuable Christian objects, like ‘a rare double-sided Byzantine Christian icon lent from the Heybeliada monastery by the Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew’ (Fowler, 2010). It pays further homage to the Christian communities in the city by showcasing ‘a 14th-century book of the gospels of Matthew, Mark, Luke and John, written in Arabic; a richly illustrated Armenian Bible; and a dictionary of Ottoman Turkish written in Hebrew’ (Fowler, 2010). Finally, the exhibition features ‘a planetarium-like projection to show how dozens of colourful domes inside existing structures like churches and mosques reflect the commonalities rather than the divisions among faiths’ (Fowler, 2010). In the words of Güler Sabancı, one of the exhibition’s sponsors, “the concept is to show the diversity of Istanbul through its domes, the domes of every religion” (Fowler, 2010).

The emphasis on religious tolerance in the ECoC programming is also evidenced by the documentary, ‘Three Days in Istanbul’. According to its description on the Istanbul 2010 ECoC website, the film ‘reveals Istanbul’s codes embracing fraternity of all religious communities that have been living together in a great peace and happiness since 1453’ (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010c). More specifically, it shows religious ceremonies performed by Muslims, Christians and Jews and highlights the similarities between all three. By supporting projects like this, the ECoC is trying to demonstrate that differences between Christians and Muslims, ‘which at first glance [seem] plausible, [become] dissolved into a complex and puzzling pattern of cultural and religious exchanges that does not provide a reasonable platform for the border demarcation of the EU along religious lines’ (Jung & Raudvere, 2008, p. 14). Thus, both the official rhetoric and the selection of projects in the ECoC programme illustrate how Istanbul is an effective example of soft power as it showcases the potential for harmonious religious diversity in Europe.

The Impact of Soft Power on the European Cultural Identity

One of the ways in which the ECoC will be considered a success for the Turks is if they are able to convince European visitors that the European cultural identity would benefit from Turkish contributions. Because this goal produces intangible results over the long-term, it perfectly illustrates the difficulty of employing soft power. In the words of Joseph S. Nye, Jr. (2004): ‘Many of [soft power’s] crucial resources are outside the control of governments, and their
effects depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audience. Moreover, soft-power resources [...] sometimes take years to produce the desired outcomes’ (p. 99). Therefore, while the ECoC programme only lasts one year, the opinions of European visitors to Istanbul may take many years to change. This is turn means that the Istanbul ECoC will not affect an overnight expansion of the European cultural identity. Rather, it will hopefully mark the start of a long-term effort to knead Turkey into the contemporary European cultural identity.

In interviews, Turkish officials readily acknowledge that the benefits of the Istanbul programme will not appear rapidly. Hayati Yazıcı, Minister of State and Chairman of the 2010 ECoC Agency Coordination Board, insists that ‘Istanbul is not a European Capital of Culture solely for the year 2010, but rather the capital of all times, a true European capital. It is about time we built Istanbul as a brand and promote that brand’ (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010b, p. 24). In another interview, Yazıcı explains how ‘beyond individuals and institutions, Istanbul 2010 ECOC is a collective and long-term venture’ (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010a, p. 22). His interest in the long-term benefits of the ECoC title are echoed by Turkish President Erdoğan, who expressed that ‘even though Istanbul will be holding the title “European Capital of Culture” for one year only, Istanbul will never lose the denotation of being a European centre of culture as long as it exists’ (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010e, p. 28). In return for their patience, however, Yazıcı and Erdoğan hope that Europeans will come to share the opinion of Luc Van den Brande, who proclaimed that “when I view history, [Istanbul] is part of our common heritage, but [it] is part of our common future” (Today’s Zaman, 2010). By allowing the Istanbul ECoC title to percolate in the minds of Europeans, the Turks are ultimately hoping that more of them will consider Istanbul, and by extension, Turkey, as rightfully belonging in the European cultural identity.

**Istanbul as a Gateway to Full EU Membership**

While improving the image of Turkey in the minds of Europeans is, in itself, worthwhile, the ECoC ultimately serves a greater purpose: increasing Turkey’s chances for full EU membership. If Turkey can convince Europe of its rightful place in the European cultural landscape, it will greatly quell outcries that Turkey does not belong as a member state of the EU. It is interesting to note how forthrightly Turkish officials express these ambitions and openly tout the instrumental value of the ECoC. For example, Nuri Çolakoğlu has stated that
“Istanbul’s title as an ECOC can be useful as it will attract many people to Istanbul in 2010 and so help people to see what actually Turkey stands for. I am sure this will help ease the tensions during the [EU] accession process” (Euractiv, 2006). These hopes were articulated by another ECoC official, Hayati Yazıcı: ‘Istanbul 2010 is a European Union project, and we will realise it with the help of our European friends. This project will reflect the societal projection of Turkey’s journey to become a full EU member’ (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010a, p. 22). Therefore, it is clear that Turkish officials have pinned great hopes on the soft power potential of the ECoC programme to increase Turkey’s chances of full EU membership.

Most significantly, President Erdoğan has argued that the Istanbul ECoC title carries great clout in Turkey’s negotiations with the EU. In an interview, he declared that ‘given that Turkey is a candidate State destined to join the European Union, Istanbul's designation as a European Capital of Culture will further the European political project, the European values, and the sense of European belonging’ (Istanbul 2010 ECoC Agency, 2010d, p. 28). For a politician of his stature to acknowledge the potential for EU membership as a result of the ECoC shows that the programme does indeed hold great soft power. President Erdoğan’s comment also illustrates his understanding that ‘when you can get others to admire your ideals and to want what you want, you do not have to spend as much on sticks and carrots to move them in your direction. Seduction is always more effective than coercion’ (Nye, 2004, p. xxx). Therefore, by marketing Istanbul as an attractive, cosmopolitan, European city that supports religious diversity and positively contributes to the European cultural identity, the Turks are masterfully exercising soft power for the benefit of their EU aspirations.

**Conclusion**

In concluding this discussion, it is helpful to return to the original research question: How has Europe’s cultural identity affected Turkey’s bid for membership? After analysing the construction and contradictions of Europe’s cultural identity, both past and present, it is clear that Europe’s cultural identity does indeed pose significant hurdles for Turkey on its path to full EU membership. Europe has traditionally defined itself around the dual axes of past traditions and Christianity, both of which exclude Turkey. However, if Turkey joins the EU as a member state, the EU has to be willing to expand its cultural identity alongside its geographical borders. Otherwise, it will privilege the cultural contributions of some member states over Turkey, thereby undermining its pivotal value of equality.
Moreover, Turkey’s integration into the EU will only succeed if Europeans overcome their antiquated perceptions of Turks as the threatening Other. While the official EU rhetoric may espouse the virtues of tolerance and equality and cautiously back Turkey’s bid for accession, Turkey’s integration into Europe will only be complete when its citizens are fully accepted as Europeans. There clearly still remains the perception that Turks are different and exterior to Europe, due largely to their Muslim beliefs. Therefore, if there is ever to be majority public support for Turkey’s EU application, Europeans must come to see Turks as rightfully belonging in Europe and positively contributing to the European cultural identity – not spoiling it or diluting it with their own cultural particularities.

In light of these obstacles standing between Turkey and full EU membership, the Istanbul 2010 ECoC holds great promise to facilitate cultural relations between Europe and Turkey. As Istanbul offers Turks the opportunity to show how their country has contributed to Europe’s greatness and how it is possible for Muslims and Christians to peacefully co-exist, it gracefully challenges critics of Turkey’s EU bid. The ECoC programme also illustrates the often overlooked and undervalued soft power that culture holds in political affairs. However, it is important to also recognise that the ECoC programme cannot, in one year, unravel hundreds of years of prejudice and tension that have marred Europe’s relationship with the Ottoman Empire, and now Turkey. Rather, the ECoC promises the start of a new chapter in Turkey’s relationship with Europe.

Bibliography


CITY AS SPECTACLE: THE FESTIVALIZATION OF CULTURE IN CONTEMPORARY ISTANBUL

By Evinç Doğan

Abstract

This paper departs from Guy Debord’s “Society of the Spectacle” and seeks to explore the interrelation between the city and the festivals through the construction of the city image around the term “spectacle”. Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts (İKSV), taking the leading role in initiating international festivals in Istanbul, has introduced the transformation in the cultural arena through privatization and globalization. Now, an increasing number of private actors, ranging from banking companies to large capital groups, take key roles and the spectacle is shaped by the cultural capital, according to the new symbolic and economic order. Thus, the aim of this paper can be briefly stated as giving a snapshot to contemporary arts and culture industry in Istanbul and telling this story through the lens of the international festivals based on the idea of the city as spectacle. In doing so, the paper takes a two-sided approach; on the one side, it literally refers to festivals as cultural events and, on the other, it adverts Situanists’ term of “spectacle” as a scene of permanent festival.

Keywords: Istanbul, spectacle, festival, İKSV, urban imaginary

Spectacle as a Sign: Illusion, Simulation, Commodity

The whole world is merely an illusion of the senses and the sensory trace of that disappearance. (Baudrillard, 1997, p. 116)

In societies where modern conditions of production prevail, all of life presents itself as an immense accumulation of spectacles. Everything that was directly lived has moved away into a representation. (Debord, 1983, p. 1)

Representations have become more powerful than the material reality itself. The mode of the representation has put forward the spectacle in holding the gaze of the viewer. What is more important than making the image, is the eye looking at it.
The word spectacle derives from the Latin root spectare "to view, watch" and specere “to look at” (Kan, 2004). Image and memory are the two elements that need to be underlined in the term “spectacle”. Debord (1983) developed the concept of the ‘spectacle’ referring to a new stage in the development of capitalist urbanization, signaling “an image-saturated society where advertising, entertainment, television and mass media increasingly define and shape the urban life”. Urban spectacles are public displays, including festivals and mega-events that involve capitalist markets, sets of social relations, and flows of commodities, capital, technology, and cultural forms. The modern spectacle addresses more complicated issues of class and control which are pertinent to mass consumerism. On the one hand, spectacle refers to particular public events, high profile extravaganzas and urban spaces and on the other a theatrical presentation or controlled visual production conceived as antithesis of a spontaneous festival (Gotham, 2005).

Debord’s definition for spectacle inscribes the social relations of power and conditions for practices associated with consumption based on the Marxist theory of “commodity fetishism”. This theory takes consumption as central rather than the production. Spectacle, in this context, can be regarded as a form of power, through which consumption comes to be understood within the capitalist societies (Cronin & Hetherington, 2008). Festival and urban spectacle became instruments of the social control in the society. Debord (1983, p. 49) says that “the spectacle is the developed modern complement of money where the totality of the commodity world appears as a whole, as a general equivalence for what the entire society can be and can do”. Therefore according to his definition “spectacle is never an image but forms of social practice mediated by images,” (Debord, 1983, p. 4) which can be perceived with all of its connotations linked to the market economy. With the rise of mass consumption and dissemination of information and advertising; spectacle has become somewhat equivalent to the commercial images that lack content. The capitalist forces strain the consumer to recede from the individual subjectivity of the choices and desires, directing towards a more singular commercial consciousness by presenting an illusionary set of image and representation. Nevertheless it should not be forgotten that the spectacle is not an abstract illusion but a material reality, which conveys attached meanings to the commercialism through the materialization of the ideology. The “commodity fetishism” tells us about the transition of “exchange value” of the consumption into the “sign value,” in which “the spectator-consumer relation to the spectacle-image-commodity creates a set of power relations and the real life turns into
a “mere representation” (Debord, 1983, p. 1). Scott (1999, p. 807) claims that the cultural economy aims to “cater to consumer demands for amusement, ornamentation, social display and so on.” The consumer culture creates signs and images to be consumed where the sign value becomes important.

The entire system of media and information is about the “production of event as a sign” (Baudrillard, 2001, p. 132). Capital, in this sense, is nothing more than a very complex simulation, and which is exercised through bourgeois model of social organization (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 36; 1981, p. 41). Baudrillard recognized that all of human culture is the result of the collective sharing in / of simulacra (1990, p. 50) and that the real “has only ever been a form of simulation” (2003, p. 39) and that “It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication; it is a question of substituting the signs of the real for the real . . .” (Baudrillard, 1994a, p. 2).

Baudrillard (1994a, p. 12) takes Disneyland as the perfect model of the orders of “simulacra” as it presents us an imaginary, a play of illusions and phantasms. The “real consumer” becomes a “consumer for illusions” (Debord, 1983, p. 47) and “ad-dict buys images, not things” (Taylor & Saarinen, 1994). We cannot speak about the false representation of reality (ideology) but instead it stands for the fact that real is no longer real. Looking from this side, we are no longer in the society of the spectacle, of which the Situationists spoke as the whole the spectacle gives us a real experience, which in the end turned into a simulation of the real. Here, spectacle is not meant to be in a relation toward a capital but a political one, therefore it surpasses by far that of the commodity described by the Situationists.

“McDonaldization” (Ritzer, 2000) and “Disneyification” of urban space (Sorkin, 1992; Bryman, 1999; Eeckhout, 2001), have been discussed through the commodification, homogenization and rationalization of time and space when the urban spectacles are started to be mass produced for the sake of profit making and bureaucratic control motives, which force individuals to consume images as passive spectators (Gotham, 2005).

Adorno & Horkheimer (1997, pp. 133-34) assert that standardization and mass production brought by the economic order of the culture industry led to subordinated masses to conform rather than to create. Thus, the “freedom to choose” gave its place to the “freedom to imitate.” Another important aspect to be underlined in this respect is the reproducibility of work of arts with the development of mechanical reproduction. The reproduction of art created situations in which the original work would be out of reach and the copies end
up having unique existence (Benjamin, 1973, p. 222). The emergence of copies further brought the “market form” of competition (Harvey, 1989a, p. 22). In this scene, Benjamin (1973, p. 234) argues that the cultural production has become more market oriented while the work of art can be perceived as the commodity itself and the consumers are the people who created the market. Debord (1983, p. 193) links this argument to the spectacle by defining culture as “the star commodity of the spectacular society” as the spectacle conceals social relations of exploitation and domination behind the spectacular appearance of commodities, which leads to the absolute fulfillment of the commodity fetishism.

**Instant Cities**

When the spectacle stops talking about something for three days, it is as if it did not exist. (Debord, 1990 [1988], p. 10 (VII))

The relentless pace at which events appear and disappear signals a society “obsessed by the desire to forget” (Kundera, 1996, as cited in Clarke, 2008, p. 138). The consumption in the contemporary society can be regarded as “instant” as of nature. Media fosters the desire to forget, through which the world historical events are increasingly condemned to disappear (Baudrillard, 1994b). The authority and the power of the capitalist order has been challenged by the “surface glitter, sense of ephemeral of display and transitory but participatory pleasure”, which is central to the spectacle, discussed by Harvey (1989b, p. 91) in defining “architecture of spectacle”.

Festivals, which last for several successive days in a year and transform the cities into urban spectacles, can be given as an example to grasp the relationship between the capitalist order and the temporality of the display. The entertainment has become the core of the festivalization in the cultural urban landscape through the creation of “festival marketplaces” and the integration with the market economies. The process of urbanization and culture production brought opportunities and threats in urban restructuring through increasing importance of images and symbols. Image making, due to its direct relation with tourism, became a tool for increasing the competitiveness of cities in the global arena by attracting the cultural capital (Florida, 2002; Richards & Wilson, 2006).

For Debord, the contemporary city is the locus of conflicts and struggles over the spectacle. In line with Debord’s view, Lefebvre’s critique of urbanization and capitalist modernity involves alienation and the commodification with
respect to the social realm of leisure and entertainment in which the spectacles are associated with the space of capital accumulation. Lefebvre (1991, p. 46) draws interrelations between “spatial practice,” “representations of space” and “spaces of representation” in different ways of production where the spatial practice is marked by reproduction of everyday life. What can be inferred from his distinction between “space” and “place” is that space is a process – the act of representation or “signification” whereas place can be thought as a product – the represented object (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 115). Walton (2010) argues that specific spatial practices aspire to re-produce particular places in the city through the existing meanings in the identity and memory because of the connection of past with the present, which is not necessarily the case all the time. Sometimes the new uses are proposed to the old places, which have lost their functions and meanings. These types of places are represented through a new image and turn out to be new places unattached from their identity and memory. New ‘cultural strategies’ of economic redevelopment, including transformation and reuse of urban spaces, designating areas of the city as artistic quarters, and the historical preservation, among others, are becoming common features of the cities, in which consumption and leisure become ‘experiences’ to be consumed, collected and displayed (Zukin, 1995; 1997).

Lefebvre (1996) argues “spatial imagination” through the example of Les Halles in Paris that is transformed from an urban centre designed to facilitate the distribution of food into a gathering place and scene of permanent festival, which became “a center of play rather than work” (Lefebvre, 1991, p. 176). Les Halles was a marginal urban space in several ways. For the government, it was an eyesore as a market district, a deteriorating hub in the city that needed cleaning up. Actually this made the space attractive for the Situanists who devoted particular attention to the Parisian spectacle through their “psychogeographical maps” studying the power and politics of urban space not only in the sense of the “play of power” but also as they “play of the possibilities” in the city (Pinder, 2000, p. 358). Les Halles, as a “cultural Mecca” and its festive atmosphere in the former markets, represents a transition between the days of May ’68 and a more structured version followed that era. In many aspects, Beaubourg is a similar case, but also a distinctive one in the sense that it stands as the terminal monument to the “festival space” – a space of complete transparency programmed for a constantly renewed celebration of the visible (Bonnemaison, 2008, p. 278). Renovation project for Les Halles was not monumental enough to actualize the political goals of the government
aimed at repressing the liminal qualities of the site. Zukin (1991) spots liminal space as a metaphor for the reordering of markets, in which the culture-led regeneration projects are developed for the sake of urban development and branding cities rather than for the sake of the arts.

Another marginal example to transformation of urban spaces is “Tacheles” in Berlin that was constructed as a department store in 1906; abandoned and severely damaged during GDR rule; then become a squatter’s zone during ‘90s; and now transformed into a centre for the arts – a “commercial senate sponsored, cultural Tra-la-la,” (Squat!net, 2006, p. 28; as cited in Carr, 2010, p. 83).1

Tacheles became an official tourist attraction led by the virtue of arts and entertainment. This was possible, thanks to a group of artists, who recognized the historic importance of the building that became known particularly for its ruined architecture. Followed by the fall of Berlin Wall, in the ‘90s, the premises of the building were occupied by artists. This particularly aimed to prevent the demolition of the building and could be described as a successful attempt to create an image and identity for the urban spaces. Nevertheless, on the State side, the envisaged plan for the site was different. The complex is sold to the Fundus Group – a group that specializes on constructing vacation resorts and luxury hotels, such as the luxurious Adlon Hotel in Berlin (Carr, 2010, p. 84). In 2003, Fundus announced its plans to construct five buildings on the lots surrounding Tacheles – including apartments, restaurants and a five-star business hotel (Nolan, 2008).

The example of Tacheles, likewise Les Halles, has strong connotations to the Lefebvre's theory of “social space”. It was a space of consumption as a shopping mall – “Cathedral of Commerce”, and a space of representation as a meeting place for the well dressed, entertainment oriented consumers. When it is considered as an artistic place, the Lefebvrian argument shows itself in cooperation with the State and the counter-culture (marginalized group of squatters) as the new owners rented the building to the artists- the squatters, which cannot be recognized as “counters” anymore (Carr, 2010, p. 85).

Hubbard & Hall (1998) draws our attention to reimagining the localities and the transformation of previously industrial cities into the spectacular cities of (and for) consumption. This is a continuous process of creating and recreating the

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1 Author's translation of, “kommerzielles Kultur-tralala, sponsert by Senat,” (squat.net! 2006; errors as in original).
image of the city while the construction and interpretation of this image enters the material landscape as a design for speculation and domination. Some of the districts in the city are becoming more popular among artists and high-level income groups due to their central location, proximity to the industries and facilities as well as their cultural and historical values. This fact, however, causes the land value to increase and, even in some cases, lower income residents have to move to the outskirts of the city. One of the most common legitimizing ways of the so called “eviction” is the historical preservation and urban gentrification aimed at cleaning up those neighborhoods in order to re-sell them to the high culture and high income capital groups. Cultural industries tend to neglect the social order and variety, which is counter to the argument that a city needs to be “secure, homogeneous, and unitary” to be attractive and consumable (Yardımcı, 2001, pp. 7-8). Sennett (2007, p. 290) claims that although the ideal cities to be visited and lived should be “clean and safe, possess efficient public services, be supported by a dynamic economy, and provide cultural stimulation”, this is not the case due to the “governmental policies”, “society’s division of race, class and ethnicity”, as well as the “economic forces beyond local control”.

The Role of İKSV: Refashioning Istanbul

Creative destruction is embedded within the circulation of capital. (Harvey, 1989a, p. 105)

The historic heritage, cultural diversity and urban vitality of Istanbul carry significant potentials, which could be flourished upon a sound cultural policy based on the exploitation of economic, social and symbolic potentials of the cultural industries, particularly through festivals of arts and culture (Enlil et al., 2008).

Nejat Eczacıbaşı, a businessman and a member of the Eczacıbaşı Family, was the organizer of the First International Arts Festival in Istanbul in 1968. He was also a pioneer in terms of the establishment of Istanbul Foundation for Culture and Arts (hereafter referred as İKSV). Today, İKSV still remains as the main actor in organizing the International Festivals in Istanbul, which includes Film, Music, Jazz and Theatre festivals as well as the Istanbul Biennial for the contemporary arts that also added the Istanbul Design Biennial in 2010. As it can be seen, İKSV blends different forms of art together and reaches to the spectators with rich festival programs. The variety of different tastes and genres are also reflected through festival programs. For instance, Istanbul Jazz Festival
is not only about pure jazz music, yet it also attracts different people and age groups as it adds up electronic jazz, funk, hip-hop, pop, rock and folk into its program and welcomes many celebrities to perform during the Festival. Since its first attempt, many things have changed within the festival organization, in terms of developing through a more professional way and the diversification of events through variety forms of arts.

In 2010, in addition to the list of other urban festivals in the city, Istanbul reaped the First International Istanbul Opera Festival under the title of Istanbul 2010 European Culture Capital project in order to honor the spectacular city through a yearlong mega-event. Although all the festivals that are organized by the non-profit and non-governmental organization, İKSV already joined to the program of the Istanbul 2010, this time, the Opera Festival appears to be pursued by the State Opera and Ballet General Directorate, which hints us on the direct intervention of the State, together with the support of the Ministry of Culture and Tourism, Istanbul Governorship and Istanbul Metropolitan Municipality. It is in fact a very positive development that the state takes a direct role in the development of the cultural agenda and initiate art festivals. Due to the financial nature of the arts and culture market, the costs are high and the quality concerns do not allow the producers to sacrifice from the costs. Correspondingly, demand for arts and culture is more related to the cultivation of taste rather than the low prices. Thus, the subsidy of the state is crucial for the survival of the artistic events that is perhaps more visible in the case of Opera productions, where the production costs are relatively high.

The intervention of the government can also be partly related to cultural policies led by the Council of Europe (CoE) and policies targeted towards the integration with the EU. CoE demands satisfactory reports from the Turkish Government on issues such as creativity and artistic production, cultural heritage, cultural industries, development of cultural participation and participative cultural policies and international cultural partnerships. The efforts of the government to develop cultural sector do not only aim to satisfy the Council representatives, but also it is as an effort that is embarked on initiatives to transform, develop and even “civilize” the society as a reflection of its concerns for creating a legitimate social image” (İnce, 2010, p. 103).

The First Istanbul International Opera Festival is released to the press as a huge Project, which puts emphasis on Istanbul as the 2010 European Capital of Culture. It is claimed that the Festival will not only set Istanbul as a unique place on the world map, but it will also push the Opera art beyond the enclosed
spaces of Istanbul and will introduce it to the large masses that represents various age groups and strata. Although the statement stresses the need for the culture and arts to reach to a wide spectrum of audience, the opera is perceived as a form of art for the elites rather than the ordinary public. In the hopes of attracting the ordinary public, the Festival introduces itself with the slogan of “The Opera is coming to the town.” Actually it seems that the opera is not only coming to the town but also rather coming down to the public itself, or to say the “populace” as a form of art, which is considered as urban and as part of the bourgeois tradition. The marketing campaign surely attempted to attract the public and many people, for the first time in their lives, had the chance to watch a live opera performance. Yet, it would not be valid to say that opera watching is now fully integrated within the public and hence the associated festival established a long lasting trend. Despite producing a kind of curiosity among the different levels of public, a longer period of time will be needed for the recognition of Opera as a popular form of art.

The Festival can be recognized as a big step towards the strengthening of Istanbul’s arts and cultural life. Besides the cultural dimension of the Festival, its political meanings, which are related to the globalization and the order of the spectacle, should also be underlined. Keyder (1992, p. 85) compares Istanbul’s integration with the world’s art map through refashioning the city or selling the city to the international audience to integration with the world economy.

The story of the international festivals in Istanbul reminds us that previously, “the festival was for the city and for its people,” which stressed the festivals’ “educational role” as a part of the nation-state’s modernization process. The elites who owned the cultural capital aimed at achieving a cultural transformation through the deployment of the Western cultural forms and therefore educate the “populace.” However, this nationalistic “identity-formation” approach was substituted with a strategy of globalization, where the festivals was turned into being the prominent cultural “institutions” of the city, or, in other words, the “accessories of the global city.” In these regards, İKSV’s role has also evolved as it turned into an “authority” in terms of the organization of Istanbul’s main festivals. (Yardımcı, 2007, pp. 3-5) This transition period can also be perceived through the abundance of promotional exercises and marketing arrangements

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3 Transl.”Opera Şehre İniyor”.
within Istanbul’s cultural scene. Klaic (2008) explains the international aspects of the festivals through the following words:

“Festivals were in the past instigated chiefly by visionary individuals or prestigious cultural institutions with the purpose of compensating for what the regular season could not offer: to celebrate artistic excellence on an international scale.”

Even if we are to exclude the festivals, there are a number of other cultural industries and events that have key roles in the formation of the city image on a global scale, which varies from the art exhibitions to the galleries, to the museums, to the fairs and even to the sports events. Not only they are effective in terms of attracting visitors to the city, they are also the ways of pulling together the executive classes, talented labor, as well as the capital itself. Herein, intellectuals, politicians and private corporate entrepreneurs in Turkey consider this aspect in their attempts to promote Istanbul as a global capital of the culture. The continuum of globalization in Turkey, as Istanbul being the core of it, gained new dimensions with the reconfiguration of the cityscape in economic, spatial, social and cultural terms. In this context, the role of festivals became more critical within the urban cultural life as their presence help to develop “an ethos that fit the emerging order” (Yardımcı, 2007, p. 4).

Together with the Istanbul International Art Festival, the Istanbul Biennial is also one of “the most politically engaged transnational art event(s)” in the city. (Rossler, 2010) No matter how much the festivals are internationally recognized though their names, programs or organizations; Biennial is always one step further than the festivals in terms of marketing its aspect of the “international.” As would easily be realized, many of the Istanbul Biennial curators are well-known foreign curators who look at Istanbul and its art from the perspectives of the Western culture. The Western model has been becoming more and more influential in the arts, in the politics of culture, and eventually in the everyday life. The professionalization of the Istanbul festivals brought the standardization along with that, and that led to a “failure to develop their own language, overlooking their own specificity, and relying on international curators in the hope that their names or practices would bring recognition” (Yardımcı, 2007, p. 5), which is mostly the case for the Istanbul Biennial. The influx of the Westerns curators and arts also resulted with the injection of the Western values into the city culture. Without giving an opportunity to the rise of the cultural clash, globalization destroys the “specificity of the cultural values,” which leads to the standardization of arts production, often blurring the distinctions between the art and non-art (Erzen, 2010, p. 226).
Festivals are not only becoming standardized, but also “touristified” in the sense of attracting the visitors to the city through the use of most common, well-known, oriental images of Istanbul coupled with the “Western-high culture”. However, we should come to an understanding that the aim of festival marketing should be to attract the high levels of economic capital, meaning the “A-class” tourists with high levels of income who are ready to spend on cultural and artistic activities, or in other words, who have high levels of cultural consumptions as parts of their lifestyles (Yardımcı, 2007, p. 7).

This brings together the following question: “Whose festival is it?” Or as Zukin (1995) rhetorically asks: “Whose city?” and “Whose culture?”, Baydar⁴ reifies these concerns in her critical newspaper article, dating back to the opening ceremony of the first International Istanbul Festival. She questions, “Who, in the population, would be familiar with the Bolshoi Ballet, an orchestra directed by Lessing or the violin concertos by Menuhin?” at a time when Istanbul witnesses the opening of the Bosporus Bridge, or fights cholera in many of its districts. Although Baydar’s approach overlooks the opportunities that might be created by the integration and creation of a high culture, it has a strong emphasis on distinctions among the society, which is based on economic, social and cultural capital and excludes those “who do not have material, temporal, spatial and social access” (Yardımcı, 2007, p. 6).

There are two critical questions, which are brought forward by the curators of the Istanbul Biennial. The first one asks, “How to set the pleasure free”, and the second one, “How to regain revolutionary role of enjoyment.” The commercial art market in the city is converging from biennials to large scale art fairs. The Contemporary Istanbul, which is the largest art fair in the city, will be held for the 6th time this year. In its first time, the fair was more about who you knew in the local art market, whereas it is increasingly becoming internationalized each year, though catering for the collectors, rather than the public, in gallery-like stand settings that resembles the each other (Karaca, 2010, pp. 244-5).

The ninth Istanbul Biennial concentrates around the theme of Istanbul, or the city itself, and places the artworks in spaces that have a more common reference to the everyday life of the city, including Beyoglu and Galata neighbourhoods, instead of its historical monuments. The discourse behind is that “the biennial

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is for and about Istanbul” (Esche & Kortun, 2005, p. 9). This was an attempt to break away from prominent historical sites of Sultanahmet, which have been the focal point of the previous Biennials. However, as Esche noted, the biennial could not be spread up to the other and remote parts of the city, and instead remained in the center of the “artistic and entertainment caché” where the biennial venues happened to be in the walking distance, particularly as the organizers and curators of the biennial were not “brave enough” to make the event for the “all Istanbul” (Karaca, 2010: 240).

Curators are on one side; yet what about the spectators that are on the other side? The target is the high-elite culture that is able to appreciate the contemporary art. However, there are also counter-groups of the spectacle culture such as “Resistanbul Commissariat of Culture” who opposes to this kind of art apprehension and stresses that the art should not be produced in the white cube but instead in the streets and squares, or, in public places, as the creativity belongs to the every member of the society who can not be individually sponsored. They claim that art should go down to the streets and reach local people, and even the marginalized groups. They bring forward the problems of everyday life that includes the struggle in the city streets, the distribution of wealth and poverty, food and hunger, political manipulations, gender oppression, social norms, or the double morality.

The slogan of the 11th Istanbul Biennial in 2009 asks the question of “What keeps mankind alive?” as quoting from Brecht’s Threepenny Opera, in which he made an undiluted critique of consumerism and bourgeois capitalism that revolutionized the role of theater as a tool for social and political change. Resistanbul, argues that there is another question that needs to be asked: “What keeps mankind not alive?”

... we do not have the right to work, we do not get free healthcare and education, our right to our cities, our squares, and streets are taken by corporations, our land, our seeds and water are stolen, we are driven into precarity and a life without security, when we are killed crossing their borders and left alone to live an uncertain future with their potential crises. But we fight. And we resist in the streets not in corporate spaces reserved for tolerated institutional critique so as to help them clear their conscience. (Rossler, 2010)

5 Esche and Kortun are the curators of the 9th Istanbul Biennial, the statement is quoted from Biennial Catalogue.
One of the assistant directors of İKSV\textsuperscript{6} states:

I do not mean that only affluent people could participate but the spectator needs to have some sort of elite taste. […] Art could not be created in line with spectators. Should we stage the play so that the person in Alibeyköy (a peripheral district) enjoys? For that he needs to enjoy theatre, and to enjoy that he must have received a certain level of education starting from his childhood.

This brings us to the “habitus” concept of Bourdieu, which is a set of “predispositions and beliefs” and merely an unconscious formation enacted unthinkingly; that is partly what defines them as habitual. According to this theory, the taste can be cultivated through passive habit formation and education (Velthuis, 2005). Judgments of taste are related to social position, while the individual develops a certain habitus that is typical of his position in the social space. In this context, Bourdieu (1984), suggests that consumption patterns give us clues about the social class of the consumer as the consumption of culture is not only dependent on economic means but also knowledge and willingness to participate to an exchange of cultural end symbolic capital in a cultural/symbolic economy. According to his theory;

\begin{quote}
[d]istinction and pretension, high culture and middle-brow culture . . . only exist through each other, and it is . . . the objective collaboration of their respective apparatuses and clients which produces the value of culture and the need to possess it. (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 232)
\end{quote}

That is to say, the symbolic power is related to social status and other forms of social capital. Thus, people who posses symbolic power, have certain level of prestige, prominence and influence accumulated through the ability to ‘know’ (connaissance) and ‘recognise’ (reconnaissance) cultural capital, which is the cultural know-how that a person builds through education and familial upbringing (Bourdieu, 1984, p. 247).

This is the point where Bourdieu’s theory of “habitus” connects with Lefebvre’s theory of “production of space” as a socio-political act, in which the power structures are to be reinvented. Habitus, in this context, can be recognized as a social dialectic between the production and consumption of lifestyles. The art as the ‘symbolic display’ signals an art market where the number of art fairs is

\textsuperscript{6} Interview by Sibel Yardimci (2007).
increasing quickly and where the investors, art patrons and clientele seek for financial means, value and prestige.

Yardımcı gives us a clear picture of the role of cultural institutions in the cultural/symbolic economy in portraying the relationship among directors of the key cultural institutions:

Fulya Erdemci, a former Biennale curator becomes the director of a new contemporary arts museum (Proje 4L), following the appointment of the former director, Vasıf Kortun by another art gallery (Garanti Platform, sponsored by Garanti Bank – which also sponsors Jazz Festival of İKSV). Another former director of İKSV, Melih Fereli, is also appointed to the advisory board of Proje 4L. This sort of interlocking directorate among cultural institutions does not only help some groups to accumulate more capital, but they also create a basis for these groups to impose their own systems of classification. (2007, p. 7)

Harvey (1989a, p. 5) argues that city is like a theatre, “a series of stages upon which individuals could work their own distinctive magic while performing a multiplicity of roles.” However this requires reading the codes of the city in the right way. Semiotic constructions of social reality in different cultural forms deserve particular attention in order to produce, disseminate and manipulate image and code. The marketing campaign of the International Istanbul Festival in 2003 is a good example in communicating these codes through the questions written on the posters: “What is a good film?” or “What is a good jazz?” According to Yardımcı (2007, p. 9), behind the codes “lurk(s) a certain imperialism of taste [. . . ] recreate(s) in new ways the very hierarchy of values. This new hierarchy, based on lifestyle and tastes, draws the line between the citizens and the classes”. It is also similarity of the lifestyles and tastes, which creates a “network sociality” where the symbolic communities are formed around similar forms of cultural consumption and cultural capital is transformed into symbolic capital: “prestige” (Yardımcı, 2007, p. 9).

The case in Istanbul reflects the domination of private sector in the cultural arena, where a few wealthy families become predominant. For instance, Eczacıbaşı Family, the main capital group behind İKSV, opened up the Istanbul Modern (Istanbul Museum of Modern Art), an old warehouse transformed into a modern art museum. This can be undertaken as a sign of communicating the power of the capital groups as shaping the city’s symbolic economy together with its image (Zukin, 1995, p. 23).
Ownership is one side of the privatization of the culture industry in Istanbul, while sponsorship is the on other. İKSV, as a non-governmental organization, is supported by the private sector and the wealthy individuals, and hence finances the 80% of its budget though the sponsorships. This fact puts forward the organizational shift that moved from public to private arena as the İKSV took the leading role. Fundraising in the arts and culture sector is a major problem that is faced by the NGOs. For this reason, the festival programs tend to be popularized by the invited celebrities; social events that attract the sponsors; and eventually in attempts to match the elite profile that aims to increase the festival's market value (Seyben, 2010). Sponsorships can be perceived as a means of building an image, and some has become a continuous success in creating the image of prestige. The festivals make the sponsors visible through the launch of their brands and logos in addition to the positive marketing for them due to contributing to some prestigious festival, and hence to the cultural life of the city.

The creation of symbolic capital through the formation of elite taste and culture carries certain levels of risk as it triggers the cultural hegemony of the elite class and private sector, where the culture becomes the subtle means of exclusion. This is the case, where the public and private come into clash, as the public space is invaded by the elites of the private sector (Yardımcı, 2001, pp. 7-8). Or, as Zukin (1995) states, it can be the case, which the public space created the cultural production, has become central in urban development through “displaying art, generating money, making an image for the city, supplying sign and symbols, and creating public spaces”. When we speak about this relation, we should remember the culture-led regeneration force of festivals in the urban sphere. An example, in this regard, can be the case of old industrial areas and buildings transformed and re-used as concert halls or art complexes. When we think about those areas in the city, we should also think of their images, their past and presents, as well as their functions. Transformation has a secondary meaning of gentrification and cleaning, which will lead to “refined image” of cityscape that would be marketed to the elite spectators of the art. In fact, the legitimacy of the festival spaces (also galleries and museums) as public spaces is a very complicated issue through this point of view.

Yet, festivals should be recognized as an interface between public policies (Metropolitan Municipality of Istanbul and/or Ministry of Culture and Tourism) and private entrepreneurship, in which the city is “an object of government” in the former and “an object of speculative desire” in the latter (Yardımcı, 2007, p. 5). This can be evaluated through a two sided approach that the festivals are
freed from the governmental control and dictatorship on one hand, but became more “sanitized” and quite “gentrified” through the dependency on private intervention and their “cultural vocabularies” on the other, which introduces multiple, and sometimes, conflicting goals (Yardımcı, 2007, p. 6; Getz, 2009).

When we look at the choice of venues for the Istanbul Art Festivals, we can see the picture more clearly. “Public-private collaboration model” cannot fully favor the private side due to the existence of Ministry’s cultural institutions and property. For instance, Ayazaga Kasır, Tiled Pavilion and Hunting Lodge were all leased to İKSV for the construction of a cultural complex that would host the events, yet the construction was put on hold a few years later due to an excuse indicated that the Ministry lacked the funds. There was a similar disagreement between the two sides in the case of Feshane in Halic, where the collaboration model projected transformation of an industrial heritage site and its utilization through cultural events (Ince, 2010, p. 103). The Third Istanbul Biennial took place at Feshane that is re-designed by Gae Aulenti, who has taken a role in the transformation of Gare d’Orsay building in Paris into the Musée d’Orsay. Eczacıbaşı Family was the sponsor of the restoration of Feshane that was owned by the Municipality. Inevitably, the controversy in this public-private model stemmed from the questions, which concerned the percentage of the Municipality’s ownership and the limits of its administrative authority (Erzen, 2010, p. 228). On the other hand, there have also been cases, where the heritage sites become the venues for the festivals without the change of its ownership. Church of Hagia Eirene (known as the Aya Irini Museum), which, along with Hagia Sophia, is considered to be one of the largest and most striking of all the Byzantine churches in Istanbul, has been one of the most important performance venues for the Istanbul Festivals since 1973.

These historical venues can be regarded as the landmarks of cultural heritage in the cityscape, being extraordinary spaces, where the architecture turns into masterpiece. Nevertheless, there are also other festival venues, which deserve equal significance due to their historical values and their central role to host the festival events. One of the critical cases is the Emek Movie Theater located in the heart of the Beyoğlu district. There have been many protests against the “temporary” closure of the historical movie theater hall due to the construction of a shopping center in its place. The 29th Istanbul International Film Festival opened up with the protests for the Emek Movie Theater, and the protests continued during the festival with a festive spirit of demonstrations on the street through the initiative of the platform against the demolition of Emek
Theater and the support of the NGO groups that included İsyanbul Kültür Sanat Varyetesi (İsyanbul Culture and Art Variety – where “İsyanbul” stems from a combination of Istanbul and “isyan” that means “rebellion”). Although the governmental authorities and state representatives preview that Emek will soon join the art and culture life of Istanbul at the upper floor, this explanation is not satisfactory for the art lovers and citizens of Istanbul as the movie theater will basically lose its direct contact with the street and people passing by; and instead of directly walking in the cinema, people will first walk into the shopping mall in order to climb the stairs. The platform stresses that the attempt to demolish Emek Theater is an occupation of a public domain for the interest of the capital. With a special emphasize on the demolition of Emek Theater, the demonstrations target the renovation project for the whole Cercle D’Orient building, which is classified as a 1st Group Cultural Asset structure, together with the surrounding lots such as İnci Patisserie and Yeni Ruya Movie Theater that are all crucial for the identity and memory of Beyoğlu and Istanbul. In this regard, Istanbul’s 9th Administrative Court has declared a stay of execution for the renovation project of Cercle d’Orient and stated that “The mentioned operation might cause irreversible or irreparable harm.” Subsequently, the approval of the renovation project by the Istanbul Regional Directorate for Protection of Cultural and Natural Assets is agreed to be re-evaluated after an expert examination. The activists, resisting the demolition, gathered around the “suspicious” group of experts while chanting as “We are all experts” and “Emek is ours, Istanbul is ours” (Emek bizim, Istanbul bizim). All the protests were held in a festive spirit in the public areas of Beyoğlu. İsyanbul Kultur Sanat Varyetesi organized an alternative closure for the 29th Istanbul Film Festival, where the plastic golden tulip awards are announced to actors of the demolition project. Though has been criticized by the activists for taking a side and trying to play an intermediary role between the state and the public, İKSV showed its support against the demolition at the closing ceremony of the 29th Film Festival. Azize Tan, who is the coordinator of the Istanbul International Festival.

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9 The jury of Istanbul International Film Festival presents the “Golden Tulip Award” as the Grand Prize of the International Competition as well as National Competition to the director of the selected film. See http://www.iksv.org/film/english/basin_bulten.asp?cid=7&ms=1[2
Young Minds Rethinking the Mediterranean

Film Festival, claimed that Emek Theatre has been the main venue for the Festival and since the theater has closed its doors, they faced many difficulties. In addition to the ones throughout the festival, the opening ceremony of the 17th Istanbul International Theater Festival also witnessed protests against the demolition of the Emek Theater. During his opening speech, Bülent Eczacibaşı, the chairman of İKSV, expressed his desire for the re-opening of AKM (Ataturk Kultur Merkezi - Ataturk Cultural Center) and the Emek Theatre.

The likely existence of the symbiotic relationship between the public and private has shifted towards the private side in an attempt to privatize and hence homogenize the public space. This is also partly due to the limited governmental funding for contemporary art. Within this perspective, the role of the İKSV can be evaluated as implementing the arts management in a more “business like” and “professional manner” (Karaca, 2010, p. 246). Klaic (2005) says, “İKSV is dependent on some of the existing venues for collaboration, which have programs that are at odds with the festival’s orientation and content”.

Festivals not only incorporate the existing venues – that have already became the pillars of the city image - but they also create new venues to extend the festival throughout the city, which should be considered as an opportunity for the transformation and the re-use of the industrial buildings in the phase of a decay. Antrepo, which is a complex formed of four buildings (a former warehouse) at the Salipazari Harbor of the Bosphorus, in the district Tophane, has become one of the largest venues of the Istanbul Biennial in order to host the events. According to Klaic (2005), the proximity of Antrepo, to Istanbul Modern, which is owned by the Eczacibaşı Family, brings the idea of transforming it into a cheap, efficient and quickly available performing arts venue with a modest investment. Hou Hanru, the curator of the 10th Istanbul Biennial, says:

It is true that these buildings embody a top-down model. However, I was interested in exploring how people have been using them, and how the confrontation between the needs of the bottom of the society and the top-down power system can generate a new energy. I am definitely not interested in preserving a building as it is. A building is not a dead object that should be preserved [. . . ] Yet these buildings are also part of certain heritage. In that sense, they should be preserved in a dynamic way as a part of the changing social life itself. A city should have dynamic memory. (Hanru, 2010, p. 209)\(^{10}\)

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10 Hou Hanru interviewed by Nilgun Bayratdar, 2010.
Hanru\textsuperscript{11} tells about the project of ‘Entre-Polis’ at Antrepo No. 3 and stresses the use of the space to function as a real city and to reflect urban life.

To use Antrepo No. 3 as a site for the 10th International Istanbul Bien- nial is inevitably to deal with its urban/geopolitical position and implication. The Antrepo is a condensed “Entre-Polis”. It is a site for artists to investigate and experiment with the intensity of today’s metropolitan life, always in-between and on the move. To function like a real city, the Antrepo space is designed as a kind of urban maze to reflect the labyrinth structure of Istanbul. (Hanru, 2007)

Although the festivals and biennials, unlike the “conventional” art types, are perceived as a “democratized” way of accessing arts, such spectacles are becoming characterized by polarization, segmentation and gentrification in the social context and commodification in the cultural context (Karaca, 2010, p. 235). At the same time, the efforts to bring the high culture and the art down to the public seem like dreaming of a “society of the spectacle” that is transforming in time and space.

\textbf{Conclusion}

Everything is said, everything is exposed, everything acquires the force or manner of a sign. (Baudrillard, 1993, p. 16)

The spectacle has entered our daily lives following the merger of the culture with the market, in which the consumer culture celebrated the commodity and its spectacle. Istanbul, now branded as the European Capital of Culture, is learning to capitalize on its historical and cultural wealth to boost its economy. No need to argue that such festivals contributes to the image of Istanbul; reflected as a cultural capital that is innovative and attractive and a meeting point for the diverse cultural currents. Nevertheless, the variety and disorder of the urban fabric behind this coherent image has always been neglected. The new representation of Istanbul is shaped by the spectacle of a world-city that is vibrating with art and culture. It is, therefore, not a coincidence that Istanbul has become one of the most popular cultural curiosities attracting the attention of the world. This is not only due to “rich spectacle of contemporary

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\item \textsuperscript{11} Hou Hanru, extract from the catalogue of 10\textsuperscript{th} Istanbul Biennial, 2007.
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artistic events” and festivals, but also due to its “urban heritage” and “cultural memory” (Erzen, 2010, p. 216). As Erzen (2010, pp. 216-7) argues contemporary is established on the “historical presences of the city to redeem an aura for the art” and to re-create the image for contemporary Istanbul through its “mythical past” and “imaginary present”.

Today, the modern spectacles are the “antithesis of spontaneity, creativity and originality” (Gotham, 2005). Together with the globalization, we witness that the festivals are becoming more standardized as they mimic each other. The destruction of originality is tried to be reified under the term “McDonaldization” which puts an emphasis on the commodification of culture. In the end, this leads us to the standardization of the culture industries that is reflected in the urbanization processes, which leave us with the standard cities, together with their instant images aimed at refashioning the urban image to make them internationally marketable through a mere illusion and simulation of the urban cultural experience. The entertainment industry feeds to the production of simulacra and hyper-realities through spectacular events like festivals, in which the cultural institutions, i.e. museums, or the contemporary art events, i.e. Biennal, is accessible by the public (Erzen, 2010, p. 231).

The production of spectacular urban events has become central within the strategies of re-imaging the cities as the “creative cities,” as festivals are recognized to be crucial for the cultural policies directed at creating the consumer cities (Harcup, 2000). To add up to their competitive advantage and hence be more attractive, cities have to invest in attractions; or in other words, they have grown to be the cities of spectacles. However, there are also certain ambiguities in this argument: in one hand they stand for a genuine interest in cultural advancement, which is central for the functionalization of the culture, and on the other hand, they are in fact exploiting the culture through the creation of such city understandings.

The spectacle has become a mode of communication through the image of production and representation that is dominated by the logic of market capitalism and formatted by the language of consumerist ideology. Artistic and cultural events, including the contemporary art festivals and biennials, are the forms of expression of this kind. Soysal claims,

Large and small, the totality of spectacular events constitutes the cultural fabric of the contemporary metropolis and often aims to facilitate formation of community and solidarity. SpectacleCity underwrites re-
organization of public spaces and the proliferation of the public spectacles in an attempt to create a brand name for the city by catering for contemporary ‘lifestyles’ and for the demands of the new economies of consumption. (2010, p. 306)

Yardımcı, in her following words, points out dynamic impact of large festivals and big museums on urban life:

Istanbul Film Festival attracts now more than a hundred thousand spectators, while each one of the Music and Jazz Festivals and the Biennale approaches this number [. . .] Nevertheless, in a period where both the material base of Istanbul and its culture are increasingly recycled, reproduced, displayed and sold to create a coherent and colorful visual representation of the city, it becomes necessary to question what comes culture to offer this city and its citizens. Festivals, artworks, exhibitions are especially important as sites to deconstruct and reconstruct the world, and express and enact alternative visions of it. (2007, pp. 15-16)

Festivals and media work hand in hand; whereas the festivals exclude – either intentionally or unintentionally – some groups of people, the media is concentrated only on the ones included. In the end, while promoting Istanbul as a culture capital, festivals “increase inhabitants’ vulnerability to social polarization and exclusion in a less direct way through which the richer is the urban cultural context, the more inviting is the city for global wealth” (Yardımcı, 2007, p. 2). Perhaps more than the symbolic value of the capital, what is more important in cultural terms is the “other” class or culture forming the margins of the society that is embracing the diversity of the city, the source of its hybrid identity. Thus, even though the demands of the capitalist order of the spectacle, the culture of Istanbul can never be homogenized or sanitized as today’s Istanbul would not exist in such a scenario. The spectacle is not the event itself, but rather the people of Istanbul and the diversity in the crowds, creating the “dynamic colorful view” of the city (Erzen, 2010, p. 219).

Not only the city turns out to a product to be “beautified” and “promoted”, but while doing that, it also becomes a “centre of attraction” and a “peak of spectacle” (Bayrakdar & Akçalı, 2010, p. 175). The crucial point to be made is that the city is not only a décor for artistic events taking place in the its most beautiful places, yet the city is also the protagonist of this spectacle together with its people.
Bibliography


ART HISTORY AND THE WAR ON TERROR: FOREGROUNDING THE SYMBOLIC IN DEBATES ON RELIGIOUS EXTREMISM

By Amanda E. Rogers

As for the ‘clash of civilizations,’ let us recall the letter from the seven year old American girl whose father was a pilot fighting in Afghanistan: she wrote that – although she loved her father very much, she was ready to let him die, to sacrifice him for her country. When President Bush quoted these lines, they were perceived as a ‘normal’ outburst of American patriotism; let us conduct a simple mental experiment and imagine an Arab Muslim girl pathetically reciting into the camera the same words about her father fighting for the Taliban – we do not have to think for long about what our reaction would have been.

– Slavoj Žižek

The violence you mete out is always the mirror of the violence you inflict on yourself . . . This is the intelligence of evil.

– Jean Baudrillard

Abstract

Can the image of a temporary tattoo save lives? Perhaps, suggests Moroccan reaction to the 2003 Casablanca bombings; the hennaed Hand of Fatima provided the focal point of anti-terror demonstrations. “Henna” refers to a decorative dye applied to the hands and feet of Muslim women at religiously significant occasions throughout North Africa, South Asia and the Middle East – regions that also face the threat of religious extremism.¹ The Kingdom of Morocco, however, remains the sole state to mount an ideological campaign in reclamation of a national religious brand: “tolerant” Islam – embodied by depictions of the female Hand.

¹ Although other religious communities use henna, the adornment carries a ritual significance specific within the context of Moroccan Islam.
2010: France deports the Roma population in defiance of global protests; politicians speak of the now-infamous “burka ban.” Simultaneously, Palestinian headscarves and “gypsy-style” appear in tourist shops alongside Eiffel Tower key chains and Champs-Elysees kitsch – reinvested with a fictional sense of cosmopolitanism, commodity mimics symbols of the very communities deemed anathema by xenophobic immigration policy. At the heart of debates concerning the compatibility of Islam and the West lie visual ideological claims to national identity, and the silence of art historians is deafening. Amidst a cacophony of Western punditry: “What kind of Islam do we want” – forgotten are more critical questions: “who defines Islam?” and “how?” The battleground is fundamentally symbolic; wars for national, religious and political authority are waged through imagery. I center instead on the powerful imagistic setting of the battleground itself, and argue that inquiries into visual culture as symbolic weapon (by state and non-state actors), provide a more viable analytic frame than methodologies that accept religiosity as sui generis motivation.

Here, we escort art historiography out of the mausoleum-museum and reveal the political theater of so-called “religious” terror, through the deployment of image and iconoclasm as both metaphor and analytical tool. I first examine the reaction to the 2003 Casablanca bombings and the manner in which states mobilize locally-resonant symbols to delimit and market identity. Once we establish a logic of the nationalistic image, I briefly review prevalent wisdom on religious terrorism; we then invert the logic of state iconography and utilize symbolic comparative analysis to question predominant characterizations of the Taliban's 2001 so-called “iconoclastic” destruction in Bamiyan Province, Afghanistan.

Judith Butler argues that any reasoned assessment of conflict must reject the “ought to be” of culture, in favor of examinations that are firmly “based on a field of description and understanding that is both comparative and critical in character” (2009, pp. 156-7). She claims, following Talal Asad, that “normative” moral judgments are inherently conditioned and “tacitly regulated by certain kinds of interpretative frameworks” (2009, p. 41). In war-time, conflict sustains itself “through acting on the senses, crafting them to apprehend the world selectively” (2009, pp. 51-2). This article does not consider the visual image as fundamentally conclusive – but rather – smashes through it.

Key words: Art, terrorism, religious extremism, symbolism, Iraq, Afghanistan, Morocco, Iconoclasm, media
Casablanca 2003: State Regulation of Affect and Imagistic Response

On May 16, 2003, bombs ripped through the economic center of Casablanca; targets included a Jewish community center, foreign-owned restaurants and hotels. Nicolas Beau and Catherine Graciet characterize the selection of locations as ideologically significant – a public stage for “révolte contre les symbols de pouvoir” (2006, p. 28). Public (state-sponsored) response upped the political-imagistic ante: protests circulated a locally-resonant icon – a Hand of Fatima emblazoned with the slogan “Ma Tkich Bladi “(Don’t Touch My Country). The distinctly feminine symbol provided a focal point for demonstrations: it appeared on T-shirts, banners, billboards and posters and continues to function as cultural marketing device – multiple levels of signification operate within the isolated image.

The singular depiction, at work as simulacrum, aims to create the fictional Real of “tolerance,” and delineate the limits of nationhood. The Hand simultaneously demarcates the boundaries of citizenship and attempts to curb political dissent – within the framework of an all-powerful monarchical State. An analysis of the image’s polyvalent significations opens a window onto the constellation of “acceptable” civil, religious and national identity. This call for “tolerance” proves specific to utopian visions of the state; image dissimulates to mask a reality lacking in historical anchor.

The symbol recalls Moroccan stop signs; selected colors, red juxtaposed with a warning written in white script, reference traffic placards posted throughout the country. Enforced is absolute authority of the State to regulate conduct at literally every turn. In response to this suggestion, Moroccan cultural theorist Farid Zâhî, sardonically declared, “we don’t need stop signs – we have the baton” (personal communication, December 28, 2010). The warning proves extraneous – an illusory referent where the true locus of power is force – tacitly acknowledged by all. At the most basic level of interpretation, then, this image tells us: “nothing falls outside the purview of Our jurisdiction.” Beyond color and script schema lurks another critical semiotic component: composition.

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2 Saïd bin Saïd Al ‘Alawi refers to victims as “Moroccan citizens and foreign guests,” a politically-charged wording: it invokes not economic industry and tourism (considered neo-imperialism by many), but Arab hospitality on which Morocco prides itself (Al’Alawi, 2006, p. 84).

3 The Hand of Fatima is a gendered referent in North Africa; in addition to a folkloric association with the Prophet’s daughter, the icon and other “popular” religious practices are considered the domain of women – in contrast with male-dominated spaces of the mosque (Dialmy, 1995; Mernissi, 1997).
The Hand of Fatima, an outstretched right palm, is renowned in Morocco as a prophylactic emblem against the workings of witchcraft, malevolent intentions and the evil eye. Miniature hands in the form of key-chains, door-knockers and pendants serve as protective amulets. A Moroccan gesture to repel evil consists of displaying the right hand while stating, “khamsā ʿi ʿaînek” (five in your eye): verbal and physical action blinds the effects of the evil eye and prevents its damage. Although the khamsā is culturally specific, the Ma Tkich Bladi co-optation presents a visual quotation – if not plagiarism – of another call to “tolerance.” French organization, S.O.S. Racisme, first circulated the prototype of a hand raised in warning – with the message “Touche Pas a Mon Pote” (Don’t touch my friend), as an attempt to instill cross-racial solidarity within idealistic “fraternité et égalité.” Yet this avowedly secularist origin masks a similar paternalism to that of Ma Tkich Bladi: my object to protect, rather than a full partner in solidarity struggles – rhetoric evident in contemporary French debates on integration (Khiari, 2009, p. 110). The Moroccan iteration adds a decisively gendered element: key chains and doorknockers consist of ornate, metal filigree evocative of the resonant local decoration of henna painting. Often, these emblems include a Moroccan flag superimposed on the palm – linking feminized Nation to spiritual protection.

Music videos by famously pro-monarchy rap group Fnaire reinforce this interpretation. The group’s governmental ties are widely acknowledged and revealed in thematic content, as well as a disparity in equipment, publicity and sponsorship (Y. A. Elalamy, personal communication, December 24, 2010). Tellingly, each time the king releases a speech concerning a particular problem in Moroccan society, a Fnaire promotional anthem follows. The video “Ma Tkich Bladi” blends gesture, image and lyrical guidelines to transmit a clear message concerning the boundaries of Moroccan Islamic identity. The initial shot depicts a record placed on a turntable, labeled with the image circulated at demonstrations. Stylistic format is familiar from American rap videos: university foot-ball jerseys, do-rags (bandanas), and oversize-attire evoke the counter-culture legitimacy of “thug” style. Choreography features the khamsā gesture; the clip depicts “everyday” Moroccans as they contribute their own outstretched right palms in defense of the homeland.

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4 Throughout Moroccan history, this symbol has constituted a shared emblem produced and consumed by Jews and Muslims. The reference to “shared” tradition contributes to the call for religious tolerance and the reinvention of history through the simulacrum of image (c.f. Apostolos-Cappadona, 2005; Herber, 1927; Hildburgh, 1955).

Lest the viewer miss monarchical production and regulation of religio-nationalist sentiment from the visual effects of the video alone, lyrics further guide our interpretation. Singers chastise the bombers in explicitly theological terminology: “It’s harām, what you did / (so) raise the khamsā”. The words evoke more than mere shame, embedded within the particular Islamic discursive binary of harām/halal – that which is religiously blameworthy or permissible. The khamsā, again, serves as prophylactic emblem – a semiotic sign of femininity as emblematic of protection and benign religiosity.

Further lyrics embed gendered notions of “homeland” within a broader discourse of paternalistic exclusivity. The singers declare, “this is my country and for her good we close the door (on you).” The possessive form (“my,” not “your” nor even “our”) raises the question of audience. Although Fnaire ostensibly speaks to the perpetrators, the language of propriety operative here asserts outright that attackers are not Moroccans, in terms of ideology or nationality. This process of definitional exclusion regurgitates the official government line that the attacks were really those of outsiders – if not in action, certainly in philosophical and motivational origin (Beau & Graciet, 2006, pp. 15, 124).

A liberal discourse of “tolerance” is layered within references to a nostalgic past that proves utopian in its attempt to rewrite the historical narrative: “touch my country, you’ll regret it / we lived as brothers / Christians, Muslims and Jews / we didn’t hate in our country as a rule.” Although many Moroccans pride themselves on the country’s position in the Muslim world as a bastion of religious tolerance and cultural pluralism, the historical record is far more complicated. Fnaire whitewashes the factual occurrences of pogroms and fluctuating hostility against the Jews throughout Moroccan history. We witness in Casablanca the investiture of the sign as described by Baudrillard: behind the symbol lurks a bulwark of constructed nostalgia when “the real is no longer what it was,” (1994, p. 6) and the supposed equivalence between signifier and signified proves utopian.

We turn now to “Yed al Henna” (Hennaed Hand), a song rich enough to merit a dissertation on its own accord; spatial constraints, however, limits us to a

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6 The Arabic term for “country” is gendered feminine, yet the reference is not a grammatical accident: the sentimental tone figures homeland as female beloved in need of protection.

7 Tawhid is the term used within Islamic discourse to refer to absolute monotheism, as opposed to shirk – denial of God’s oneness, and the only unforgivable sin.

8 The historic experience of Jews in Morocco is a hotly contested subject. For further reading, refer to Mittelman, 1987; Rosen, 1984; Stillman 1975.
The viewer meets again with the following propaganda messages: Morocco is peaceful, pluralistic and tolerant – under the benevolent paternalism of a religiously sanctioned king; henna signifies love of country, marks the Sahara as Moroccan and emphasizes the feminine legacy of culture bearer, preserving the submission necessary for full citizenship-subjectivity in the Kingdom.

The film clip opens with prototypical Orientalist tropes: a Saharan woman clad in blue garments of Hassaniya and Tuareg nomads, leads her camel before a vast desert horizon. She calls upon the youth, and the Arab women in particular, to remember Moroccan tradition – deep and meaningful as the Sahara's henna. Woman’s job is to produce and mold the citizen, create and educate in the service of the paternalistic state; her function here enfolds nomadic populations into the purview of post-colonial governance – drowning out dissenting voices. In another feminized exclusionary act, her call to the Arab Woman underlies a claim to the Moroccan state not as Amazigh (Berber) but as thoroughly Arab – a further erasure of the pluralism governmental campaigns and state-sponsored expressive culture strive to create.

The remainder of the video clip reenacts the infamous nationalist 1975 Green March (in which subjects – armed only with the Qur’an, flags and pictures of the king – marched into the desert and thus claimed the territory as Moroccan), and splices together shots of hennaed hands on anti-terror campaign stickers, with hands cupped in dua’a, supplication. Lyrics again reveal masculine appropriation of henna’s feminine symbolism. An emblematic line translates simultaneously as “Men, move your hands with us,” (familiar from hip hop swagger) and “raise your hands praying with us.” This is followed by a call to women: “raise our children so they walk with us.” Feminine henna is wielded as rallying symbol. The stanza concludes, “my hands are in your hands, out king is protecting you.” Here – at last – is the clearest demarcation of the Moroccan state’s paternalistic hierarchy.

**Logic of Image in Service of State**

Ma Tkich Bladi’s nationalistic discourse exemplifies Butler’s description of mechanisms that underpin a

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9 Transliterations of Moroccan Arabic renders the word “yedd,” with two letters to denote the diacritical “shadda.” As youtube utilizes one “d,” I duplicate the spelling as it appears. See Maroc Rap: Yed El Henna. Retrieved from http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=k7-rlibZI6s.
certain version of the subject . . . produced and sustained through powerful forms of media . . . what gives power to their version of the subject is precisely the way in which they are able to render the subject’s own destructiveness righteous and its own destructibility unthinkable. (2009, p. 47)

M.E. Combs-Schilling’s analysis of Moroccan ritual vis-à-vis semi-sacred kingship makes a similar point (1989); rite-du-passage events are so intertwined with monarchical legitimacy – mapped onto the individual body – that they literally come to embody nation. Combs-Schilling interprets potential revolts as suicide (against both self and country), yet Ma Tkich Bladi and Fnaire’s cultural production render the point explicit. The dynamics of expressive culture and its state manipulation are, however, not regionally specific.

In the production of post 9/11 grief, American media dared not criticize Iraq policy and risk the dislocation engendered by a shift in perspective that included state-sanctioned violence abroad. Noting that “affect depends on social supports,” Butler points out that regulation of public perception of “worthwhile” life depends on sensory levels for its production (2009, p. 16). In an analysis of Guantanamo Bay poetry censored by the Department of Defense, she critiques censorship of material that shatters “dominant ideologies that rationalize war through recourse to righteous invocations of peace; they confound and expose the words of those who torture in the name of freedom” (2009, p. 61). Dissent (particularly in the realm of affective culture) places one far outside the delineation of appropriate citizen-subject.

The same holds true for Moroccan state control over potential political threats (defined broadly). Post-colonial monarchical efforts to consolidate an independent and cohesive state involved such affect regulation. Peaceful Islamist dissident, Ahmed Haou, “paid dearly for his writings on the wall . . . He was sentenced to 30 years in prison” (S. Slyomovics, personal communication, December 30, 2010). During a dark period in Moroccan history known as the “Years of Lead” (zamman al-rasās), activists across the political spectrum faced arrest, torture and disappearance – on the grounds that material culture posed a clear and present danger to the government, a direct plot “against the state” (Slyomovics, 2005, p. 169). Moreover, the inquisitorial criminal justice system secured convictions through admissibility of cultural production as evidence of seditious tendencies. Casablanca 2003 would prove re-ignite both the memory of the Years of Lead, and the need to maintain a heightened control over public affect.
As the casualty count rose, the identity of the perpetrators surfaced: disaffected young men from the Sidi Moumen shanty-town, on the outskirts of Casablanca – motivated by extremist ideology. State reaction was swift and resulted in the round-up, detention and interrogation of thousands in urban centers across the nation. Shattering cherished illusions of “la particularité marocaine,” the attacks revealed an impotent Moroccan state – which took rapid action in a desperate attempt to bolster legitimacy. According to Beau and Graciet, the outburst of violence proved especially damaging to the public image and credibility of Mohammad VI, the current monarch, who lacks not only the social legitimacy of his father but also the iron-fisted security system – one of the most world-renowned – of the previous sovereign (2006, p. 33).

Jean Baudrillard characterizes Watergate not as a scandal but rather as “a large dose of political morality reInjected on a world scale,” and a “lure held out by the system to catch its adversaries – a simulation of scandal for regenerative ends” (1994, pp. 14-6). The teleological system benefits everyone – state and adversaries. Casablanca 2003 revealed the weakness of a state – which seized the opportunity to prove itself anything but – the subsequent crack-down on dissent, in turn, allowed opponents ground to critique a supposedly democratic monarchy in its crushing suppression of opposition.

In the sense that the “condemned at Burgos are still a gift from Franco to Western democracy . . . to regenerate its own flagging humanism,” May 2003 created an opportunity for the Moroccan government to consolidate authoritarian control – and ideal terrain on which to reassert Islamic legitimacy (Baudrillard, 1994, p. 18). The Ma Tkich Bladi campaign excludes Islamists, Amazigh-movement leaders, nomadic rebels and Marxists alike. We witness not a battle for Islam nor religious pluralism but state manipulation of resonant symbols to maintain nationalist claims to authoritarian power. This is particularly critical in light of the power shift and reform that occurred in the wake of Mohammed VI’s succession. According to Baudrillard:

Power itself has for a long time produced nothing but the signs of its resemblance. And at the same time, another figure of power comes into play, that of a collective demand for signs of power – a holy union that is reconstructed around its disappearance. (1994, p. 23)

If one may still claim a certain “Moroccan exceptionalism,” it lies in the regime’s attempt “to transform itself from inside . . . to become democratic yet retaining control” (Slyomovics, 2005, p. 41). Susan Slyomovics compares Casablanca to
September 11, and argues that while not equivalent in scale, each generated similar “shock value and reaction” (2005, p. 193). The Moroccan government swiftly passed reforms to the penal code, ostensibly to crack down on the threat of religious extremism; yet, Number 03-03 broadly defines terrorism in ambiguous terminology (any “attack against the public order”) (2005, p. 193). Cultural production critical of monarchy faces suppression, at best – or harsh punishment. 10

In post 9/11 America and post-2003 Morocco, state regulation of affect underpins the political power game. More recently, in each country, this ideological game is played out in the American debates over releasing photographs of Osama Bin Laden’s death, and in the latter country through the mobilization of local images to press for governmental reforms in the wake of the Arab Spring. The creation, proliferation and suppression of (selective) visual culture simulate control against oppositional discourse that acts primarily through the senses. In the combat against challenges to state legitimacy, image construction protects powers that be. What happens, then, in the inverse of image construction – when the symbol is smashed? Taking an iconoclastic approach, here we will shift focus to the role of the symbolic in the fight not to bolster the powerful – but to knock them off the proverbial pedestal.

**Breaking Down the Image: Iconoclasm as Methodology**

At first glance, it resembles any other painting in Italian Renaissance style: beatific Virgin Mary gazes at her infant son. The Christ Child, arms outstretched, beckons for attention – the eye of the viewer is drawn in to focus on three blood red sticks of dynamite strapped to his torso. Serene contemplation explodes. This work, “Suicide Bombers Just Need a Hug,” by Banksy, proves deeply disturbing due to the anonymous artist’s manipulation of figural and literal perspective. The baby Jesus confronts the viewer and demands contemplation of his eventual death by the ticking bomb strapped to his chest.

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10 As this article goes to press, the situation of expressive culture within the Arab Spring must be briefly addressed. The Ma Tkich Bladi campaign has been revived in an effort to thwart demands for popular democratization; the demonstrations across Morocco utilize all manner of visual symbols to contest the corruption of the state – while holding aloft images of the king. The Moroccan state learned the lessons of Egypt and Libya well; in years past, demonstrators would never attempt to film Parliament, yet since the February 20 Day of Rage, local police have exercised an unprecedented level of tolerance. This is, however, at present, beginning to change – and revert to the predominant policies of censorship extant before the Arab Spring.
Banksy juxtaposes the paramount image of Christian salvation with a gesture to the (ostensibly) Muslim suicide bomber, and brilliantly troubles conceptions of martyrdom in shocking freeze-frame. His nuanced contribution proves far more profound than the rhetoric of talking heads, analysts and terrorism experts paraded on news outlets.

The mere visual image shocks. Christ, lauded in contemporary Western culture as a symbol of benevolence, pacifism, and a literal embodiment of “turning-the-other-cheek,” simultaneously complicates, sardonically glorifies and critiques the idea of martyrdom. The elision of contemporary and biblical “martyr” provokes us and unmasks a latent ambivalence towards the willing acceptance of self-sacrifice in the Christian tradition. This direct comparison with “their” fanatic “cult of death” represents, to many, a blasphemous comparison. Banksy mocks the “defective culture” explanation for terroristic violence and presents a controversial alternative that suggests mothers of suicide bombers love their sons as deeply as Mary loved Christ. This image provides a fitting introduction to our call to dislocated perspective. Banksy, a celebrated Western “iconoclastic” artist, overturns the veneration of utopian pasts in search of prescient cultural critique. Rather than theological rhetoric, perspective provides interpretative key.

Conventional Literature on Extremism: Non-Thinking in the Name of the Normative

Post 9/11 era provides a lucrative industry for scholarly works on religious extremism, terrorism and fundamentalism. An exhaustive review of the literature would be impossible within the constraints of this paper. I focus here on a sample emblematic of conventional wisdom: with few exceptions, studies on extremism accept religiosity (albeit “misguided”) as sui generis motivation.

Charles Kimball’s (2003) *When Religion Becomes Evil: Five Warning Signs* argues that all faiths prove equally susceptible to extremism. Radicalization, Kimball concludes, perverts “true” or “pure” religion. The author’s well-meaning value judgment is incapable of escaping a fundamental moralistic relativity evidenced by the choice of “evil” in his title – a vacuous analytical category. Mark Jurgensmeyer’s (2000) *Terror in the Mind of God* explores extremism among various religious groups and posits violence as ritual and signifier of a tacitly amenable cultural climate. Jurgensmeyer’s optimistic speculation that current acceptance of violence may conversely lead to a renewed respect for pluralism unwittingly reiterates the subjective dichotomy of “good” versus “bad” religion.
A second body of literature pits religion against the equally nebulous analytic category of “modernity.” Karen Armstrong’s *The Battle for God: A History of Fundamentalism* argues that modernity provides a historically conducive climate for the development of extremist ideology – which could “take root in no other time than our own” (2000, p. viii). The predominate thesis, however, presumes the secular aspect of modernity is paramount – discounting socio-economic and political aspects of “modernity.” The *Fundamentalism Project*, edited by R. Scott Appelby and Martin Marty, spans religious traditions, and investigates “familial resemblances” among diverse organizations, yet its conclusion also falls short; secular modernity again provides supposed explanatory key. A limited referential frame neglects ideological equivalences in similar regions, political contexts and temporal settings – recurrent problem of the “religiosity” paradigm.

Interpreting Western modernity as definitively secular is misleading, and conforms to what Butler terms “non-thinking and the normative” (2009, pp. 137-163). The purported religious/political divide is a false dichotomy. Arindam Dutta notes that the transition of mercantile to industrial capitalism in Europe enabled Enlightenment-era states to
dissemble their identity as a triumph of the political state over religion . . . the basic identification of every European state with one particular religion remains to this day a dirty little secret that could be made visible or covered at will. (2002, p. 47)

In Dutta’s explanation, European anxieties concerning the threat of religiously-fueled nationalisms resulted in an effort to circumscribe religious influence in the colonial world (and ignoring it at home). Does any of this sound familiar? A recent exchange with a Fulbright colleague in Morocco underscores Eurocentric non-thought: asked what sparked interest in political Islam, he responded, “I’ve always been fascinated by religion and politics, and Islam is where they meet.” Is it really? My colleague and I both hold American passports – citizens of the same United States that birthed Sarah Palin and the vociferous public debates questioning Obama’s “true” religion.

Scrutiny of religious rhetoric in United States military institutions and American foreign policy reveals a fundamental problem with accepted explanatory paradigms. Evangelical group “Operation Straight Up” (O.S.U.), an official member of the Department of Defense’s organizational support mechanism, planned to disseminate “freedom packages” to American troops
stationed in Iraq (Weinstein & Aslan, 2007). Packages contained Arabic-language Bibles and proselytizing pamphlets; kits also included copies of the “Left Behind” video game (in which users play the role of “Christian soldiers” in the apocalyptic show down between the forces of good and evil).

The 2003 actions of Army Lt. General William G. “Jerry” Boykin provide a forceful example of the contradiction in American rhetoric of secularist exceptionalism. The former Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Intelligence tasked with the responsibility of bringing to justice Osama Bin Laden came under fire for speeches at churches, in which he appeared in full uniform and unambiguously characterized the “War of Terror” in apocalyptic terminology. Boykin explicitly painted U.S. foreign policy in religious language, declaring: “I knew my God was bigger than his. I knew that my God was a real God and his was an idol” (de Vries, 2004). He further explained to an Oregon audience that the roots of Islamic radicalism lie not in a hatred of foreign policy but “because we’re a Christian nation, because our foundation and our roots are Judeo-Christians . . . the enemy is a guy named Satan.”

I wager that the vast majority of Americans believe our wars (and on-going “military engagements”) promote human rights, democracy, freedom, or for financial gain and economic control – rather than a horrifying civilizing mission. When we widen the perspectival frame, however, it is no longer possible to discount the opinions of many who find evidence of a crusade against Islam. Chastised by the Pentagon, Boykin had already done damage: his remarks drew wide-spread criticism in the Muslim world as representative of U.S. policy, and bolstered already-circulating interpretations of a zealous Christianizing campaign. Denial of legitimate grievances and rational motivations to “Others,” represents not only a superiority complex, but a one-dimensional approach to conflict – and ultimately, one that is dangerously short-sighted and fundamentally obscurant.

Consider again Banksy’s iconoclastic masterpiece – shock arises from his comparative analysis. Let us pick up where the brush stroke left off, and play again at juxtaposition and iconoclastic substitution – this time with literature on terrorist recruitment and Muslim extremists. Marc Sageman, a renowned expert on Islamic terrorism, claims to shed light on the phenomenon through his usage of a “scientific” method of analysis yet concedes: “most people know what they mean by terrorism, but it is a little like obscenity: people believe they know it when they see it, but cannot define it” (2008, p. 15). Surely a scientific
study will establish the necessary objectivity to answer the nebulous definition of terrorism?

Sageman’s (2008) *Leaderless Jihad: Terror Networks in the Twenty-First Century*, presents a sleek model of Salafi radicalization: a four-pronged process, beginning with:

>a sense of moral outrage at apparent crimes against Muslims both globally and locally . . . This outrage is interpreted in a specific way, namely that this moral violation is part of a larger war against Islam. This ideology appeals to certain people because it resonates with their own personal experience of discrimination, making them feel that they are also victims of this wider war. A few individuals are then mobilized through networks. (2008, p. viii)

While Sageman’s criteria might well apply to the social networks that comprise Al Qaeda, does it reveal attributes or dynamics specific to religious terrorist recruitment? Is the criteria applicable to other ideological paradigms? Is the “scientific” approach generalizable?

Invert the perspective: a young American man in Iowa watches television on the morning of September 11th, 2001. After the towers crumble to ash, news commentators heatedly theorize about the identity of perpetrators, and presidential murmurs of “they hate freedom. They hate democracy” reach his ears. The shadowy “they” loathe everything for which America stands. Our hypothetical young man experiences intense moral outrage born of patriotic fervor. In the following weeks, glued to his television, he watches coverage of terror in Kenya, in Tanzania, the first World Trade Center bombing. Our patriot interprets these actions within the framework of broader campaigns against freedom, democracy – against the very values and foundation of the United States. The young man thinks back to the death of his favorite uncle in the first Gulf War. Glenn Beck screams over the airwaves that Islamic law is infiltrating British courts system – Western civilization is under attack. The young man enlists in the U.S. Army.

I do not posit ideological equivalence between the Army and Al Qaeda. However, a comparative method that reaches beyond the closed-system religiosity analysis reveals its inadequacies. “Moral outrage,” as a point of analysis is clearly not a viable avenue for inquiry – as demonstrated, “far from offering a case apropos of which we can adopt a clear ethical stance, we encounter here the limits of moral reasoning” (Žižek, 2002, p. 50). Žižek points out:
The only possible solution here is to reject this very opposition . . . this can be done only if we resort to the dialectical category of totality: there is no choice between these two positions; each is one-sided and false. (2002, p. 50).

Enter the image – to consider the totality of illusion necessitates re-appraisal of the frame.

**Iconoclasm: Breaking the Interpretative Frame**

Like suicide bombing, iconoclasm is a destructive action often associated with religious zealots. Multiple examples of Jewish, Hindu, Buddhist and Sikh iconoclastic campaigns exist, in addition to Christian episodes; the desecration of venerated objects often occurs in concert with religious fervor and forcible conversion (Corbey, 2002, pp. 69-71). Yet, to many, Islam appears particularly predisposed to image-hostility. Rohini Hensman argues that “if the Taliban clerics had confined themselves to a philosophical or theological critique of idol-worship, no one could have faulted them” (2001, p. 2032). It is, rather, the manifestation of ideology – rhetoric translated into action – that provoked international condemnation. If we cannot fault the Taliban for philosophical stances, but instead for the visibility of those “beliefs,” clearly – ipso-facto explanations are deeply flawed.

Finbarr Barry Flood comments that medieval debates on iconography and the permissibility of images “are almost always confined to texts,” yet laments that the Bamiyan destruction will “define ‘Islamic iconoclasm’ in the popular imagination for decades to come” (2002, p. 641). D. S. Uchida exemplifies Flood’s worry: “I do not mean to be critical about Islam . . . But why do they have to destroy the precious images of other regions?” (2002, pp. 104-6). Beyond popular conceptions of Islam, what does Bamiyan tell us?

The Central Asian nation of Afghanistan is located at the continental crossroads, historic trade routes, and territorial chess board for the imperial Great Game. Cold War clashes between Russian and American foreign interests took place on the local stage of this strategic geopolitical region. The particular circumstances engendered by an eventual Soviet retreat and subsequent American desertion led to a vacuum of indigenous leadership in an already war-torn and unstable country – the ethnically Pashtun *Mujaheddin* split into rival contingents, and viciously vied for power, “leaving the field free for . . . the Taliban” (Rashid, 2001, p. 19).
The militant group, religious students from Pakistani refugee camps, was largely ignorant of their country’s history but raised on utopian puritanical Deobandi Islam (Rashid, 2001, p. 23). Their stated objectives included the restoration of peace and order, general disarmament, enforcement of Muslim legal codes, and defense of Afghanistan’s Islamic identity. Members rooted claims to ideological legitimacy not only in Deobandi creed but implementation of the *Pashtunwali* (the ethnic majority’s tribal code) (Pattanaik, 2002, p. 123). Amidst extended and bloody struggles for power, Taliban forces seized partial control over the disintegrated nation, capturing global attention.

On February 26, 2001, Talib leader Mullah Omar issued a decree in the name of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, mandating destruction of the colossal Buddha rock-cut statues located in Bamiyan (Mani, 2002, p. 196). The central Afghan province is home to the predominately Shi’ite Hazara ethnic minority, and the site of previous Taliban genocidal campaigns (Rashid, 2001, p. 73). Omar’s edict explicitly ordered eradication of all shrines and statues under religious obligation: systematic destruction would, ostensibly, obliterate any possibility of future worship. The following month, Taliban members entered the valley and using explosives, grenades, rifles and rockets – ensured total destruction of the statues. The iconoclastic campaign simultaneously involved an escalation of violence against the Hazara; in a cruel premonition of Bush’s directive to “smoke ‘em out of their holes,” fighters cornered refugee families seeking refuge in the very caves on which the Buddhas were carved – after placing hay at the cliffs’ entrance, militants wafted smoke inwards to slowly suffocate an already negligible minority.

That media accounts rely on sensationalist language to market streamlined information is unsurprising – yet in the case of Bamiyan, even scholarly publications regurgitate the dismissive discourse of irrationality. The vast majority resort to conventionally simplistic explanation: Muslim intolerance of imagery – as if the only aim was an irresistible puritanical urge to destroy the legacy of religious pluralism. Taliban motivation is described in terms of mental illness or psychological disturbance, revealing what Žižek calls the “paranoiac perspective,” in which “terrorists are turned into an irrational abstract agency . . . subtracted from the concrete socio-ideological network which gave birth to it” (2002, p. 33). *China Daily* referred to the act as a “fit of iconoclastic rage.”

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horrors of the Islamic fundamentalist government,” and argues that statues should not be reconstructed in an Islamic country, where iconoclastic frenzy could spontaneously occur at any moment (2006, p. 1). S. S. Toshkhani speculates that “the paranoid perpetrators of this heinous crime may have derived sadistic pleasure” (2002, p. 75). Mental illness and psychological disturbance as explanatory linguistic frame represents an obscurantist project – superficial and bound to fail.

Few accounts contextualize the Bamiyan destruction within Afghanistan’s historical, geographic and political climate. Rarer still are investigations which mention Taliban ethnic cleansing against the Hazara; most condemn the destruction of cultural heritage and emphasize a “need for safeguarding world heritage and for promoting cultural pluralism, inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue as a means to promote understanding and peaceful co-existence” (Warikoo, 2002). Such reports fail to account for critical inconsistencies between rhetoric and action. The religious explanation belies the statues’ survival for more than a millennium (well after Islam took hold). The Taliban initially agreed to protect the objects, before suddenly reversing ideological course on figurative antiquity – a puzzling action for such a profoundly zealous group – the notoriously secretive Taliban strangely issued an internationally circulated referendum broadcasting advance plans for the destruction. Puritanical opposition to representation was mysteriously relaxed for the duration and aftermath of the destructive process; reporters documented preparations, completion and the desecrated site.

Let us pretend, for a moment, that the conventional explanation of misguided religiosity indeed explains Bamiyan. The edict issued by the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan was unequivocal on the topic of figurative imagery; “scholars” declared that

all statues and non-Islamic shrines . . . must be destroyed (broken). These statues have been and remain shrines of infidels and these infidels continue to worship and respect these icons (statues). Allah (God) Almighty is the only real shrine and all false shrines (symbols) should be smashed (destroyed). (Warikoo, 2002, p. 235)

The referendum delegated responsibility for iconoclasm to the Ministries of Information and Culture, a prerogative of the Ministry of Promotion of Virtue and Suppression of Vice. A 2001 Afghanistan Supreme Court ruling explicitly condemned the Buddhas as a threat to Islam (Bryant, 2002, p. 188). Mullah
Omar himself issued a fatwa in favor of the destruction to permanently eradicate superstition (Van Kriekon, 2002, p. 212). The aims of the Taliban in undertaking the iconoclastic campaign appear to match the language circulated by official spokesmen. Conventional approaches to religious extremism would involve a comparative assessment of Bamiyan in concert with Byzantium or Saudi shrine destruction; but as previously noted, such closed-system analysis will only yield teleological self-affirmation. Do the mechanics of image destruction function differently undertaken by ideological actors not claiming zealous religiosity? Can fervent iconoclasm be secular?

We turn now to a consideration of Revolutionary Mexico’s own iconoclastic project. A brief review of the Mexican “de-Christianization” campaign bears marked parallels with conventional wisdom on the relationship between iconoclasm and religious fundamentalism. The Marxist national project (1930 to 1936) aimed to “destroy traditional culture . . . backwardness and religious ‘fanaticism’ were to be eradicated by the use of cultural tools such as iconoclasm . . . the ultimate goal was to forge ‘new men’ and a new, revolutionary, civil religion” (Bantjes, 1997, p. 88). The Mexican government sought a radical vision of modernity imposed by force – strikingly similar to Taliban action and rhetoric. The revolutionary elite was more than willing to utilize violent tactics in the struggle to usher in “modernist utopian blueprints” (Bantjes, 1997, p. 89). The public arena, particularly those spaces related to religious practice, provided a stage for eradication of superstition as a hallmark of progress.

Organized iconoclasm provided a key tactic to inaugurate Marxist paradise through a whole scale slate-cleaning. Revolutionary cultural strategy inscribed its ideals even on the topographic level – civic names viewed as dangerously religious in nature faced erasure, replaced with governmentally-sanctioned secular heroes. The government nationalized church buildings, and subsequently closed down houses of public worship, to erect in place cultural centers and union headquarters (Bantjes, 1997, p. 100). Down came local village shrines; up went secular rural schools. The government prohibited depiction of crosses in cemeteries and mandated the desecration of saint imagery, as well as religious paraphernalia. In Revolutionary Mexico, imagistic desecration provided a means for the implementation of modernity, progress – and secular salvation.

Each organized social movement utilized iconoclasm as a tactic to impose an ideological project bent on consolidation of power towards a utopian end. In the Mexican Revolution, Marxists sought the vision of a secular, “enlightened” nation; in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, ideologues dreamt of a superstition-
free society. These revolutionary movements utilized artistic destruction for to better society, and the ideal communal nation of utopian bliss and moral righteousness as new formations of statehood were being enacted. In a closed-system analysis of religious terrorism, Jessica Stern argues that all “started out believing . . . that they are creating a more perfect world” (2003, p. 281). To be a religious extremist, according to Stern, is “to know that one’s group is superior to all others, to make purity one’s motto and purification of the world one’s life’s work” (2003, p. xxviii). Even if we accept religiosity as primary motivation in Bamiyan, simple conceptual substitution of the symbolic mechanism reveals the flaws in epistemologies of religious violence – comparative assessment demonstrates that enactment of ideology in incipient state building assumes similar form: tearing down the old to resurrect a new. We move now to trouble even this face-value conception of religiosity.

**Iconoclastic Politics: Destroy the Past for a Purer Future**

Here we shift analytical focus to imagistic destruction at the moment of state formation: not merely as creative act – but as propaganda, press release and political tactic in struggles for power consolidation. The Taliban seized control (amidst continuing opposition) around 1994, after fierce struggles throughout Afghanistan – including the central Bamiyan province (Rashid, 2001, pp. 68-80). Previous incursions (including massacres of the Hazara) did not accompany attempts to purge Afghanistan of its idols. Although current aims of the Taliban leadership remain largely consistent with those originally espoused by the group, a complete reversal occurred vis-à-vis the religious permissibility of imagery. Leaders once declared that Islamic law protected the Buddhas as the legacy of an extinct religious minority. Following the imposition of international economic sanctions against the regime, the Taliban government issued advance notice plans weeks in advance for the statues’ obliteration – and waited.

Some attribute the time elapsed to “the exigencies of war”, an insufficient explanation (Bahadur, 2002, p. 112). Mullah Omar’s July 1999 assertion could not have been more clear:

> All historical heritage is an integral part of the heritage of Afghanistan and therefore of the international community . . . the famous Buddhist statues of Bamiyan were made before the arrival of Islam in Afghanistan and are amongst the largest . . . in the world. (Pattanaik, 2002, p. 137)
He continued, “the government regards the statues with serious respect and considers the position of their protection today the same as always.” Taliban leaders warned that damage to the statues would meet with punishment – a directive enforced. In November 2000, the government chastised one of its own for damaging the largest Buddha (MacPhail, 2002, p. 165). Weeks after the imposition of sanctions on Afghanistan by the international community, the Islamic Emirate issued an about-face, circulated by the Ministry of Information: a bizarre action for the secretive group (Rashid, 2001, p. 5). Although policy statements do not constitute a regular component of Taliban political process, the group chose a press release format to internationally publicize the destruction.

Muslim countries throughout the world loudly condemned the impending devastation – including the rival Islamic State of Afghanistan (Siri, 2002, pp. 108-9). Pakistan offered to pay for the Buddhas’ safety, others sought to purchase the rubble. The international community increasingly pressured the Afghan regime to preserve the figures, and ultimately isolated not only the Taliban but by extension, the populace; spokesmen seized the opportunity to point out the hypocrisy of offers for exorbitant sums allocated to preservation – at the expense of a population ravaged by famine and war. Mullah Omar, former protector of the “idols” in question, defiantly responded: “all we are destroying are stones” (Siri, 2002, p. 107).

Leadership purposefully fed media sources conflicting accounts of the Buddhas’ statues for days prior to the destruction in a successful attempt to heighten international tension and exploit the press’ attention (Bahadur, 2002, p. 113). The generally silent Minister of Information explicitly referred to the Bamiyan attack as a reciprocal “gift,” in exchange for the international community’s economic sanction (Pattanaik, p. 138). It matters little whether humanitarian concerns or zealous religiosity proved the motivation – official Taliban rhetoric invoked both.

The Taliban, moreover, took measures to publicize the event. According to Ahmed Rashid, “with their ban on photography and television, nobody knows what their leaders look like” (2001, p. 5); it is more than mere contradiction that the militant government allowed journalists to document the obliterated site and stages of destruction. Participants are caught in freeze-frame, making eye contact with journalists – happily mugging for the camera. In spite of the facile recourse to “puritanical” motivation, symbolic analysis reveals a host of alternative interpretations that prompted theological reversal. Exploitation
of the international community – and its media outlets – registered Taliban protest against their treatment at the hands of the global community.

Nancy Stieber notes that although the U.S. decried the Taliban’s actions, the same country remained mute against accounts of wanton destruction of Iraqi cultural heritage (2003, p. 292). Troops ignored warnings, elected not to protect museums and architectural sites, and in many cases, actively participated in looting. Knee-jerk patriots may respond that the Taliban set out to destroy cultural heritage, yet the Army merely turned a blind eye to devastation already in progress. Salient parallels between Bamiyan and another act of iconoclastic destruction nonetheless exist: the orchestrated “fall” of Saddam Hussein’s statue in Firdous Square, Baghdad, at the hands of U.S. forces.

Saddam’s statue commemorated the dictatorial leader’s 65th birthday and depicted him as he wished to appear – an icon of veneration (Fahmy, 2007, p. 145). On April 9, 2003, American troops entered Baghdad and media broadcast images from the Palestine Meridian Hotel (facing the square) that would come to define – for an American audience – the triumph of Baghdad’s fall. Coverage circulated:

A victory frame of a jubilant Iraqi crowd jumping on a toppled statue signaling to the world that Americans were liberators of the Iraqi people . . . showing close-ups of cooperative Iraqi citizens enthusiastically welcoming and working with the U.S. forces. (Fahmy, 2007, p. 145)

At the time, the event marked the end of the war, American victory, and the birth pangs of democracy. A new era, we were told, had begun – affect regulation, par excellence.

Later information revealed that the spontaneous display of Iraqi joy was not so spontaneous. The immediate “freedom” to destroy the old order of Saddam was not magically obtained within moments of the American presence, nor was the decision to destroy his statue. Clergyman Neville Watson related, “it was a very small crowd. The rest of the square was almost empty, and when we inquired as to where the crowd came from, it was from Saddam City . . . a rent-a-crowd.”12 Kim Sengupta, correspondent for The Independent commented, “The pulling down of Saddam’s statue in Firdous Square was supposed to have

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been an expression of popular joy at the downfall of a tyrant. The ‘impassioned populace,’ it turned out later, were people bused in” (2008, p. 24).

Nikhil Pal Singh characterizes media coverage of the act as marked by “the messianic discourse of spreading American freedom” (p. 430). Such a framing was not accidental but a “stage-managed event” – a propagandistic photo opportunity – spectacle organized, directed and edited for a particular audience:

A U.S. tank (off-screen) pulled the rope that tightened the noose around its neck, as a modest gathering of Iraqi men celebrated . . . The U.S. Marine who hooded the stars and stripes over the head and face was reportedly chastised by his commander, but not before an intrepid photographer captured the image. (p. 430)

Singh concludes, “the statue’s fall perfectly captures . . . a theatrical simulation of Iraqi agency framed by submission to American power” (p. 431).

As ironic proof that the “new era” was not so joyously ushered in as planned, the same location rearticulated the oppressor’s identity five years later. The now-iconic act of destroying Saddam’s statue was replaced by another image: burning the new tyrant – George W. Bush. In 2008, pro-Muqtada al-Sadr protestors set fire to Bush’s likeness. The president’s effigy, clothed in a black suit with suitcase in hand (reading “security agreement”), was “hoisted up in a parapet where the Saddam statue stood” (Haynes, 2008, p. 51). That the destruction of the Bush figure was intended as a commentary on the earlier American orchestrated ousting of Saddam (both highly symbolic acts) is unquestionable. Abu Muqtada, himself a participant in the demonstration, explicitly confirmed this: “just like Saddam’s statue was brought down, Mr. Bush has fallen as well.”

**Inscrutable Motives: Mona Lisa Mujahideen**

In war, no image proves sacred. Obliteration of the Buddhas allowed the Taliban to sacrifice religion at the altar of political opportunism and the American manipulation of Firdous Square ripped apart the image to orchestrate legitimacy in a bid for political control. To bring our analysis full circle, we close with another prescient commentary by Banksy. “Mona Lisa Mujahideen,” spray-painted on a London wall, depicts Leonardo da Vinci’s enigmatic muse. A placid gaze holds the eye of the viewer, as she slings over
her shoulder a rocket-propelled grenade launcher. An iconoclast created this image, but audience rendered it comprehensible. Merely fifteen minutes after its appearance, a passer-by covered Mona Lisa’s face with Osama bin Laden. The meta-iconoclastic act is participatory, born of the desire to strip the image of its complexity – to simplify and render “evil” understandable.

Afghanistan’s Taliban dynamites Buddhas, Mexico burns saints, and America tears down Saddam: an inverse of Ma Tkich Bladi, Banksy’s iconoclasm is far more constructive. Current academic debate on the “war on terror” necessitates reframing. Iconoclasm and hostility towards imagery is writ large in dialogues on Islamic extremism but symbolic analysis better places us to understand the dynamics of political theater masquerading as religious rhetoric. Priorities for political dialogue have largely revolved around rarefied examinations of “Islam,” rather than ideology manifested. Art historians must begin doing our jobs – and dynamite the restrictive walls of the classical canon. To avoid the multiplicity of perspectives is to wear blinders against – the Mona Lisa Mujahideen will perpetually return the viewer’s gaze – as always – inscrutable.

References


CHANGE AND CONTINUITY, 
TWO FACES OF THE SAME COIN: 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE EU’S 
MEDITERRANEAN POLICY

By Beatrice Schimmang

Abstract

The paper focuses on the features of continuity in the Mediterranean policy as part of the European foreign policy. It emphasises the assumption that shifts in this specific policy field resembles ‘bounded’ developments. The paper concentrates on three points. First, based on recent academic research efforts, it draws on the attention to some of the Euro-Mediterranean institutional settings that influence the cooperation. Second, the paper proposes a rational and a sociological-normative historical institutionalist account in order to demonstrate the effects of the Euro-Mediterranean institutional framework. Third, it suggests that self-reinforcing processes characterise the EU Mediterranean policy. Their patterns determine the possibilities for endogenous change in this policy field

*Keywords:* EU Mediterranean policy, Euro-Med relations, EU foreign policy, historical institutionalism

Change and Continuity, Two Faces of the Same Coin: 
The Development of the EU’s Mediterranean Policy

The Paris Summit of the Heads of State and Government launched the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) in July 2008. New institutional features like the UfM Secretariat, the co-Presidency, and biannual summits promised more co-ownership and thus more equality (Gillespie, 2008, pp. 281-283). Now key strategic projects characterize the cooperation in various technical issue areas (e.g. de-pollution of the Mediterranean, Mediterranean Solar Plan, Higher Education and Research) (Aliboni & Ammor, 2009, p. 17). They are aimed at the UfM partners who want to participate (principle of variable geometry) (Schwarzer & Werenfels, 2008, p. 2). The UfM also strengthened the local
and parliamentary level (Jünemann, 2009, p. 55). The European Union (EU) hopes that this initiative activates a new dynamic in the Euro-Mediterranean partnership. The UfM format derives from the necessity to improve the volatile nature of previous Euro-Mediterranean relations and to reduce the deficiencies of the former EU Mediterranean policy; e.g. in the field of security cooperation, human rights protection, political liberalization, prosperity gap between the North and the South, ‘civil society’ among the partner countries of the Mediterranean (Asseburg, 2005, pp. 2-5).¹

I argue that many of the UfM innovations reflect continuity. The UfM does not introduce a new approach to the EU Mediterranean policy. It rather echoes a continuation of the already established Euro-Mediterranean partnership.

The EU has organised its different Mediterranean policy initiatives according to the principle of complementarity: The UfM relies on the Barcelona Declaration of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership (EMP) and its four chapters of cooperation (Reiterer, 2009, pp. 323-324). The bilateral European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) complements the multilateral EMP (Emerson, 2008, p. 6). The EMP, in turn, bases on the past Euro-Mediterranean agreements (Gillespie, 1997, p. 39) of the Renovated Mediterranean Policy, which complemented the Global Mediterranean Policy. This officially stated principle of complementarity can be further extended. Each Euro-Med initiative entails inherited patterns from the past Mediterranean EU strategies. Embedded in the Euro-Med institutional set-up and in the EU structures, these patterns generate continuities. These regularities are the products of the interaction processes of the different Euro-Med policy initiatives. They lead to the typical characteristics of the Mediterranean policy: inter alia a weak political-normative dimension, a partnership asymmetry, a strong bilateral component, a weak visibility, organisational overlappings, and time-consuming and complex procedures.

In arguing that these characteristics are regular patterns, I rely on the institutional dimension of the Euro-Med partnership. This institutional dimension produces self-reinforcing activities (positive feedback processes). They determine the development of the Mediterranean policy of the EU.

¹ The Mediterranean cooperation framework now comprises the EU-27, the Maghreb states (Algeria, Morocco, Tunesia, Mauretania), the Mashriq countries (Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, the Palestinian Authority and Syria), and the non-Arab participating states Turkey, Albania, Monaco, Croatia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and Montenegro (Balfour, 2009, p. 101).
Hence, my aim is to emphasise the effects of these self-reinforcing processes that generate path dependency in the Mediterranean policy of the EU. Therefore, I am reflecting the state of the art in the field of the institutional dimension of the Mediterranean policy. In consideration of expressions that depict the key projects of the UfM as “old wine in new tubes” (Jünemann, 2009, p. 52 – own translation) and the ENP as “New Wine in Old Wineskins” (Kelley, 2006), I am drawing on the historical institutionalism (HI) with its two important concepts about path dependency and change. Especially, I am referring to self-reinforcing activities as the processes that induce path dependency and endogenous institutional change in order to show that the Mediterranean policy follows one trajectory instead of many.

The State of the Art

A Selected Characteristic of the Institutional Dimension in the Euro-Med Relations

First of all, the EU addresses the interrelations with its neighbours “through the external projection of internal solutions” (Lavenex, 2004, p. 695). In the case of the Euro-Med region, the EU projects its integration model “more than anything else” (Bicchi, 2006a, p. 152). Thereby, the EU mirrors its rules, standards, principles and institutions to support regional integration (Pace, 2007, p. 660, 662). The Southern EU presidencies and the EU Commission are the major driving forces, when the new Euro-Med initiatives come into existence and develop (Gillespie, 1997; Reiterer, 2009; Missiroli, 2010). However, the implementation of the EU ambitions in the Mediterranean region is not satisfactory, partly because of the inherent institutional ‘dualism’ of the EU foreign policy system (Monar, 1999, pp. 77-79, 90). The dualism of the EU structures relates to the tensions between the intergovernmental and the supranational features of the EU.² It constrains the EU’s capability to act as a powerful actor in the Mediterranean region. The EU is not able to enforce its officially declared objectives of the Euro-Med cooperation (Schumacher, 2005, p. 360).

At the beginning of the EMP, the EU Commission showed serious problems of policy implementation due to the holistic EMP approach that covered an extensive number of issues (Monar, 1999, p. 83; Stetter, 2004a, p. 165). Further, the

² The development of EU policies takes place in different institutional ways or pillars and in different time episodes. This leads to problems of coherence in the EU system (Vanhoonacker, 2005, p. 68).
EU member states resisted to equip the internally fragmented EU Commission for the increasing amount of tasks (Schumacher, 2005, p. 373). The Commission suffered remarkably due to the insufficient human resources in Brussels and in its Delegations in the Mediterranean partner countries. In addition, the oversight committees of the intergovernmental European foreign policy (member states) hampered the supranational EU Commission during the implementation of the financial assistance (e.g. in Palestine) (Stetter, 2004a, p. 169).

However, the EU institutional structures have learned to enact an EU Mediterranean policy and they have adapted to the challenges of this policy field, thus widened their scope of action. E.g., the EU Commission engages in the association councils and develops sub-committees with the representatives of the Mediterranean partner countries. These institutional formats support the enforcement of the Action Plans within the ENP (Bicchi, 2010, pp. 210-212). In contrast, at the beginning of the Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972, the EC Commission hardly organized meetings with the delegation of the respective partner government within the council format (Schumacher, 2005, pp. 99-100). Despite these improvements, the room for manoeuvre of the EU institutions depends on the interest constellations of the EU member states (Monar, 1999, pp. 78-79). The EU displays the tendency of acting more coherent towards the Mediterranean region in cases where the EU Commission fulfil an important role (e.g. in the negotiations of Association Agreements, whereas the communication of diverse member states preferences remain rather in the background (Schlotter, 2007, pp. 307-308).

Competing interests in the EU and the problems of coherence between and within the EU pillars (dualism) prevent the EU from acting effectively (e.g. Stavridis & Hutchence, 2003, pp. 71-72). Thus, the EU’s insufficient performance in the Mediterranean has been partly traced back to the interaction processes of the EU structures, in particular since the beginning of intensified institutionalization of the Euro-Med relations through the EMP in 1995.

Following this short and selected characteristic of the institutional dimension of the EU Mediterranean policy, the next section is devoted to the Euro-Med cooperation in respect to three theoretical institutionalist approaches.

**The Euro-Med Cooperation in View of Institutionalist Approaches**

According to the rational choice institutionalism, actors define their preferences outside the institutional framework (Pollack, 2010, p. 23). In the case of the Mediterranean, special relationships between some EU member states and
single partner countries, poor socioeconomic situations in the Mediterranean partner states, security concerns (energy dependency, terrorism, organised crime), the management of migration, the needs to support stability, and the overall alignment of the partner countries to the European spheres of influence reflect the manifold interests of the EU states in the Mediterranean. The EU member states determine their course of action in respect to the calculations of those interests in order to maximize their own profits (‘calculus approach’) (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 7, 12).

The Euro-Med institutions resemble the constellation of the national interests of the EU member states, as they have to realize them (Xenakis & Chryssochoou, 2001, pp. 107-108). Institutionalized relationships reduce the uncertainty that stems from the interdependencies with the Mediterranean region. Further, institutions minimize the costs of the Euro-Med cooperation and maximize the benefits of the involved members (in particular the EU member states) (Panebianco, 2003a, p. 7). The profits of the Euro-Med relations - e.g. security related benefits for the EU states and economic and political support for the Mediterranean partner countries - provide the incentives for the Heads of State and governments to agree on cooperation in accordance with the neo-liberal institutionalist understanding. According to this neo-liberal institutionalist version, Euro-Med institutions reduce transaction costs, which occur in the contexts of deliberations, collection of information, rule-formulation, rule implementation etc. A neo-realist institutionalist view, in contrast, emphasises on the powerful states, which tries to dominate the institutional settings. The EU commits to the Mediterranean policy in order to install itself as an influential actor around its southern neighbourhood (Solingen & Ozyurt, 2006, pp. 53-55). A neo-realist tendency in the Euro-Med partnership refers to the ambitions of the EU to extend its bilateral relationships to single Mediterranean partners instead of enhancing regional non-governmental networks (Schäfer, 2009a, p. 90).

According to the normative-sociological institutionalism, actors follow established practices and appropriate patterns of behaviour to enforce their objectives. Institutions incorporate a catalogue of appropriateness, which is more important than the calculations of the costs and the benefits (Hall & Taylor, 1996, pp. 7-8). Hence, actors’ preferences are not exogenous to the institutional context, but endogenously constructed through institutional socialization (Peters, 2007, p. 26). So, actors are rather “context-driven than goal-driven” (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p. 7).
Etel Solingen and Saba Özyurt argued that the logic of appropriateness is far less developed in the Euro-Med partnership than the calculative strategies. Only in the case where material goals start to accumulate, the Mediterranean policy will be more prone to socialization. Despite the fact that the internalization of the logic of appropriateness through socialization is essential for cooperative interactions (Solingen & Ozyurt, 2006, p. 56), the ambitions of the EU towards an enhancement of social interaction processes in the EMP are insufficient. Existing divergences of preferences and norms between the EU and the Mediterranean partner states make socialization processes extremely difficult (Solingen & Ozyurt, 2006, p. 73; Attinà, 2003, p. 193).

Even in the light of the absence of shared norms in the Euro-Med cooperation, the EU structures have a strong tendency to project their own organisational settings, norms and routines ‘unreflexive’ into the institutional framework of the EMP (Bicchi, 2006b, pp. 286-287). This institutional isomorphism, which is a concept of the sociological institutionalism, has occurred in the organization of the Euro-Med ministerial meetings. Their arrangement along different topics mirrors the EU Council’s organization along thematic lines. Hence, the EMP agenda is quite similar to the EU agenda. Further, the EMP working groups and senior officials’ meetings resemble the EU Council structure at lower levels (Bicchi, 2006b, 295-296). Thus, the EU projects its organizational practices of its structures in the Euro-Med framework.

Finally, the historical institutionalism (HI) can help to detect the founding episode of institutional set-ups that shape future paths. After the institutional formation, their further development is affected or constrained by past decisions. Once actors initiated a policy choice, it will tend to continue throughout the further institutional development. Institutional change is characterised by bursts (critical junctures) that follow long phases of continuity (Peters, 2007, pp. 71, 77). The initiation of the EMP (Barcelona Process) in 1995 is seen as a critical juncture. The Barcelona Declaration realised a higher level of institutionalization in the relations (a burst of institutional change) from which the EMP partners have agreed to certain commitments. In parallel, structural asymmetries influenced the Euro-Med relations in the 1990s. The EU member states supported the creation of an international community, whereas the Mediterranean partners showed serious problems in their political, economic and social development. This starting point of the EMP foreshadowed implementation problems in the path of the Euro-Med integration (Solingen & Ozyurt, 2006, p. 57). However, the commitments of the Barcelona Declaration are manifested through path dependent developments.
Other academics argued that the initiation of the Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972 resulted in political and economic guidelines of the Euro-Med cooperation that have remained largely unchanged. Adaptations occurred most notably in the light of the international environment (migration pressure, terrorism, etc.) (Bendiek & Kramer, 2009, pp. 214-215). In contrast, Peter Schlotter in his article suggested that the explanatory force of the historical institutionalism (HI) is weak, because of the volatile nature of the Mediterranean policy, which allows the EU member states to break with the agreed commitments. Thus, rather path dependent orientation points than path dependent processes arise (2007, p. 308).

In sum, various institutionalist approaches can be applied in order to analyse the Mediterranean policy of the EU. They provide an added value to the understanding of the Mediterranean initiatives (Schäfer, 2007, p. 261; Holden, 2009, p. 127; Stetter, 2004a, p. 155). In order to investigate the continuing patterns of institutional rules and practices, the historical institutionalist strand is the most appropriate one. This approach can help to reduce the gap of contested interpretations between claims of continuity and change in the Euro-Med relations. A consistent analysis is useful to shed further light on the different opinions about path dependent developments in the Mediterranean policy. It helps to construct appropriate expectations in regard to the effects of the UfM, preventing disappointments, which hamper the EU’s credibility in the Mediterranean region.

**Institutions Matter in the EU Mediterranean Policy**

I will address the path dependent continuities of the EU Mediterranean policy with the help of the middle-range theory of the historical institutionalism (HI). The HI serves as a bridge combining claims of the rational choice and normative-sociological institutionalism (Morisse-Schilbach, 2005, pp. 271-272). This analyses applies both, a rationalist HI and a normative-sociological HI. Both variants have in common that institutional settings and patterns are the carriers of the historical past and structure individual action through formal and informal constraints (rules and codes of behaviour) (North, 1990, p. 4). Rules constitute rights and obligations (opportunities) for actors, thereby enabling collective expectations and actions (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 9). The both variants of the HI differ from each other to the extent that actors are goal-driven in the rational strand and context-driven in the normative-sociological version (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p. 7). Through institutionalization constraints (rules) become part of the humans’ dispositions (Voss, 2001, p. 7562).
How the Mediterranean policy of the EU looks like when the institutions matter? In terms of a sports analogy, this EU policy field can be compared with a game. To win the game means to build a Mediterranean region of peace, security, prosperity, and shared values. This leads to the set-up of a Euro-Med security community (Jünemann, 2004, p. 5; Adler & Crawford, 2006, pp. 4-5). At the moment, the Mediterranean partnership is rather perceived as a “would-be community region” (Panebianco, 2003b, p. 185) or a “region under construction” (Reiterer, 2009, p. 313). However, the teams have been playing since the Global Mediterranean Policy (1972), where the European Community (EC) tried to harmonize the bilateral agreements under a concept of a coordinated regional policy for the first time (Schumacher, 2005, pp. 80-81; Khalatbari, 2007, p. 177). The formal and informal rules constrain the team players, because they “define the way the game is played” (North, 1990, p. 4). Formal rules are the Association Agreements, the Action Plans, the various association councils, the settings of the EU Commission, the Council Secretariat of the EU, the External Action Service, the Union Delegations, the EU presidencies, the financial assistance, the working groups etc. Informal rules comprises principles, values, norms and routines like equality, the horizontal and de-centralized cooperation, the principle of variable geometry, the regional, bilateral and normative-political dimension, the routine package deals, and etc.

However, these rules build the framework for the group of actors to develop (to play). At the same time, the groups influence the formal and informal rules of the Euro-Med framework – e.g. through the creation and development of structures like the UfM. The focus is on this interaction process between institutional rules on the one hand and the influence of the actors on these rules on the other hand (North, 1990, pp. 4-5). It is obvious that the EU dominates the Mediterranean policy. That is why the analysis focuses more on the interaction processes within the EU system than between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries. However, through these interactions, self-reinforcing activities play an important role. They relate directly to the assumed path dependency of the Euro-Med game and are treated in the following section.

**The Concept of Path Dependency**

**The HI Ontology of Self-reinforcing Activities**

Each step along the Euro-Med path generates effects (patterns of relationships) that enhance the attractiveness of that track for the next Euro-Med strategy of the EU. As such effects begin to accumulate, they produce a self-reinforcing
activity. This self-reinforcing activity (or positive feedback process) influences the incentives and constraints of future decision-makings in unintended ways (Pierson, 2004, p. 18; Parsons, 2007, p. 72). Thereby, the probability of path dependent processes in the Mediterranean policy increase remarkably. To put it more concretely, with self-reinforcing activity:

- the actors have a strong motivation to concentrate on a single option
- and they further follow the chosen path once primary steps are taken in that trajectory (Pierson, 2004, p. 24).

This, in turn, highlights the importance of the initial decision. Only if this “first” event occurs and actors engage in this choice, self-reinforcing processes can proceed. Self-reinforcing activity (or positive feedback) is a feature of historical developments that lead to path dependent patterns (Pierson, 2004, p. 21).

Not all initial decisions activate positive feedback processes. They must fulfil several conditions. In accordance with that, Paul David, Paul Pierson and Douglass C. North stated that four features of a choice and its social context are necessary for self-reinforcing activities. High start-up costs, learning effects, coordination effects, and adaptive expectations must appear (Pierson, 2000, p. 254; North, 1990, p. 95). These four features will be applied in each of the two HI variants.

Argument: The Mediterranean policy is path dependent because high start-up costs, learning and coordination effects, and adaptive expectations occur. They lead to self-reinforcing activities which constraint unintended the European actors insofar as they have continued the Mediterranean policy patchwork for decades.

Self-reinforcing Activity in the Context of the Rational HI

*High set-up costs.* The set-up costs of the Mediterranean policy arose between 1972 and 1989. During this period, the EC tried to implement the Global Mediterranean Policy in order to realise and maximize the calculated interests of their member states. It was the first concept of the EC that envisaged relations with the Mediterranean partner countries within a regional policy framework (Khalatbari, 2007, p. 177). The establishment of the cooperation agreements and the financial protocols with each partner state, the introduction of the ‘Article 6 Committee’ that controlled the EC Commission during its enforcement of the Global Approach, and the installation of EC Delegations in each Mediterranean partner state between 1978 and 1981 (Schumacher, 2005,
produced high start-up costs. These Euro-Med institutions, in turn, reduced transaction costs – e.g. the EC Delegations fulfilled an information and communication function for the EC (Bruter, 1999, p. 183).

Learning effects. The Commission started to learn how to implement a regional Mediterranean policy. Thereby, the officials engaged frequently in bargaining processes with representatives of the Mediterranean partner states. In so doing, the Commission adapted to the new policy challenges (Monar, 1999, p. 85). Over time, it became more efficient in the implementation of the financial assistance. Organizational adaptations did not only occur at the EU level but also “from below” (Pollack, 2007, pp. 22-23). Social networks started to engage in the EU Mediterranean policy framework (Schäfer, 2009b, pp. 199-200). Further, the collected experiences and adaptation efforts have spurred further innovations in this policy field. The EU Commission launched many Euro-Med communications on the basis of their experiences with the policy. These, in return have built the foundations of the following Mediterranean approaches of the EU like the Renovated Mediterranean Policy, the EMP, and the UfM. Innovations lead to Euro-Med institutions that realise the calculated interests of the participants more effectively. Hence, the EU member states continue with the chosen Euro-Med cooperation.

Coordination effects. Coordination effects are especially important because the Mediterranean policy has to be compatible with the linked EU system. The coordination effects in the Mediterranean policy are enormous (Monar, 1999, p. 85). The cross-pillar EU foreign policy (Stetter, 2004b) between the Council, the Council Secretariat, the member states, the Commission, the European Parliament (EP), and the Court of Auditors produce interinstitutional interactions. The EU Council Secretariat supports the EU Presidency to achieve consensus among the member states. The enforcement of the EU sanctions requires cross-pillar interactions between the member states, the EU Council and the EU Commission (Duke & Vanhoonacker, 2006, pp. 175-176, 178). Thus, coordination effects are necessary and significant despite the EU’s institutional fragmentation (Stetter, 2004b). In general, coordination effects increase the profits of the actors as others apply the same approach. The EU and its member states receive more benefits as the Commission continues to implement the EU Mediterranean policy. The Commission negotiated Euro-Med Agreements with the Mediterranean partners and hence the partner countries have committed to the EU Mediterranean policy. Thereby, the possibility of the EU member states increases to achieve their calculated benefits.
In addition, the rising use of the Euro-Med policy tools encourages investments in the linked EU system. The improvements of the EU system, in turn, lead to new ambitions in the Euro-Med partnership (Schäfer, 2009a, p. 87). E.g., the EC negotiated cooperation agreements with the Mediterranean partners and thus developed relations with the protagonists of the Middle East Peace Process. These have encouraged many joint declarations about the Middle East at the EU level (Smith, 2004, p. 64, 86). The institutional interlinkages have also occurred between the Euro-Med initiatives. The attempt during the formation of the UfM was to combine the multilateral EMP dimension with the bilateral ENP approach (Reiterer, 2009, pp. 330, 332). So, the value of each policy package is supported by the existence of the other one (Pierson, 2004, p. 150). This minimizes the partnership costs and leads actors to continue with the established Mediterranean policy.

Adaptive expectations. Drawing on the “self-fulfilling character of expectations” (Pierson, 2004, p. 24), projections about the further structural use of the policy encourages actors to channel their actions in ways that help to realise their expectations (Pierson, 2000, p. 254). Here, the EU and its member states calculate their interests in consideration to the Mediterranean policy. The Euro-Med partnership generates the ‘playing field’ for future calculations of the actors. If these preferences remain within this scope of action, the realisation of the calculated benefits will increase. The EU member states channeled the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union along their adaptive expectations. They calculated them on the basis of the Mediterranean playing field. French President, Sarkozy developed his initiative outside the expectations for the future structural use of the Euro-Med cooperation. Hence, if the realisation of Sarkozy’s initiative had been possible, the EU members could not have achieved their already expected Euro-Med benefits. That is why the chosen path of the Mediterranean policy continues.

Despite the rather weak and slow Euro-Med institutionalization (Xenakis & Chryssochoou, 2001, p. 109), self-reinforcing processes appear through its four features – set-up costs, learning and coordination effects, adaptive expectations. They support the chosen path of the Mediterranean policy. These positive feedback processes provide a strong incentive to focus on the single Mediterranean policy path. Actors continue to move down this track.

Self-reinforcing Activity in the Context of the Normative-sociological HI

According to the normative-sociological HI, the features of the self-reinforcing activity become visible in terms of socialization, norm diffusion and collective
preference-building (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 23; Pollack, 2010, pp. 24-25). Here, the logic of appropriateness, in contrast to the logic of consequentiality, comes to the fore.

*High set-up costs.* High start-up costs deploys through the installation of institutional procedures (interpretation and implementation of norms, rules, etc.). Therefore, actors delineate the situation and their identities. Before they pick the appropriate choice, they mull over the (most) appropriate set of actions (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 23). Hence, actors set in the motion, according to the logic of appropriateness. This logic is embedded in institutional practices and rules which are internalized by the actors through socialization. Thus, institutional practices organize knowledge through the logic of appropriateness and, in return, these internalized norms and procedures reproduce institutions when actors apply them in different situations (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 15; Peters, 2007, p. 29).

The EU member states delineate the Mediterranean situation in terms of European security needs and economic interests in the Mediterranean markets. Therefore, they construct the necessity to support regional integration through reforms. The EC member states and the Commission defined their identities in the framework of the Global Mediterranean Policy and established their appropriate rules. These included socialized time-consuming and complex procedures to implement the agreed objectives, their understandings about how the Euro-Med region should evolve, and their own experiences of regional integration. The Mediterranean partner countries should internalize this catalogue of appropriate behaviour which has leaded to contestations. When the EC member states have constituted themselves as Mediterranean actors through the fulfilment of this role (promoter of regional integration), they, in turn, established the Global Approach as the norm of reference. Hence, the Global Mediterranean Policy has reflected regional integration as the dominant or appropriate norm. E.g., the EC Commission called for a Mediterranean solidarity in 1972 (Schumacher, 2005, p. 129).

*Learning effects.* According the logic of appropriateness, rules, norms, and procedures constitute obligatory actions. Actors learn to apply them (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 24) through socialization. They apply them in iterative interpretations of situations (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, pp. 6-7, 9). Hence, when the Commission implements the Mediterranean policy, it must act according to the appropriate rules. In cases of non-compliance, punishment is possible. E.g., the EC Council decided to punish the Commission as its officials extended its mandate from the Council during the negotiations of
the Association Agreement with Jordan in 1997. The EU Commission started again, which was quite embarrassing (Monar, 1999, pp. 85-86). The EU member states, in contrast, learned to make package deals according to their heterogeneous Euro-Med interest constellations. E.g., the EU member states were able to ‘rescue’ the UfM (Emerson, 2008, pp. 1-3) and avoided the division of the whole EU. Otherwise, the French proposal would have harmed the logic of appropriateness around the dominant norm of regional integration between the EU and the Mediterranean partner countries. Instead, they continue the established Euro-Med track through the inclusion of the UfM. Concerning the Euro-Med institutional framework, actors like the Commission, the Council representatives, and the representatives of the partner states have learned to cooperate especially at the lower state-level and non-state level (Panebianco, 2003a, p. 10; Schwarzer & Werenfels, 2008, p. 4). Despite this, socialization and the increase of mutual understanding through the EMP remain very difficult (Solingen & Ozyurt, 2006, p. 73; Attinà, 2003, p. 193).

Coordination effects. Standard operating procedures enable actors to organize many immediate actions in a way that they become “mutually consistent” (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 24). The EU standard operating procedures were reproduced in the Euro-Med framework. The organization of the Euro-Med ministerial meetings along the same thematic lines as the EU Council (Bicchi, 2006b, p. 295) helps to implement the partnership. Models about appropriate action expand, because actors will apply their scripts of behaviour by creating other structures in the same way (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 5; Pierson, 2004, p. 138). On the one hand, the Mediterranean neighbours should mimic the European experience of regional integration (Pace, 2007, p. 664). On the other hand, new EU responsibilities immediately run into the partnership. The EU used its new competences in justice and home affairs to extend the Euro-Med cooperation in this policy field (Gillespie, 2004, p. 28). Through these coordination effects, the compatibility between the EU competences and its Mediterranean policy becomes increasingly interlinked (Schäfer, 2009a, p. 87). This interdependent web of the logic of appropriateness enhances the continuity of the Mediterranean policy because it “form[s] a complicated ecology of interconnected rules” (March & Olsen, 1989, p. 170).

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3 A group of Senior Officials on Justice and Home Affairs developed a programme. The EuroMed foreign ministerial meeting approved it in 2002 under the name – ‘regional cooperation programme in the field of Justice, in combating drugs, organised crime and terrorism as well as cooperation in the treatment of issues relating to the social integration of migrants, migration and movements of persons’ (Bicchi, 2006b, p. 298).
Adaptive expectations. The established norms, rules and practices do not only organize and support a particular knowledge. They validate the shared knowledge (Wendt, 1999, p. 188). The existing repertoire of rules of appropriate behaviour make revisions of the chosen trajectory difficult as this repertoire is widely valued (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 16). Despite that the Mediterranean partners are not following the appropriate behaviour, the Mediterranean policy continues because the EU institutionally dominates the established partnership. Hence, EU standard operating procedures reproduce themselves and thus deepen their value and their codes of appropriateness (Peters, 2007, p. 39). A Euro-Med institutional ‘taken-for-grantedness’ slowly arises. New Euro-Med strategies did not abandon existing institutional structures. The EU has complemented them (Reiterer, 2009, pp. 323-324). Euro-Med meetings take place regularly (routine), but shared understandings between the EU and its partners are still in the making and very contested (Panebianco, 2003a, pp. 6-7; Bicchi, 2006a, pp. 160-162). The legitimacy of the logic of appropriateness remains at low level.

Through the institutional embedded understandings, actors develop adaptive expectations about the future appropriate behavior in the Mediterranean policy. They adapt their appropriate actions in ways that help to make their social expectations come true. The French proposal was contrary to the adaptive expectations of the majority of the EU member states. Thus, groups of member states channelled this national proposal in ways that fulfil the social expectations at the EU level. Hence, the UfM became an appropriate action that maintained the developed Euro-Med ‘institutional-for-grantedness’. Adaptive expectations also occur at the civil society level. They are relatively viable but rather weak due to the inconsistent behaviour of the EU (Schäfer, 2009b, p. 199).

In sum, the shift of the Euro-Med path becomes increasingly unattractive. Collective understandings about the Mediterranean policy and its norms, and appropriate standards produce self-reinforcing processes and institutional inertia (Pierson, 2004, pp. 38-40; Wendt, 1999, p. 188). However, the norm of a Mediterranean solidarity that has been set-up in the framework of the Global Mediterranean Policy deploys a weak practical value (Schumacher, 2005, p. 129). In general, the normative-sociological self-reinforcing activities are more volatile and contested due to the dominance of the EU (unequal partnership) and external disturbances in the Mediterranean. This leads to much weaker socialization ambitions among the Mediterranean partner states and interrupts the Euro-Med institutionalization process (Panebianco, 2003a, p. 6-7; Reiterer, 2009, p. 320).
These four features of self-reinforcing activities that give rise to path dependent processes characterise many social networks (Pierson, 2004, pp. 24-25). They are ubiquitous. Nevertheless, self-reinforcing activities help to clarify interaction processes that are significant to explain why the EU still concentrates on its Mediterranean policy patchwork. Self-reinforcing processes in the Mediterranean policy means that the EU focuses on a single option - to develop Euro-Med integration within the EU foreign policy -. In addition, it implies that the EU continues moving down its chosen path: the creation of the Euro-Med region through economic, political and cultural cooperation. Even though the causing event, the initiation of a regional policy through the Global Approach, disappeared, it has a continuing influence on the further development of the Mediterranean policy. Over time, the attractiveness to switch to a possible better alternative decreases (Pierson, 2004, p. 19). The costs would increase remarkably, even if another Mediterranean policy option generated higher payoffs in terms of benefits and appropriateness (e.g. more equality, more balanced trade relations, and more effective conflict resolution).

Self-reinforcing activities in the Mediterranean policy constitute the point of departure on which to develop arguments about endogenous change. Their characteristics or patterns explain when change actual appear in the Mediterranean policy.

The Concept of Change

The EU Mediterranean Policy According to the Punctuated-equilibrium Model

Besides the concept of path dependency, the HI contains a concept of change. Historical institutionalists revert to the punctuated-equilibrium model (Peters, 2007, p. 77). Institutions or policies consist of phases of continuity and moments of critical junctures. The latter are moments of abrupt change from which a ‘branching point’ can emerge and lead the historical development onto a new track (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 10). The source of change originates from exogenous forces or shocks like an economic crisis (Pierson, 2000) or a revolution (Wendt, 1999, p. 188). According to this model, the Global Mediterranean Policy did not continue because of weak self-reinforcing activities and low costs of change. Hence, the EMP has leaded the Mediterranean policy onto a new path through the end of the Cold War (external shock). Then, the ENP add a further trajectory to the Euro-Med cooperation due to the EU enlargement in 2004. Thus, the EMP and the ENP can be interpreted as critical junctures. The EMP set in motion
new self-reinforcing processes as it has introduced an institutional framework to the Euro-Med cooperation. The relations experienced a huge step forward in qualitative (set-up of a political and cultural agenda) and in quantitative terms (increase of meetings) (Jünemann, 1999, pp. 49-60). The ENP, in contrast, has changed the path of regional integration in that way as the EU initiated a differentiated bilateralism. The EU focuses on each Mediterranean neighbour individually through tailored Action Plans (Bicchi, 2010).

However, starting from another perspective, arguments about continuity in the Mediterranean policy without critical interruptions are equally possible. The launching of the EMP, the ENP and the UfM has resembled ‘bounded’ developments. However, the self-reinforcing processes of the chosen Euro-Med track prevented that these initiatives have changed the trajectory of the Mediterranean policy. At best, external events opened windows of opportunities, but the members of the Euro-Med initiatives were not able to use them to a considerable extent. Thus, the core of the Mediterranean policy still presents the neo-liberal economic and financial partnership including economic “liberalization, privatization, restructuring, and deregulation” efforts in the Mediterranean partner states (except agriculture) (Attinà, 2003, pp. 185-186). This should prepare the partners’ domestic markets inter alia for the set-up of the Free Trade Area (FTA) with the EU internal market (Jünemann, 1999, pp. 44-45). The politico-security dialogue stagnated with the failed adoption of the Euro-Med Charter for Peace and Security in 2000 (Asseburg, 2005, p. 2). The cooperation on cultural and social issues received only low attention from both sides (Philippart, 2003, p. 216). Further, the aim to construct a cultural dialogue and to include societal actors in the establishment of a Euro-Med region through the third basket of the EMP did not develop within a new track with new self-reinforcing activities. In 1992, several MED programmes have been initiated with civil society actors; e.g. MED-Media (Jünemann, 1999, p. 57). The ENP, in turn, has developed on the basis of the Association Agreements (concluded in the EMP) and should complement the Barcelona Process. Further, the ENP and the EMP show similar objectives (Faath, 2007, p. 210). With the ENP, the bilateral component experiences a stronger emphasise, but it has been prominent since the beginning of the Euro-Med relations (via bilateral cooperation agreements). Ultimately, some analysts argue that the ENP Action Plans did not differentiate between the single Mediterranean neighbours and provided every partner the same “low-rewarded agreement” (Bodenstein & Furness, 2009, p. 392).

Thus, the punctuated-equilibrium model can be considerably stretched by argumentation. However, it is essential to note that critical junctures can end in
a new track, only when self-reinforcing processes did not achieve to establish the trajectory. The existence of an external force is insufficient to argue in favour of change or continuity. Thus, the point is that shifts can develop from the self-reinforcing activity as well. Then, change appears rather incremental (Pierson, 2004, p. 135) and as the result of endogenous institutional evolution (Peters, 2007, p. 79). Often, accumulated self-reinforcing activities remain invisible until an external event deploys it (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 22). But the source of change originates from endogenous positive feedbacks even if “the Peace Process, the fight against terrorism, Asia’s interest in the Mediterranean, and the economic crisis and the position of the [...] US president towards Arab-Israeli relations” (Balfour, 2009, p. 105) influence the EU Mediterranean policy.

The Mediterranean Policy According to Endogenous Types of Change

When analysing the development of the EU Mediterranean policy in the context of an endogenous change model, the results from the investigation of the self-reinforcing processes that are based on the strategic calculations, and the logic of appropriateness will be merged. Hence, in order to explain possibilities of endogenous change in the Euro-Med cooperation, the ‘calculus’ HI approach in connection with the ‘cultural’ HI approach provides the foundation for a model of endogenous change.

An endogenous path dependent development that culminates in a probably new track implies that institutions carry a dynamic element (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 7), which proceeds through the self-reinforcing processes. According to the rational HI, the dynamic institutional component occurs because institutions entail a bias which mirrors compromises or power constellations of their designers (Hall, 2010, p. 206, 208). Thus, institutional settings prefer some policies to the others, and thus some actors to the others (Aspinwall & Schneider, 2000, p. 17). E.g., the initiation of the Global Mediterranean Policy in 1972 reflected the interests of France and Italy rather than the preferences of Great Britain, the Netherlands and Germany. Hence, the Global Approach established asymmetrical trade relations in favour of the EC because the French and Italian governments wanted to protect European producers from the North African cheap goods (Schumacher, 2005, p. 80).

Yet, institutional outcomes can change the allocation of resources (benefits) among the actors (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 10-11). During the policy enforcement through the dynamic institutions, some gaps appear in comparison to the predetermined objectives and tasks (Streeck & Thelen, 2005,
These gaps emerge over time when actors design their package deals or when the official institutional functions differ from the actual implementation (Pierson, 1996, p. 131). Because of the self-reinforcing processes, these gaps are difficult to close. E.g., Tunisia detached the political dimension from the economic ENP dimension. Initially, the EU has conceptualised these as interconnected (Jünemann, 2004, p. 7-8). The Tunisian government concluded an industrial FTA in 2008 without establishing a dialogue about human rights and democracy with the EU (Bicchi, 2010, p. 215-216). Maybe through package deals, Tunisia could create a gap between formal rules and actual enforcement and thus has achieved its benefits.

Further, it is also possible that the established procedures of the ENP did not achieve compliance among the institutional members according to the logic of appropriateness. Thus, Tunisia can prevent itself from engaging in a normative-political dialogue. It exploited the institutional ambiguity of the normative-political dimension of the Euro-Med cooperation. According to the ‘cultural’ HI approach, the dynamic institutional component originates from the institutional ambiguities and the need for interpretation and implementation of the appropriate actions. Hence, institutional members can stop applying to a routine or a procedure as a result of the reinterpretation processes (Hall, 2010, p. 216) or contestation (Hall & Taylor, 1996, p. 21). E.g., the introduction of more co-ownership at all levels of the Euro-Med cooperation through the UfM suggests that the EU predominance is not any longer a standard operating procedure. The legitimacy of the EU dominance in the Euro-Med relations is increasingly contested. Self-reinforcing processes could not establish a sufficient logic of appropriateness. The institutionalization of the Mediterranean Policy is slow and conducive toward political factors and different interpretations of the rules (Panebianco, 2003a, p. 12). Finally, the possibilities of rule (non-)compliance and the use of ambiguities depend on the gaps between rules and their interpretation (broad or narrow) and rules and their induced practices (resolute or easy-going) (Mahoney & Thelen, 2010, p. 14, 21).

The gaps in the ‘calculus’ and ‘cultural’ HI approach emerge over time when self-reinforcing activities display between actors and institutional structures. They can result in endogenous change, which can lead the EU Mediterranean policy on a new track through four different ways: conversion, drift, layering, displacement (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 20-31).

Conversion. Actors interpret, calculate, and enact existing rules to new functions and purposes. They exploit the weak institutionalization and the political context...
(interest constellations) does not hamper this type of actions (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 26). For example, the EU decided to redeploy the third cultural chapter of the EMP after 9/11. The EU Commission detected an urgent need to introduce an intercultural and interreligious dialogue with the EMP partners (Schäfer, 2007). Further, the extended scope of action through new EU responsibilities in the field of justice and home affairs runs into the third cultural EMP chapter due to the deadlocked political security chapter (Gillespie, 2004, p. 28). Self-reinforcing activities in the third EMP basket allowed the redeployment of this institutional setting, which might induce an endogenous change.

**Drift.** Change can occur through institutional non-adaptation. Institutions change their impact as their surrounding environment shifted over the years. Self-reinforcing activities maintain high policy stability and the political context (many different interests) prevent policy revisions (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 24-25). E.g., the EU is captured between the promotion of democratization measures and the enhancement of stability and security in the Mediterranean (Jünemann, 2009, p. 41). Thereby, it prioritises the latter and incrementally detaches security from the democratization efforts (Jünemann, 2004, p. 7-8). But the developed self-reinforcing activities obstruct a solution and the political context shows heterogeneous EU interests on this topic (Schwarzer & Werenfels, 2008, p. 7-8). It is not appropriate for the EU to officially exclude the promotion of democracy from the regional integration model, which is in fact the dominant norm. In the meantime, the external circumstances shifted insofar as the EU interdependencies with the Mediterranean increased (e.g. in the field of fossil fuels) (Schimmang, 2008). Good diplomatic relations with the Arab elites are important. The stable democracy-stability dilemma of the EU may have changed the impact of the Mediterranean policy through modified external circumstances: The EU lost its credibility among the Arab populations.

**Layering.** Amendments introduce new rules along with the existing ones. They are possible in cases where the political context does not obstruct institutional revisions. Over time, new rules can change the trajectory as old institutions lose their grip (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 22-23). The EU has never abandoned the structures of the Euro-Med partnership. Each revision has complemented the existing Mediterranean policy (Reiterer, 2009, p. 323-324). Here, the interesting question addresses the relationship between the new and the old rules. Old institutions lose their grip when self-reinforcing processes of a new Euro-Med initiative begin to dominate. Then, the Mediterranean policy can experience an endogenous change. This would be the case if the partnership relied only on the ENP Action Plans, whereas the Association Agreements of the EMP disappeared.
Displacement. Gradually increasing salience of alternative institutional commitments occurs through the defection of the old rules in favour of the new ones. Instead of revisions, active promotion of different institutional forms appears, as the political context is not conducive for the official amendments (Streeck & Thelen, 2005, p. 19-20). E.g., alternative institutional forms are the special relationships between the single EU member states and some of their Mediterranean partners (Spain and Morocco, France and Algeria, Italy and Libya, Germany and Israel). There also exist special relationships between the EU and the single Mediterranean countries, such as the relationship between the EU and Morocco. They still remain as a very important feature of the Mediterranean policy (Schäfer, 2009b, p. 187, 193). If the salience for these relations outside the Mediterranean policy rises through self-reinforcing processes, the possibility of change increases, which might shift the Euro-Med path. In addition, the tide to securitization carries potential to shift the Mediterranean policy without revision. The fight against terrorism and the perceived need to intensify the migration management in the Mediterranean region lead to new rules (agreements with Libya on migration or the European Security Strategy and its impact in the Mediterranean). Yet, the civilian approach of the European foreign policy in the Mediterranean region partly counters this development of securitization (Jünemann, 2004, p. 3-4).

The above described types of endogenous change emphasise the significance to analyse the patterns of self-reinforcing activities that display in the institutional Euro-Med set-up. They allow a clearer argumentation about change as the punctuated-equilibrium model can provide. They detect, in terms of inherent institutional ambiguities or gaps between formal rules and actual enforcement, whether the development of the Mediterranean policy is path dependent or whether the advancement leads to a new track in the Euro-Med relations.

Conclusion

Path dependency means that once the Mediterranean policy has started down its track, the costs or barriers to reverse the regional-oriented logic of intervention of the Global Mediterranean Policy are very high. Other choice points occur – e.g. the French proposal of a Mediterranean Union in parallel to the EU – but the entrenchments of the institutional arrangements (the formal and informal rules) obstruct an easy reversal from the initial choice of the Global Approach through the passage of time. Thus, the French idea was subject to strong ‘Europeanization’ efforts (Aliboni & Ammor, 2009, p. 20).
The Euro-Med self-reinforcing dynamics can keep the vision to construct a Euro-Med region down its path. Thereby, the utility-oriented use of the policy preceded the development of common understandings through the application of standard operating procedures in the Mediterranean policy (Panebianco, 2003a, p. 7). In any case, the change is possible. Therefore, a differentiated model of change promises more explanatory force than the punctuated-equilibrium model. In respect to the endogenous change, the displaying self-reinforcing activities can culminate in shifts, which may interrupt the Euro-Med path. Perhaps, with the help of an external event, this situation can introduce a new trajectory. A consistent analysis, which the author will be conducting within the next two years, will shed further light on what is actually happening to the EU Mediterranean policy.

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